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A B S T R A C T
J,J. Cherns: Government and public information in the 
political system . A study of formation and 
systemic relationships, with particular 
reference to the Israeli political system, 
and appropriate comparison with the United 
Kingdom,
Government information organisation and processes are 
studied in limited aspects, often as public relations. This 
thesis attempts to present a comprehensive view of them in 
contexts of theoretical concept and real-world government.
A distinction is made between government and public 
information. Hypotheses are formulated to account for 
systemic differences, in terms of government constraints 
from a position of information superiority on the extent of 
countervailing power distributed to the public with 
information.
Influences on inputs, conversion and outputs demonstrate 
the extent of mediation which information undergoes within 
government. Transfers to the public are subject to further 
mediation in direct and indirect communication channels. 
Media, in symbiotic relationship with government, dominate 
transfer of political information. Discussion is mainly in 
terms of competitive political systems; but the influence 
of political structure is noted.
Government and public information are examined within 
the illustrative real-world example of Israel. Influences 
of history, structure, standards and government and public 
attitudes are noted. Systemic disarticulations in output and 
feedback are discussed and case details given of consequent 
information defects. Comparison with the United Kingdom 
emphasises disparities in government and public information 
which can exist between politically competitive systems. No 
decisive relationship to stability is apparent.
Theoretical concepts of response and steering of the 
political system are discussed with the aid of a political 
communications model. The cycle of information input, outpub 
and feedback has apparent discontinuities in terms of con­
straints in reception, diffusion through media, and thus in 
feedback, at the public extreme, and of response and steering 
within government, suggesting limitations in the continuous 
relationship implied in theoretical models. An alternative 
framework of assessment is suggested as an indicator of stability.
Influences for change are noted, in access and outreach 
development. Antithetical tension within the government/ 
media symbiosis suggests possible alternative government/ 
public communications.
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INTRODUCTION
Theoretical concepts of the political system have come 
increasingly to see it as a system of communications with a 
capacity for self-regulation through a cycle of information 
and feedback, Deutsch and Easton, in particular, have 
expressed these concepts in well-known abstractions and 
models. Other analysts, following structural/functional 
rather than pure communications concepts to formulate 
political systems theory, nevertheless accept the cardinal 
importance of information within it.
It is difficult, however, to bridge the gap between 
deliberately remote and oversimplified abstractions of the 
political system and the real world of government and other 
organisation operative within it. Government exercises 
power, it has elaborate organisation and uses media and 
other channels through which information, of which it is a 
major source and user, is transferred within the system 
and influences its operations. Transfers of information 
can be seen as distributions of power.
There has, however, been little research penetration 
into the information processes of government. They tend 
to be considered as a form of public relations. But 
government is far too large and complex a form of 
organisation for such limitations to contain its information 
processes. These are mediated by a variety of organisational 
goals, and they have obvious connections with the exercise 
and maintenance of power. They are processes involved in 
decision, as well as in public persuasion. This suggests 
underlying influences which may be hypothesised to account 
in general terms for the differences between what government 
knows and what it tells. Such differences express constraints.
What government tells is communicated to the public 
largely through the media, whose importance to government
(viii)
is indicated by the degree of specific government 
organisation to provide them with a regular and reliable 
supply of information, which Gandy (1982) has put in terms 
of subsidy, often seen as "managed” news. The dominant 
position which media have acquired as channels of 
communication for government is emphasised by the symbiosis 
which has developed between them, which also expresses the 
organisational needs of media for sources. This has been 
the subject of study, mainly from the media viewpoint.
Like governments, media are organisations whose goals affect 
information which they handle. Chaffee (1975) has described 
them as parapolitical organisations, exercising their own 
constraints. Details and mechanisms of these influences 
have been examined by Tunslall (1971), Schlesinger (1978) 
and others, and there is now a body of empirical evidence 
on the subject.
A great deal of information produced and distributed 
by government for the public does not have news value for 
the media, though important to individuals. These outputs, 
and the kinds of mediation associated with them are rarely 
considered by researchers into government communications, 
a field dominated by aspects of political rather than 
administrative communication. But all communication 
between government and public may have political 
significance.
Finally, the public itself is a complex receptor, made 
up of individuals with all sorts of orientations to governmert, 
whose perceptions of government are not necessarily drawn 
from what they receive through established channels of 
communication. Chaffee (1975) has drawn attention to 
problems of public understanding and of the diffusion of 
information from government, particularly through the media. 
This Ibs a clear bearing on concepts of feedback information 
and steering in theoretical models.
Thus questions of government information and its transfer 
to the public are studied from a number of viewpoints, across 
disciplines of political theory and communications. It is 
the aim of this study to try to take a more comprehensive 
view of them in relation to the operation of real-world 
government, in which the generalities of theoretical concepts
(ix)
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face the considerations of power and the machinery of 
governaent through which they must have effect.
Such a view requires comprehensive assessment of the 
factors which shape the generation and flow of information 
between government and public. The methodology adopted 
here for this purpose is to consider theoretical views of 
information as a factor in the political system, and to 
associate concepts of power and its expression through the 
structures and elements of government. This involves 
discussion of the power conferred and distributed through 
the cumulation and transfer of information. Some basic 
relationships are postulated in hypotheses linking government, 
power, information and public. The study progresses to a 
more detailed examination of "real-world" mechanisms 
involved in the formation and transfer of government 
information, and the effects and problems of media 
dominance of channels of transfer.
The full process of mediation is not operative, however, 
in non-competitive political systems in which media are 
state-controlled. The factors are discussed briefly in 
order to cover the full scope of mediation. Otherwise, 
the discussion (with occasional reservations) is in terms 
of competitive political systems.
Conclusions drawn from theory need testing agaihst the 
characteristics and political culture of a particular regime, 
in order to illustrate the complexity and interdependence of 
the factors at work. It is also important to display in one 
account all the information elements of an operative system, 
rarely seen in complete terms. For reasons given, this is 
undertaken in relation to the political system of Israel, 
drawing on Galnoor’s work (Steering the Polity, 1982), to 
which I am indebted for its approach as well as its close 
application to communications within the structure of 
Israeli institutions and society. Galnoor uses Deutsch's 
highly abstract concept of the political system as a complete 
network of communications, and especially the concept of 
steering. From this he develops an approach to comparative 
study of political systems and to analysis and classification 
of political development in Israel.
(x)
A brief comparison here between Israel and the United 
{(ingdom does not have scope to try to adopt a similar 
approach. But the political classification of the United 
Kingdom is well enough established on other bases» and even 
a summary comparison limited to information characteristics 
is sufficient to emphasise the differences in information 
origination and transfer which can exist between two 
politically competitive systems. The comparison highlights 
aspects of power and organisation within the hypotheses put 
forward; but it does not suggest decisive relationships 
between information and stability, though there are connections.
Further discussion of the concepts of the Easton model 
in the light of a political communications model by Meadow 
(1980) suggests a limited relationship between information, 
response and steering and a (£.iferent kind of framework of 
assessment, more closely related to power balances, is 
suggested.
Finally, the political system is never static. In the 
information relationships between government and public, and 
not least within the media which dominate the communication 
channels between them, a pattern of constraints emerges.
They can be held to be a contribution to stability, but they 
involve the exercise of various kinds of power, in government, 
particularly, on residual bases of authoritarianism as well 
as of man ipulation. Influences are beginning to modify 
government constraints. Modern pressures for more open 
government, often formalised in freedom of information 
legislation, are now well-established in a number of states 
as working features of public communications with government. 
These have resulted from public initiatives, through groups. 
There have been less coherent intitiatives from governments 
to improve their communications with the public, hardly 
classifiable in the same way as a coherent phenomenon, but 
at least an influence which,offers a further form of access.
Government initiatives are described here as ’’outreach”. 
Some have been politically committed, and for that reason 
have met with political reverse. But a good deal of quiet 
success has been achieved in less controversial ways in 
offering the individual public information relating to their 
personal relations with government, as a service on request,
(xi)
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with informal and personal means of access to the bureau­
cratic echelons of government. They may be held to involve 
mild forms of political socialisation from which government 
as well as public can benefit. They are further easements 
of constraint in communication between government and public, 
and all easements of constraint may be considered as wider 
distributions of power.
Such developments could have application, however, in 
more specifically political terms. This has a relevance to 
the dominance of the media as channels for political 
information and the effective constraints of diffusion of 
political information among the public noted by Chaffee as 
a field for research. The current, even if somewhat 
controversial. Social Responsibility theory of the media 
gives media no prescriptive monopoly over government 
communication with the public, and suggeste the possibility 
of government in competition with them. The question is too 
large to be more than mentioned within this compass, but it 
has an importance•in relation to media constraints.
It may be, of course, that it is not possible to 
expand public understanding of government outputs of 
decision and information beyond the personal, mainly 
administrative relationship, and that the sometimes elaborate 
distribution of information from government merely creates 
illusions about the distribution of power in the political 
system. Some features of the comparison between Israel and 
the United Kingdom give food for thought here. Political 
participation remains a minority interest.
At any rate, there is no lack of issues to explore. 
Within the scope of this study it is neither intended nor 
feasible to research deeply. Its concern is to bring to 
closer attention as a whole, using Israel as a working 
example, aspects of communication between government and 
public which tend to be studied in not always connected 
parts, within the framework of competitive political systems 
where the Interactions can be most extensively seen. It 
also tries to clothe some conceptual frameworks, necessary 
as they are to understanding of the political system;, with
(xii)
the elements of communication and power which affect the 
theoretical information cycle as the activator of operation, 
response and steering.
Hypotheses formulated in this field cannot be mathe­
matically verified. But if acceptable, they may suggest 
lines of research into the so far very superficially 
explored intricacies of government and public information, 
particularly behind the screens of decision processes 
within government, where the final interactions of 
information and power which determine adaptation and 
steering take place. Despite the easing of some constraints, 
these are the areas which government assiduously guards 
against penetration.
(xiii)

CHAPTER ONE
INFORMATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
"Government” and ^Public” Information
Information deriving from government and circulating 
within the community is a major constituent of information 
within the political system. This study is concerned 
essentially with concepts of "government information" and 
"public information", differences between them, how these 
may arise, and the part which they play in the operation 
and stability of the political system, "Government 
information" is used here to embrace all information 
received, collected and originated by government and under 
its control, "Public information" is used to denote the 
extent of government information which reaches or is 
accessible to the public, and the forms which it takes as 
the end-product of processes of information transfer within 
the political system. To differentiate between government 
and public information is to raise questions: how far is 
a distinction correctly made; why should it occur; and is 
it a haphazard product or a systemic phenomenon following 
principles which can be hypothesised and tested? ^
Basic reasons for a distinction can readily be seen in 
the size and political organisation of society. The larger 
the society the greater the differentiation of roles and 
institutions and the extent of working delegations. The 
gap between government and members of the society (the 
public) widens, and government may become remote. The 
public are unlikely to require as much information as 
government, or to be able to assimilate more than small 
fractions of it relevant to their needs and interests. 
Remoteness may be increased by the form of political 
organisation; government may not recognise obligations to
à ,3
provide information, especially that which it prefers to 
withhold, and the public may have no effective means of 
obtaining it. Moreover, though in theory( political 
organisation apart) all government information could be 
made available or accessible to the public, in practice 
distinctions of privacy and security are general. Few 
would want their personal tax, medical or criminal records 
accessible to all; and most would accept some retention 
within government of information vital to state security. 
Such selective retentions are elementary constraints in 
principle, if controversial in extent and control.
The existence of differences between government and 
public information is clear enough, as are some of the 
reasons. Differences may be found in all types of 
political systems in widely varying degree. The aim here 
is to examine how far they conform to general rules, and 
how far these affect the operation of the political system 
generally.
The literature of government and politics discusses 
some of these questions, and the modern movements for 
freedom of information are intensely concerned with the 
removal of constraints on government information and the 
regulation of those which must remain. But the literature 
does not distinguish clearly or conceptually between 
government and public information, though it may 
incidentally imply and discuss aspects of the distinction. 
Some of it describes organisational and bibliographical 
information linkages between government and public. Thus 
Ogilvy-Webb (1963) describes the information organisation 
of the British government; Scanlon (1964.) describes the 
organisation of Canadian government information, which he 
sees primarily as an exercise in public relations. Works 
such as Johansson's (198ii) are primarily bibliographic, 
identifying and describing the complex published outputs of 
government; an established periodical. The Government 
Publications Review, is essentially a professional 
discussion vehicle for librarians about these outputs.
These are restricted contexts. Cherns (1979» 1980) deals 
mainly with organisational and publishing aspects of
government information, but also discusses some attempts, 
particularly in Canada and Australia during the 1970's to 
link government information organisation more closely to 
the political system.
Others deal with government primarily as a source of 
news from the viewpoint of journalists and media. These 
are more concerned with political aspects and with 
information goals and motivations within both government and 
media. But they are incidentally illustrative rather than 
systematic about the influences within government on what 
is presented to the media to convey to the public, Rosten 
(1937), Cohen (1963) and Sigal (1973) have produced 
well-known works of this kind. Tunstall (1971) and 
Schlesinger (1978) deal more systematically with the 
origins and treatment of news material, including 
information from government and associated sources, as well 
as with media goals. Seymour-Ure (1968, 197^) discusses 
aspects of political communication, with detailed case 
studies illuminating the interaction of government, media 
and public in working political contexts.
Generality, however, the literature does not examine 
the concept of information and its distribution as distinct 
from communication between government and public as a 
general phenomenon of the political system. For this we 
need to look at the work of political theorists, the place 
and functions which they ascribe to information in their 
models, and the extent to which they deal with any 
differentiation between government and public information.
Information and Political Theorists
Information as a concept tends to lend itself to 
abstraction because of its very generality and to be 
semantically involved when considered in particular contexts» 
e.g, psychology or information science (McQuail, 1975» 15-16)* 
Deutsch's well-known definition of information (1963, 14^ 6)
as ”a patterned relationship between events" conveys a high 
degree of abstraction; but elsewhere (1967; 274) Deutsch
conveys the variability, relativity and elusive meaning of 
the term which are closely relevant to the political
context :
.•Ha
”The important thing about information 
is...the pattern carried by the signal 
and the relation to the set of alternatives 
available in the same information-carrying 
channel. (The meaning of this information 
is something else again; it depends on the 
relationship of the pattern of the signal 
to the set of patterns stored in the receiver)”•
This emphasises the message - the content - as well as the 
process, and its meaning to the receiver.
McQuail (1975; 15-18) brings Deutsches statement
closer to the real world of government, in terms of the 
"information expectations of the communicator" not 
necessarily fulfilled in the reception of his message. 
Communication of message content requires shared referents, 
objects common to the environment and experience of both 
sender (e.g. government) and receiver (e.g.public), if the 
message is to have a common meaning for them. This is 
clearly of great practical importance in the transfer of 
information within the political system. McQuail 
emphasises the ambiguity of the content of a message which 
may derive from "...the possible discrepancy between what 
is intended by the originator and what is perceived by the 
recipient". The originator can attempt to create 
ambiguities in his messages. Chaffee (1975) also carries 
Deutsch's statement into the political system, by drawing 
attention to the importance of diffusion of political 
information and the public's understanding of what the 
political system is doing.
Political systems theorists attach a pervasive 
importance to information as a connective and activating 
factor in political processes, but they are concerned with 
communication process rather than content, in broad 
conceptual terms. Their analyses view the political system 
as a set of abstracted phenomena and interactive mechanisms 
with a capacity to maintain themselves and adapt to change - 
that is, to persist. Thus Deutsch (1963)* the most 
"information-oriented" of these analysts, considers the 
dominant influence in the political system to lie in the
context :
"The important thing about information 
is...the pattern carried by the signal 
and the relation to the set of alternatives 
available in the same information-carrying 
channel. (The meaning of this information 
is something else again: it depends on the 
relationship of the pattern of the signal 
to the set of patterns stored in the receiver)"•
This emphasises the message - the content - as well as the 
process, and its meaning to the receiver.
McQuail (1975; 15-18) brings Deutsches statement
closer to the real world of government, in terms of the 
"information expectations of the communicator" not 
necessarily fulfilled in the reception of his message. 
Communication of message content requires shared referents, 
objects common to the environment and experience of both 
sender (e.g. government) and receiver (e.g.public), if the 
message is to have a common meaning for them. This is 
clearly of great practical importance in the transfer of 
information within the political system. McQuail 
emphasises the ambiguity of the content of a message which 
may derive from "...the possible discrepancy between what 
is intended by the originator and what is perceived by the 
recipient". The originator can attempt to create 
ambiguities in his messages. Chaffee (1975) also carries 
Deutsch's statement into the political system, by drawing 
attention to the importance of diffusion of political 
information and the public’s understanding of what the 
political system is doing.
Political systems theorists attach a pervasive 
importance to information as a connective and activating 
factor in political processes, but they are concerned with 
communication process rather than content, in broad 
conceptual terms. Their analyses view the political system 
as a set of abstracted phenomena and interactive mechanisms 
with a capacity to maintain themselves and adapt to change ■ 
that is, to persist. Thus Deutsch (1963)» the most 
"information-oriented" of these analysts, considers the 
dominant influence in the political system to lie in the
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capacity and organisation to gather and store information, 
and to transmit this in order to make decisions which 
modify the system's behaviour. He sees the political 
system as a network of communication channels for this 
purpose, forming a cybernetic, or self-regulating 
mechanism, continuously adapting itself to change through 
"feedback" information, which takes account of previous 
action in modifying subsequent behaviour. This is 
fundamental to the concept of "steering" the political 
system, which is the ultimate conceptual function of its 
machinery. We obtain from Deutsch this notion of a 
cyclical process of information.
But it is difficult, as many have noted, including 
Galnoor (1982; 8), to apply Deutsch’s concepts to a
concrete political system. In Easton's phrase (1965; 21):
"Deutsch has organised a conceptual structure around the 
message and its networks as the major unit of a kind of 
analysis that leads towards a theory of political 
communications". A view of the phenomena of communications 
structure and information transfer processes in relation to 
steering behaviour does not, however, convey a morphology 
of the political system, or indicate the depth of dimension 
through which it interacts with its environments and can be 
conceptually abstracted from them.
Easton gives more indication of dimension and 
morphology. "The conceptual orientation that I am 
proposing - systems analysis - is one that stems from the 
fundamental decision to view political life as a system of 
behaviour. Its major and gross unit of analysis will be
the political system"..... "The political system is the most
inclusive behaviour in a society for the authoritative 
allocation of values" (Easton, 1965; 23* 56). The
allocation of values involves the control of access to them 
by deprivation, obstruction and facilitation. We must note 
that this necessarily involves applications of both 
information and power ;information about values and 
circumstances, and the power to allocate or withhold those 
values. Easton (1965; 64^ -69) also makes an important
conceptual distinction between the political and
non-political environments within society as sources of 
information, and the discernible though moveable boundary, 
analytic rather than spatial, which marks the movement of 
information from one system of social behaviour to another.
Though equally concerned with information process 
rather than content, Easton brings the cybernetic concept 
more comprehensively than Deutsch within a morphology of 
the boundary-maintaining political system, abstracted from 
its environments, self-governming and responding, with 
capacity for regulation of stress and persistence dependent 
on feedback information, and affected by boundary-crossing 
influences expressed through information. Like Deutsch he 
deals with information in terms of inputs, or demands in the 
system, and their conversion into outputs, or decisions 
which may enable the system to adapt and persist through 
stress. In a "gargantuan oversimplification...in order to 
lay bare the essential framework" of political life as a 
system of behaviour Easton (1965; 109, 111) states the
processes of what he terms "dynamic response":
"Through its structures and processes the system 
...acts on...intakes in such a way that they
are converted into outputs.... The outputs
return to the system in the environment, or, 
in many cases, they may turn directly and 
without intermediaries back upon the system 
itself".
This is the essence of the process of information 
cycling between the political system and its environments.
It is, of course, no more than conceptually possible to 
regard this complex interchange of information in terms of 
the ordered flow implied in Easton’s models by input and 
output within or across notional boundaries. The political 
system is so indissociable from its environments that 
information percolates between them by what may be regarded 
as osmosis rather than boundary-crossing. The information 
environment can be seen as co-extensive with and all- 
pervasive in the organisation of society, comprising the 
total stock of updated knowledge and opinion within it, 
expressed ultimately from the minds of individuals. It 
cannot be circumscribed or classified in a political sense;
the political system is embedded in it.
The complexities of interchange emerge from Easton's 
well-known model of dynamic response (Fig. l). In 
"stripping the rich and complex political processes down to 
their bare bones" (Fig. 2) the osmotic rather than boundary­
crossing nature of the interchange is clearer.
The abstractions of Deutsch and Easton provide 
invaluable concepts, but they are not concerned with the 
actualities of government. They need to be brought closer 
to individuals and institutions. Downs (l957),in a 
theoretical elucidation of the governing of a particular 
type (democratic) of political system, provides some 
valuable general insights for our theme (though we need not 
follow here his specialised argument based on assumptions 
of economic rationality - the maximisation of personal 
economic benefit in attaining goals). Downs does express, 
however, both the relativity and content of information in 
a way much more closely related to the individual, the basic 
unit of the political system. At the same time some of his 
statements suggest the impracticability of trying to force 
information into specific conceptual moulds:
"Contextual knowledge... we define as 
cognisance of the basic forces relevant to 
some given field of operations. It is a 
grasp of relations among the fundamental 
variables in some area............ .
when we speak of an informed citizen, we 
will be referring to a man who has both 
contextual knowledge and information about 
those areas relevant to his decision-making
Information is data about the current 
development in and status of those variables 
which are the objects of contextual knowledge" 
(Downs, 1957; 79).
The informed citizen, in fact, organises and abstracts 
from his stocks of already assimilated information, and 
applies his discriminative abilities. But the political 
or other context cannot, limit the range of information which 
individuals may bring to bear upon a particular topic, if 
only because they differ in knowledge, perceptions and 
discriminative ability. This brings into question the very
(X
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Ibroad typological distinction which Downs makes between 
information acquired by individuals, as either "enter­
tainment”, solely for edification, however serious the 
context, and "non-entertainment information", used as a 
means to decision and including "political information". 
This is analogous to Easton’s distinction of political 
and non-political environments. But even within the 
defined economic rationality of Downs' model it does not 
seem possible to maintain such arbitrary distinctions 
between classes of information in the minds of«individuals. 
Downs is obliged to qualify his classification: 
"Entertainment sources sometimes yield political 
information as a surplus benefit" and "Some citizens 
also seek political information purely for its entertain­
ment value, because they enjoy political rivalry and 
warfare" (Downs, 1957; 215, 223)»
Nevertheless, Downs’ approach to a stated form of 
political system rather than to a complete abstraction 
begins to focus on operative government, in forms, 
typology and sources of information. It elaborates the 
notion of an information environment, from which there 
is selection for the political environment. Information 
sources include the governing party, which "publishes 
large amounts of information as an intrinsic part of its 
governing activities", other political parties, piblishers, 
interest groups and interpersonal contacts (Downs, 1957; 
222). We have here major elements in information transfer 
within a competitive political system.
Two important concepts emerge: the sources of an 
individual’s information in the political sense; and his 
own 'bontextual knowledge", of sources as well as data, 
which guides him in his evaluation and decisions. Both 
are important variables in circulation, absorption and 
effects of information within the political system.
Another approach to the political system is the 
structural/functional analysis characterised by the work 
of Almord and his associates. This is grounded in 
identification and analysis of the functions which must
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be performed within the structures of political systems 
if they are to continue as systems, regardless of the 
formal structures or institutional mechanisms which 
actually perform these functions. The resulting concepts 
of the essentials of the political system as an entity are 
still abstractions, but they directly relate the political 
system to the territorial state and its basis of power. 
Elements of power and compulsion which are incidental to 
Deutsch and Easton and confined within the economic 
rationality and political basis of Downs* democratic model 
are explicit in the input/output analysis which Almond also 
considers as fundamental to operation of the political 
system: "Legitimate force is the thread that runs through
inputs and outputs of the political system, giving it its 
especial quality and salience and its coherence as a 
system" (Almond and Coleman, I960; 7),
The framework is^  again, of inputs, conversion, outputs 
and feedback, the dynamic element in change. But Almond 
identifies input/output functions, such as interest 
articulation and rule application (I960; 17), from which
typology and transfer of information are conceptually 
indissociable, even if not discussed within the scope of 
the work. Its relation to functions within actual 
political systems brings Almond*s analysis also to bear 
on classifications indicative of types and sources of 
information. Thus output functions are specified as 
governmental, including outputs of rule. This analysis 
must lead into concepts of government and public 
information, channels of transfer and ultimate sanctions 
for enforcement.
In his concern with the political structures of 
modernising, predominantly non-industrial societies,
Apter (1965)goes beyond structural/functlonal analysis into 
the normative behaviour of government. He associates 
information and coercion in a dynamic and inverse 
relationship as "functional requisites of government" 
(Apter, 1965» 238), Varieties of government authority
resulting from the opposing relationships of the
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libertarian value of the individual and the supremacy of 
community goals support a classification of systems of 
government.
Apter (1965; 237, 30, 239, 238) makes, but does not
explore some important incidental rather than systematic 
statements about information in the political system. 
Government "...requires appropriate information in order 
to settle problems that arise" is unexceptionable. Cursory 
assertions associate information with education and 
identify it as the link between public and policy. Input 
sources of the information on which government decision 
must rest - "what might be called the feedback of decisiori' - 
are indicated. These statements include as a requirement 
for government decision "...knowledge of the limits within 
which the public will support action". This is an importait 
variable in the influence of information on government, 
which directs attention to the views of Chaffee (1965) on 
the understanding of members of the political system.
His direct relation of information with coercion 
inevitably brings Apter's analysis to associate information 
also with legitimacy and authority, that is with power.
But for analytical purposes he matches Downs* economic 
rationality by making assumptions about a flow of 
information "...freely available to voters and officials 
..." in the political marketplace in which an informed 
public and an informed government operate, as a basis for 
political choice (Apter, 1965; 30, 293)* Nevertheless,
both Downs and Apter recognise, outside their assumptions 
of rationality, practical inequalities of information 
related to power which distort the principle of political 
equality (Downs, 1957; 236) and are characteristic of the
modernising societies on which Apter rests his analysis - 
indeed, he recognises the need for modernising elites to 
have information that is "...not for the public" (Apter, 
1965; 175). Elsewhere Galnoor (1975) has explored the
inequalities of the marketplace for government information, 
distinguishing those who have access to it on preferential 
terms. Any assumption^’ of equality or inequality of
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information between government and public go to the root of 
the distinction between government and public information, 
and to the reasons for it.
Other statements about information in the political 
system are found in the literature of political culture - 
cognitions, feelings and evaluations of a population 
towards its political system. Almond and Verba (1963; 57-
58), for example, relate information to democratic 
competence, the power of citizens to influence government, 
and they relate "...valid information about political issues 
and processes" to this. They attempt to produce simple 
measures of citizens* information in terms of content, such 
as knowledge of political leaders, cabinet offices and 
departments. They rightly concede that "These simple 
measures...tap only a limited aspect of the dimension of 
knowledge". But the concentration on the recipients of 
information emphasises once more the importance of the 
receptivity and perceptions of the public in the transfer 
of government information, and therefore the degree of 
common referent.
Almond and Verba conclude from empirical studies 
that those who consider themselves politically competent 
are those with higher education or occupational status.
But these attributes (which imply greater ability to make 
use of information) also suggested by Downs (1957; 235)
and Apter (1965; 29-30) are not exclusive or supreme in
producing political effects. Almond and Verba (1963; 4-5-
62) also demonstrate that those who have low levels of 
political information often have a high level of opinions. 
In Mexico, for example, those with little or no education 
or information on public affairs who took positions on 
general political questions were twice as numerous 
proportionately as in any other country in their sample 
range. Opinions, however formed, educated or uneducated, 
are just as much part of the information environment of 
the political system as more formally organised influences.
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Thus we find in main analytical currents of political 
system and culture a variety of approaches which give or 
imply an indispensable though not uniform place and 
salience for information and its transfer between 
government and public. The input/output pattern, however 
expressed, the process of conversion which transfi^ nf'ti the 
former into the latter, and the cybernetic analogy of 
feedback information as an adaptive influence are common 
themes in varying degrees and forms of emphasis, as 
dynamically essential to the capacity of political systems 
to maintain themselves through change.
All theoretical approaches contribute to consideration 
of government and public information. But modelled 
abstractions of the political system are constructs 
deliberately remote from actualities. It is difficult to 
apply such general concepts as, for example, the inter­
change between the political system and its environments, 
without, like Meadow (1980), narrowing the focus much more, 
as indicated in his model at Fig. 3» adapted from Easton, 
to the actual elements in political systems through which 
interchanges are effected, with the many variable 
relationships involved. Meadow is primarily concerned to 
depict communication, but his model makes it clear that 
the cycle of information and feedback between government 
and public is heavily dependent for continuity on the 
articulation of the interests and goals of its elements. 
Power, though indicated within decision systems (government) 
is given no weighting in relation to other elements. 
However, the model is far closer to the working framework 
of real-world political systems.
Models, of course, are over-tidy. It cannot be 
assumed in real-world political systems that information 
follows orderly theoretical patterns of progression to 
adjustment of the steering. The very conceptual complete­
ness of theoretical abstractions may imply a degree of 
order not to be found in real-world political systems, 
which are the outcome of confused historical processes, 
and of complex and untidy heritages of political structure
U
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and culture which affect their attitudes to information as 
a political factor.
The real-world government is driven by balances of 
ideological and pragmatic forces which can manipulate the 
transferred content of information which it originates and 
controls. It is not cybernetically bound to feedback 
corrections if these are incompatible with its aims. It 
may set a course perverse in relation to information 
received, but rational in its ideological terms. And 
however cybernetically responsive, the system may be 
overwhelmed by the impact of new ideologies or circumstances 
which break the accustomed moulds of the political or 
social culture and confuse the mechanisms of adaptation 
and stability. Inputs or feedbacks too extreme or rapid 
for the system to absorb can destabilise the response of 
cybernetic systems.
Above all, the real-world system is based upon 
variable distributions of power which affect the ways in 
which government information originates and is controlled, 
and the machinery of government which deals with it. 
Variables such as content, circulation and articulation of 
the machinery of government and of communication channels 
may give rise to spasmodic, unevenly distributed, 
incoherent or ambiguous information which will be reflected 
in conversion, outputs and feedbacks. The analysis of 
power rather than system brings us to the operative 
political realities through which the traditional direct 
equation between power and information is expressed. In 
its simple form it is a statement of potential, realised 
only through complex interactions within the political 
system, to determine what Deutsch (1963; Ch. xi) has 
characterised as steering - in effect, making and applying 
the decisions which direct the affairs of the polity 
towards desired goals.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTEXT OF POWER
Power and Consent
Power is the essential attribute of state and 
government» which embrace specific territoriality and the 
exclusive right to the use of force, or coercion, in the 
maintenance of rule and order (Easton, 1971; 109» Dahl,
1976; 12). The potential for coercion underlies
acceptance of authority, on which the exercise of 
government commonly rests, "the untested acceptance of 
another’s judgement", closely linked to legitimacy,
"...the acknowledged right to command and the acknowledged 
obligation to obey" (Easton, 1958; 178).
The literature of power distinguishes between coercion 
the threat of deprivation to secure compliance (Lukes,
1974-; 17), and influence to secure compliance without
sanctions. Deutsch (1974-; 32) sees power as imposed from
outside, while influence involves appeal to thoughts and 
feelings. Wrong (1979; 53) suggests the practical limits
of coercion in government as more effective in restraint 
of behaviour than in causation. Influence can be a subtle 
and hidden expression of power, put by Galbraith (1985; 23)
as conditioned power "...exercised by changing belief. 
Persuasion, education or the social commitment to what 
seems natural, proper or right causes the individual to 
submit to the will of another or of others. The submission 
reflects the preferred course; the fact of submission is 
not recognised".
Dahl (1961), Parsons (1967), Arendt (1970), Bachrach 
and Baratz (1970), Partridge (1971), Lukes (1974^ ) and 
others discuss power from many aspects and with much 
semantic refinement. Government usually seeks legitimacy
17
»(j
through acceptance. The acknowledged obligation to obey 
must be eroded, and legitimacy undermined, by the use of 
coercion to a point at which it may secure obedience only 
at the cost of felt obligation. Authority and legitimacy 
are maintained by consensus, the pursuit of collective 
goals, achieved through influence in Galbraith’s sense of 
conditioned power. Consent is manufactured by **.. .defining 
issues or problems, assembling and distributing information 
...engaging in public persuasion” (Patridge, 1971; Al). 
Public opinion is prepared for prospective government 
policies and measures. This is the organisation of peopled 
attitudes, in which, accepting Galbraith's statement of 
conditioned power, there are elements of manipulative 
influence, not recognised as such by those influenced.
The manufacture of consent involves fostering 
agreement rather than encouraging dissent. The potential 
for either may be present. Information is not necessarily 
consensual, and submission seens a strong term for choice 
of a preferred course. Approval, support or assent are 
the objectives. There are judgements to be exercised on 
the basis of established attitudes and perceptions by both 
government and public about information put out by the 
former and received by the latter. The choice of preferred 
course may require conscious compromise on both sides in 
relation to the perceived importance of consensus rather 
than dissent. By no means all consensus is manipulated.
The choice is often deliberate between courses of action 
or assent in relation to the pragmatic considerations which 
affect political decisions.
Galbraith (1985; 23-2i) identifies organisation as
the most important source of power in modern societies, 
having its foremost relationship with conditioned power. 
Lukes {1971; 17) notes Schattschneider»s well-known
statement (i960; 71) that "organisation is the mobilisatioi
of bias”, and Bachrach and Baratz associate this with the 
discussion of power, as ”...a set of predominant values, 
beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ('rules of 
the game') that operate systematically and consistently to
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the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense 
of others” (1970; U3-U) •
In government these rules of the game may be seen to 
be even more than systematic and consistent. They are 
systemic, implicit in the nature of political organisation 
in which specific interests with a virtually monopolistic 
command of sources and machinery of information are
inevitably led to mobilise the bias of their position.
This is applied to processes of selection and emphasis, 
inclusion and exclusion involved in the formulation of 
government information and its transfer to the public as 
a vehicle of influence, and may be as much unconscious, 
the outcome of implicit conditioning by the internal 
culture of government (Galbraith, 1985; 39). as conscious
persuasion. Those who command power are subject to personal 
and collective impulses to maintain their position.
Conscious intent is no less systemic in government than 
implicit conditioning. We need not attach normative or 
moral values to the association of bias with information 
processes; it is inherent in any selection of data, and 
is not a pejorative term in this sense.
The processes within government are only part of the 
complexities, because government needs channels of 
communication in order to transfer information to the 
public, and these have their own characteristics and goals. 
They may be within government controlcr outside it; they 
may be completely autonomous, or subject to degrees of 
government influence. Between the original information of 
government and what is received by the public there is a 
complex chain of mechanism. A review of the ways in which 
government information is formed and projected, the 
characteristics which it acquires, and the influences to 
which it is subject in selection and transfer to the public 
will illuminate the working relationships of power, 
information and influence in the political system.
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The Authority and Superiority of Government Information
Government information carries a historical inheritance 
of authority. Authoritarianism, the principal form of 
government until modern times, regarded government 
information as the preserve of ruling elites. It was for 
them to decide what the public might know about the 
processes by which it was governed.^ Ruling elites were 
served by bureaucracies, whose secretive habits were in 
full harmony with the authoritarian philosophy that those 
outside the apparatus of government had no rights to know 
what those inside were saying and doing, what information 
was available to them by virtue of their position, and 
how they came to conclusions on it.
Though major barriers to the circulation of government
information have been broken down with the decline of
authoritarianism in many states it retains an authority of
its origin, sustained by deeper social forces. Sennett
(1980; 1, 18, 20) notes authority as an aspect of social
psychology involving desire for stability and order, bonds
of loyalty and fraternity, and ’the force of habituation".
Such forces are associated with government as an institution
The mere mention of government authority tends to confer2authenticity.
The modern state and its bureaucracy extend their 
authority far beyond the central machinery of government, 
into what is termed the public sector. They penetrate 
deeply into the community in economic and social regulation. 
(In states which are still authoritarian the public sector 
is virtually the state itself). The resulting bureaucratic
The British Parliament, whose Hansard is now an archetypal 
public document, treated public reports of its proceedings 
and debates (about public affairs) as a punishable breach 
of privilege until the late 18th century.
2Traces linger in the formal legend"Published by Authority" 
still to be found on some United Kingdom official documents, 
such as The London Gazette (whose origins exemplify the 
exercise of government power over dissemination of 
information - Handover, 1965; 1-18).
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organisation has been noted as a major source of conditioned 
power, by which bureaucracy "...has made the state 
extensively the instrument of its own purpose" (Galbraith, 
1985; 139).
To the basic authority of its information government 
adds formal powers (e.g. a periodic census of every house­
hold in the country) and an unmatchable range of access to 
sources and control of the machinery of collection and 
collation from which it derives an information superiority 
in range#' quantity and quality over other elements within 
the political system. Its authority and control promote 
acceptability of information and impede challenge. The 
complexity of many public issues on which government 
controls the essential information enhances its superiority. 
It is able to supplement its own information resources by 
drawing on those of special interests which often work in 
close co-operation with it, such as financial institutions 
and industrial and commercial organisations, particularly 
where it commands powers of patronage to key appointments.
Information Potential and Its Discharge; A Distribution 
of Power
This information superiority can be expressed as the 
accumulation of a charge, or "information potential", at 
the disposal of government. It sees discharges from this 
potential as positive or negative; positive if likely to 
further its purposes and gain public acceptance or 
approval; negative if likely to evoke public criticism or 
disapproval. Though government controls the content and 
intensity, e.g. the coverage, channels and emphasis, of 
discharges,their polarity is not immutable. It may be 
strengthened, reduced or even reversed in channels of 
transmission or in ultimate public reception. Nor is 
control of content and intensity absolute control of 
discharge itself. The most authoritarian regime cannot 
function without some discharge of information. Competitive 
political systems must function imperfectly without 
sufficient discharge of information from government for 
its performance to be assessed as a basis for choice. The 
power of discharge implies the power of retention, or 
constraint•
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In discharging or distributing information government 
will tend to try to select it for, or to give it positive 
potential, possibly by manipulating content as well as by 
presentation, and to neutralise, reduce or screen out 
negative potential. It will do this in accordance with 
the identifiable political values which it sees attached 
to it. The value with which it is intimately concerned is 
maintenance of its power, and we can call this attached 
value the power-content of the information. This is not 
intrinsic to the cognitive content of the information; it 
may be implicit in it, or separable from it. It may 
overlap explicatory values. For example, the most 
convincing explanation of why it is necessary to impose a 
heavy tax on some popular commodity is likely to have some 
potentially negative power-content. Power-content of 
specific information m^ derive from information previously 
distributed, or not within government’s control, or from 
relationships or associations in the minds of the receivers. 
Nor is it a fixed quality. The United Kingdom government's 
annual Report of the Northern Lighthouses Commission is low 
on intrinsic power-content, as is some obscure amendment 
to a specialised piece of legislation, but both are capable 
of developing power-content in some unusual circumstances. 
Some information may be intrinsically high in power-content, 
for example, information that the police have shot and 
killed a number of demonstrators against the government.
The contextual political circumstances will determine 
whether this power^content has positive or negative 
potential for government.
These are extreme examples, and the possible variations 
in relation to government information are very much more 
complex. But the tendency of government will be to make 
the most of the power-content of information for its 
purposes, and in any case to try to limit or reduce the 
power-content distributed to the public. It may attempt 
to suppress information, in the above example, of what 
might be regarded as a brutal massacre, or not mention the 
number of casualties, or represent the demonstrators as 
subversive agitators, or claim that the police were
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provoked to fire in self-defence* or link this information 
with other information to suggest that it has successfully 
halted an insurrection. Whatever the information may be, 
forms of content and presentation will be used to turn it 
to government's advantage, or lessen disadvantage.
The most elementary purpose of discharge, or 
distribution of information is basic to government - to 
secure compliance with outputs of rule and regulation.
The public must know what to obey. Beyond that are legal 
and conventional obligations on government to give account 
of its conduct and decisions. A great deal more information 
is distributed in the exercise of Galbraith's conditioned 
power, effort to obtain persuaded belief, which he regards 
as .central...to the functioning of the modern economy 
and polity and in capitalist and.socialist countries alike". 
Galbraith is in fact maintaining that this conditioned 
power is systemic in much modern government, regardless of 
its nature.
Power-Content and Public Countervailing Power
Distribution of power-content of information, however 
basically cognitive for the recipient - a simple accretion 
of knowledge - is a potential transfer of power, in the 
possibility of intrinsic or contextual evaluation which it 
confers. Evaluations are formative of opinions, which may 
be expressed to government through channels of articulation 
and aggregation. If supportive these enhance government's 
authority. But critical or oppositional opinions may 
influence government to refrain from or modify some course 
it would otherwise have taken (or to take some course it 
would otherwise not have taken). This potential to 
encroach on government's freedom of action is a form of 
public power by way of response to transferred information 
as the public sees it. It is basic to what Galbraith 
(1985; 80-81) calls countervailing power, a collective
response called into being by the exercise of government 
power, and expressed through interost groups and organisa­
tions. Clearly, public countervailing power derived from 
government information received is more likely to be
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effective when organised or aggregated. In extreme cases 
public countervailing power can be coercive, for example 
strong, possibly violent public demonstration which forces 
its will on government.
In terms of power-content we may distinguish between 
two main classes of information from government, adminis­
trative and political information. Administrative 
information is distributed as an intrinsic function of 
government, and comprises basically the regulatory and 
administrative laws and directives and other formally 
prescribed and mandatory information relating to the 
continuing relationships of citizen and government, which 
incumbent governments continue and new governments take 
over. Unless some significant change occurs or is 
contemplated it is only marginally the political concern 
of incumbent government. Its substance generally requires 
all or most of its power-content to be distributed with it, 
but this is more an enhancement of government than a basis 
for public countervailing power; it is a manifestation of 
authority. Nevertheless, government often has adminis­
trative discretions in forms of presentation and 
availability, through which some influence on power-content 
can be exercised.
Administrative information also comprises outputs of 
advice, reports and reviews which often relate closely to 
government activities and policies, and government has 
much more discretion in this. It is closer to political 
information, concerned with current considerations, 
decisions, policies and actions of government, which are 
often the subject of political controversy. It is therefore 
not only "news”, and thus of close interest to the media, 
but it is also the basic material of government image- 
building and the manufacture of consent. Its power-content 
will be manipulated accordingly to produce positive public 
reactions and to minimise accretions of public counter­
vailing power.
Manipulation of information may frustrate its purpose 
if it goes so far as to be in plain conflict with 
observable fact. It then tends to produce negative
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instead of positive potential which it was meant to achieve. 
There comes a point where manipulation can no longer bridge 
the discrepancy between visual evidence or commonsense about 
human and political behaviour and the information which 
issues from government. The result is to undermine the 
credibility of the information. No amount of explanations 
attributing shortages of food or goods in the shops to 
temporary causes or doctrinaire rigidities of belief will 
ultimately prevail in acceptance by the public against the 
constant sight of empty shelves in the shops and a thriving 
black market in the commodities of shortage. The public 
becomes aware that the information it is receiving is meant 
not to inform but to obscure. Persistent unemployment 
conveys more information to the public about government 
policies than plausible explanations that it is a pasàig lia^ 
or even that it is necessary in the longer-term public 
interest, particularly if alternative policies are apparent.
If information loses credibility it gains negative 
potential, and the government sources of it lose authority. 
Their decisions and explanations no longer carry the 
authenticity and acceptance which is an attribute of 
government information in the eyes of the public, and 
acquire characteristics of propaganda, dissemination of a
doctrine.
To retreat from such a position is to lose further 
credibility as a screen of manipulated information issues 
from government in order to disguise a change of ideological 
direction. It is polittoaLIy naïve to assume that manipulation 
of information by government is always unidentified as such 
by the public, which accepts that governments have difficulty 
in terms of ideology, prestige and maintenance of power in 
making open admissions of doctrinal error. The manipulation 
of information may be seen in such circumstances as a 
nominal deffence against the augmentation of public counter 
vailing power which an unsustainable manipulation created 
in the first place. There must be limitations of credibility 
on the extent to which information from government can depart 
from overt actualities and retain authenticity in the publi 
mind.
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The known or suspected retention of information or 
power-content within government may in itself augment 
public countervailing power. This situation is most real 
for government in political systems where there is 
nominally effective distribution of power-content with 
information. Nevertheless, public dissatisfaction with 
the information received from government, even if it can 
find no effective channels of expression and aggregation, 
is rarely without some influence on government in the 
long term, if only to evoke some more coercive means of 
sustaining authority than persuasion. Apter's pivotal 
relationship between information and power is relevant. 
Growth of public countervailing power in relation to 
information from government is implicit in the modern 
movements for freedom of information, the right to know 
and open government, which penetrate and weaken government's 
command of discharge from its information potential.
There is now an extensive international literature on these 
intertwined concepts of public availability and access to 
government information.^
It is a straightforward proposition in principle that 
government information generated and collected by public 
appointees at public expense is public property, to which 
access should be constrained only on defined and 
demonstrable grounds of public interest determined by some 
authority independent of executive government. Acceptance 
of this proposition would be anathema to authoritarian 
government in which such public rights are not recognised
^*Open government is complemented by the "right to know • 
Goren (1979; 29) dates the expression of this concept as
late as 19i^ 5, as a function of the citizen's right to
criticise government (she writes on ^ ,,and to enjoy rights and freedoms which can be protected only
by adequate information.
^•A useful bibliography which documents the present position 
of developments in countries with established legislation 
and practice is to be found in a United Kingdom report 
(Civil Service Department, Disclosure of Official 
I n f o r m a t i o n .  1979; A 1^3-50TI
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in the political structure. But even in nominally non­
authoritarian political systems it is a notable demonstration 
of the persistence of ingrained inheritances of historical 
authoritarianism that movements against constraint of 
information from government are surprisingly modern. The
successes achieved in recent years may be more symbolic 
than effective; concessions won may often be little used 
by the public at large. But they diminish the area of 
discretionary government constraint, and the consequent 
wider scope and availability and accessibility of government 
information must have an effect of augmenting public 
countervailing power.
The Public Dimension
There are further influences on the complete process 
of transfer of government information to the public, not 
least in the characteristics of whatever communication 
channels may be used. But public receptivity and perceptions 
are the final factors in communication and impact of content. 
These can never be accurately predictable. Government itself 
is not always organisationally a tightly demarcated source 
of messages. But the public is a highly diffused receptor, 
physically definable within the spatial boundaries of the 
state, but otherwise an amorphous collectivity of individuals 
with whom the extent and precision of common referent with 
government often topic-specific, fluid and uncertain. 
Messages from government, as they reach the public, about a 
devaluation of the currency may encounter many different 
degrees of indifference, understanding or misunderstanding. 
Messages about the harmful effects of smoking, or a 
reduction in income-tax will register more uniformly on
’A League of Nations Conference of 1927 discussed barriers 
to freedom of information. A basic international forum for 
views was established at the United Nations International 
Conference on Freedom of Information as late as 194-8. The 
subject has since had much discussion in the United Nations 
and Unesco contexts, the former seeking to formalise the 
right to receive and distribute information, the latter 
(controversially) seeking to establish a right of control 
in developing states over the reports of foreign media organisations operating within them (Canada, Task Force Report;
II. 5-6).
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broader and less differentiated audiences. A motorist may 
be indifferent today about the price of petrol, as long as 
his employers are paying, but acquire a sharp political 
interest tomorrow if government proposes that he should in 
future pay himself out of taxed income.
Almond and Verba (1963; 33 et seq.) have identified a
range and mix of orientations to government which 
individuals may exhibit out of the differences in their 
acquired knowledge, interests and perceptions. A message 
from government may call any permutation of these variables 
into response. Easton's conceptual statement (1965; 69);
"...a person might act in any analytically differentiated 
role without changing his setting or empirical role", 
expresses the fluidity with which information may give rise 
to individual response. Communication, if process can be 
separated from content, is a necessary condition of 
response formation; but content is the activator of 
referent and response, and the pattern of meaningful 
communication between government and public is in practice 
an extremely complex factor in the operation of the 
political system.
Chaffee (1975; 95) emphasises the "support-oriented"
and "authority-directed" view of Easton's analysis of the 
political system, and draws attention to the importance of 
members' understanding of what the system is doing. This 
must be determined partly by the diffusion of information 
within the system, and this must be related to channels of 
communication and public orientations and consequent 
perceptions of a particular item of information. Clearly, 
there is a relation between diffusion and public counter­
vailing power. There is also a reverse dimension. What 
does government receive and understand from the public 
through possibly faulty or inadequate feedback channels? 
Public countervailing power is also a potential; to be 
effective it must have a means of discharge to government.
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riovernment and Public Information; A Hypothetical Framework 
All these complexities are contained within the 
comprehensive abstractions of political systems models.
The many variables involved can be regarded as part of 
the allocation of values within Easton's approach to 
adaptation, stability and persistence, or as contained 
within the structural and functional relationshiis discussed 
more particularly by Almond and Apter• But the direction 
rather than the mechanisms of steering which determine the 
attainment of system objectives must rest on transfer and 
retentions of power with information, within systems of 
government with elements of ideology, authority, bureaucracy, 
communication channels and public perceptions. Their 
interactions produce differences between government and 
public information.
We can at this point usefully summarise the primary 
relationships of government and public information so far 
discussed within three hypotheses which provide a 
systemic framework. They are, of course, operative within 
the conditions, power-distribution, related structures and 
conventions of particular political systems; but they 
are applicable in principle to all;
1. Government and public information as defined 
are neither co-extensive in content nor 
identical in form;
2. The discharge of information from government's 
information potential tends to restrain public 
countervailing power which may be derived 
from it;
3. For this purpose government tends systemically 
to emphasise the positive and to reduce the 
negative potential,as it sees them, of 
information which it distributes.
The discussion which follows of the processes of accumulation 
and discharge of information by government will illustrate 
how intimately the systemic influences are embedded in them.
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CHAPTER THREE
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POTENTIAL: 
FORMATION AND TYPOLOGY
The Collection of Government Information
Collection of the information which underlies its 
outputs of decision, action and regulation is a constant, 
basic government activity. The instrument of government 
especially involved is bureaucracy.
The theory of bureaucracy as an indispensable adjunct 
of government and other forms of organisation has an 
extensive literature, stemming largely from the work of 
Mosca (1896, tr.l939) and Michels (1911» tr.l962) and 
Weber (tr.l9i47, 1962). Modern sociologists and management 
and organisation theorists, such as Dimock (194-4-)» Blau 
(1955» 1956)» Simon (1957) and Grozier (1964-) have much 
modified Weber’s concepts of the ideal and rational 
bureaucracy in a framework of legitimacy and authority.
Apter (1965; 152-53» 221, 259) discusses aspects of
bureaucracy in modernising states, in technical and 
political roles.
Allbrow (1970; 54-105) discusses seven modern
concepts of bureaucracy, of which ’’Bureaucracy as Public
Administration”, and ”Bureaucracy as Administration by —
^•Allbrow (1970;16) traces the origin of the term to 
de Gournay in 1764 and notes its early association with the 
arrogation of power by officials. Cremieux-Brilhac vJ.9/^ » 
14) cites a notable early modern bureaucrat, Sebastien 
Bottin who, as Secretary.General of the Prefecture of Bas- 
Rhin, published in 1788-89 the first in his series of 
Statistical Annuals, which he developed into a mine 01 
demographic, economic and sociological information - a 
forerunner of the systematic organisation of information 
within modern government.
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Officials" convey the sense of a communication function of 
government within which questions of organisation, 
efficiency, rationality and power involved in the 
discussion of the phenomenon itself may be subsumed.
Allbrow discounts the idea of "Bureaucracy as Rule by 
Officials", considering bureaucracy as a component of 
government rather than government itself, though it may 
acquire power.
The political and bureaucratic echelons of government, 
in working combhation, exercise the authority and carry on 
the affairs of the state. The political echelons hold, by 
whatever elective or other process they attain it, the 
power and responsibility of directing these affairs and 
of making the necessary decisions. The bureaucratic 
echelons consist of those salaried and permanent officials, 
organised into departments and hierarchies, whose basic 
functions are to serve and advise the politioaL echelons 
(which involves informing them) in their decisions, and 
to give effect to them; to seek political decision as 
necessary for the processes of government; to maintain 
continuous administration of the regulatory outputs of 
government.
Casual and 'systematic collection of information are 
diffused throughout the machinery of government, in day-to- 
day administrative casework and in organised collection 
operations. The accretion of information is continuous 
and fragmentary over the whole field of government.
Diversity and diffusion make it impracticable in any 
sizeable government organisation for any one hand or 
office to control it. The quality of the information 
product is affected by both internal and external standards.
The internal standards are those of bureaucratic 
efficiency, objectivity and integrity. These vary greatly 
from state to state. LaPalombara (1963; 10) notes that
classic Weberian attributes of hierachy, responsibility, 
rationality, professionalism and discipline may be largely 
irrelevant to the needs of less developed countries or 
unattainable within the concepts of their societies.
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Skills and orientations of administrative cadres may be 
inadequate at managerial levels, where the collection and 
processing of government information are organised. 
Relatively scarce skills and abilities of higher adminis- 
•trative cadres may draw them into the political rather 
than bureaucratic orbit. Low standards may result from 
poor remuneration and status, particularly in contexts 
of petty corruption. Lack of co-ordination or over- 
compartmentalisation within bureaucracy may confuse 
responsibility for collection. In highly developed 
societies bureaucracy may be penetrated by influential 
pressure groups (Key, 196^; 14-7-A8) which import or
inject information organised in their interests.
The variables in internal standards are complemented 
by those in external standards, particularly by the 
affective orientations, the feelings about government or 
the political system,of the population which supplies the 
majority of government information - the public. Very 
high rates of taxation generate evasion not only of tax 
but of information about personal or corporate finances. 
Governments imposing unpopular policies have difficulty in 
collecting relevant information. Information sought by 
government may be seen by businessmen, trades unions or 
other interests as associated with government policies 
which they consider hostile and. have no wish to assist 
with information. Political divisions may generate 
suspicion. Few types of information sought by government 
can be regarded as politically value-free in the minds of 
all respondent Individuals and organisations.
Government may also be seen as over-demanding 
information to the point of nuisance, causing its requests 
to be treated with perfunctory inaccuracy, or ignored. 
Requests for information may not be easily intelligble to 
respondents, who may give it by proxy. Widespread minor 
inaccuracies cast doubt on the accuracy of statistical 
consolidations•
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Governments themselves may influence input information 
at source ly comims^ning it. The composition and terms of 
reference of official committees are almost invariably at 
the discretion of government. The "whitewashing” committee 
is a well-worn device to put preferred information on the 
authoritative record.
Perfection in the collection of government information 
seems unlikely even in the best-organised bureaucracies 
and the most co-operative and literate of populations.
The quality, coverage and objectivity of collection must 
be at least questionable on some occasions in all 
bureaucracies, and at least dubious in some. The full 
details of collection and compilation are usually known 
only to those who organise and carry out the work, and 
inaccessible to others. There is little basis on which 
it can be publicly challenged. The context does not 
necessarily corrupt the function or undermine the integrity 
of bureaucrats, who may be fully aware that if perfection 
is unattainable, imperfections can be absorbed into 
information which, at least, cannot be refuted. Whatever 
its standards, however, information collected by bureaucracy 
is the core of government information potential and the 
basis of further processing within government, though it 
must often be an approximation, even if a close approximation, 
to the actualities - the best information available within 
the internal and external circumstances of collection.
All this mass, variety, detail and accretion of 
information builds up the superiority of government 
information. The sources, motivations and interests 
involved in its collection are primarily bureaucratic.
Though conscious intent may be a factor in deciding what 
information, and in what forms, to collect (or not to 
collect) it is likely to be marginal in political rather 
than bureaucratic terms. The political echelons of 
government have only peripheral contact with this largely 
routine and undisplayed activity of government, most of it 
continuing regardless of changes in political direction.
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Government information potential does have political 
inputs, from political parties and their declared policies 
in relation to information collected or collectable and 
from parliamentary institutions, whose debates and 
proceedings draw on political constituency and special- 
interest sources. Much of this information is equally 
accessible to public and to government, but parliamen­
tarians and bureaucrats may have extensive information 
exchanges on preferred terms behind the public scenes 
(Galnoor, 1975), (Norton, 1985; 83-87). Some parliamen­
tary proceedings may not be published (e.g. committee 
proceedings in some parliaments) though bureaucrats may 
be closely involved with their work. Some parliaments, 
of course, particularly where there is no political 
competition, have very formal roles and produce virtually 
no information.
The media are also a source of information for 
government, of opinion rather than fact in terms of 
organised information, though investigative journalism 
can sometimes bring to light information inadequately 
known within government, such as the effects of housing 
or welfare policies on which the bureaucracy lacks a 
"fieldwork” as distinct from statistical approach.
Moreover, where the machinery of government is poorly 
co-ordinated, government departments may sometimes obtain 
more information about each others' activities and policies 
through the media than they do from each other. In states 
where the media are completely controlled by government, 
input from the media is "internal", reflecting currents of 
policy which often give information and clues to the 
bureaucratic and political echelons.
Added Values of Government Information
The information potential is not a simple matter of 
volume, variety and reliability. The intrinsic value of 
its content is enhanced by its concentration within the 
bureaucracy, where it acquires added value of:
1
continuity and accumulation» building up 
a record against which the significance 
and proportion of accretions may be 
measured (e.g. changes in population 
composition; distribution of wealth 
and incomes);
association, relating types or items of 
information on particular themes (e.g, 
changes in imports in relation to customs 
duties; the cost of providing medical 
care for geriatrics); 
internal government co-ordination» 
facilitating association of information 
gathered by different departments.
Bureaucracies with effective co­
ordination derive a greater added value 
than bureaucracies in which deficiencies 
of organisation and control impede co­
ordination;
incontestability § a valuable attribute of 
government possession of the only information 
of its type or coverage available; there 
is no other basis on which its content and 
accuracy can be challenged.
A Typology of Government Information
A brief typology of government information potential 
is suggested below. Types of information have characteristics 
which bear on use. The typology suggested is not exhaustive, 
nor are the types mutually exclusive or always consciously 
defined within government itself. Any item of information 
may be appropriate to several classes according to the 
content and the context in which viewed. The feasible 
combinations are an indication of the flexibility of the 
information sources which government is able to use in 
selecting, presenting or withholding information in pursuit 
of its goals.
d.
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Information within government may be considered as:
a. Primary information» as it arises or 
arrives in the form of data» reports 
and general administrative detail*
This raw material of government 
information potential is divisible into:
i. particular and personal information» 
identifiable with individuals and 
organisations» often gathered under 
pledge of confidentiality» e.g* 
tax returns; medical records; 
ii« generalised information» relating to 
topics or activities in impersonal 
and generalised form» usually consolidated 
from particular and personal information 
(e.g. criminal statistics consolidated 
from records of offences; trade 
statistics compiled from details of 
transactions). Generalisation is a 
major and exclusive added value of 
government information and its superiority.
b, secondary information» the recorded discussion 
experience» opinion» advice» recommendation» 
and decision with which primary information 
becomes associated. History and ambience» 
records and precedents set a framework
for consideration (Vickers» 1965» 15)*
It is the accumulated memory of government» 
the substance of dissociation and re­
combination (Deutsch» 1965; 85-86) at the
disposal of bureaucracy» which controls it.
From another point of view primary and secondary 
information may be classed as:
c. active information» used in processes of 
advice and decision within government» 
possibly published in detailed or 
consolidated form» with or without 
accompanying explanation» by obligation
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or convention, or at government discretion,
d. passive information«, accumulated within 
government without positive use. It may 
be made available outside government at 
bureaucratic discretion, sometimes to 
special interests and at some compensating 
advantage to government (Galnoor, 1975). 
Passive information often has a latent 
power-content which events may activate. 
Meanwhile it is simply not known to the 
public, or often even to bureaucracy 
beyond its immediate ar^of collection.
In terms of public access government information is 
either:
e, open information, published or freely 
accessible in principle to the public. 
Access in principle requires government 
organisation to be effective in 
preservation and systematic recording. 
Government papers are extensively 
"weeded" before passing into archives, 
and information may be destroyed, 
sometimes deliberately, but usually 
because no further interest is seen in 
it. Effective access requires competent 
archival resources within government, 
and often legislative safeguards,
f, constrained information, deliberately 
restricted in access or circulation by 
formal or informal rules. Constraints
on information operate within government, 
and between government and public.
They are common to all forms of organised 
government, usually formalised in 
legislation conferring extensive dis­
cretionary powers on "the authorities", 
or enforced in convention or doctrine 
(e,g, collective responsibility for
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government decisions). Constraint is 
difficult to contest, or even identify, 
because of its formality and subject- 
matter, and is correspondingly liable 
to political and bureaucratic abuse to 
avoid embarrassment or to pursue hidden 
objectives. Constrairt also emphasises 
the perceived power-content of the 
information to which it is applied. It 
is usually maintained by bureaucratic 
procedures for "classifying" documents 
with formal degrees of restriction.
Bureaucracies which administer systems 
of constraint tend to use such devices 
to the point of stultification, and 
constraint is often maintained by inertia - 
the absence of systematic declassification 
procedures. Constraint is the most 
discussed and contentious aspect of 
government information.
The primary information bases of government are a 
systemic product of administrative routines and operations 
in the hands of the bureaucracy. The added values which 
they acquire are similarly derived from accumulated stocks 
of information and bureaucratic knowledge of how to 
comtsne, select and associate them in relation to specific 
topics. The political echelons of government are 
functionally remote from these processes, impermanent in 
office, and thus unlikely to be able to have more than 
fitful and particularised influence on them, confined to 
occasional topics which they see as of significance to them­
selves. The very continuity of information collection, 
however, tends to throw political interference with it 
into relief (e.g. attempts to change the form of housing 
statistics which are regularly published).
Bureaucracy itself has no absolute standards of 
efficiency or motivation. Its composition and standards 
are the product of the ambient political and social culture.
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Individual bureaucrats have goals» discussed by Downs 
(1967; 11-88), and self-interest and bureau goals tend to
be uppermost in their behaviour. Moreover, bureaucrats are 
close to their departmental functions and interest; 
overriding bureaucratic interests are largely limited to 
conditions of service, status in the community and relations 
in general with political echelons. In the wide diversity 
and diffusion of information collection in which they engage 
for departmental needs and purposes it would be next to 
impossible for any one hand or office within the bureaucracy 
itself to control the collection of government information 
in any detail. It is doubtful whether such a collective 
concept of government information would be recognised by 
individual bureaucrats in their departmental work-places.
Once collected and collated, however, information 
becomes the basis for advice and policy formulation both 
within bureaucracy itself, and between bureaucracy and 
political echelons. At this stage it begins to pass 
through processes of conversion which may modify its 
content and form, a possibly extensive mediation related 
to the purposes for which it is being considered. Conscious 
intent becomes a more applicable and common influence. 
Nevertheless even intent may be a systemic product of the 
operation of the hypotheses put forward at page 29 above,
no less systemic for being purposeful.
Conversion processes are almost entirely in the hands 
of bureaucracy, and we can examine the influences which 
they exert on information subject to them, and the extent 
to which political echelons may be involved.
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INFORMATION CONVERSION WITHIN GOVERNMENT
Selective Loss in Conversion
Easton (1965; 131-32) relates the regulation of
stress and the capacity of the political system for 
persistence to the conversion processes which translate 
inputs of demand and support into outputs to meet demand 
and retain support. In this sense, conversion is a crucial 
process. It absorbs and selects inputs from the information 
potential, prepares them for the appropriate level of 
consideration or decision and decides whether and how to 
communicate the converted information inside government, 
and possibly outside. Conversion involves the quality of 
the information potential, levels of efficiency and 
co-ordination in government, the typology and power-content 
of the information concerned and the orientations and goals 
of political and bureaucratic echelons.
Once identified as needing further examination, 
information begins to move through conversion processes 
comprising labelling, screening and summarising which aim 
to reduce it to manageable proportions for decision-making 
levels. The very extent of its information-gathering 
imposes on government a burden of digestion to which it 
must match its machinery and capacity to handle information 
if it is not to suffer from what Deutsch (1967; 162)
describes as "communication overload” or "decision 
overload”, with a consequent risk of confusion or breakdown, 
or of inability to cope with stress and to innovate.
All this involves a selective function, making use 
of secondary symbols attached to primary information, in 
a process which Deutsch (1963; 200-05) discusses in terms
of the "consciousness” of the organisation in associating 
a wide range of informationofor a particular purpose.
This gives an initial influence to bureaucracy, which 
generates and attaches the secondary symbols and messages 
which signal the significance of information, to determine 
outcomes or promote syntheses providing new insights. It 
is able to draw with the aid of modern methods of 
information association and retrieval on the full 
typological range of information.
The upward presentation of information is designed 
to reduce it to essentials, with a display of options and 
recommendations additional to the information itself. 
However, information cannot be reduced pro rata; it 
loses content, with the probability that the residue which 
comes through all processes may have its significance 
changed or distorted by losses on route. A complex 
situation may be reduced to a statement of the one fact 
considered crucial, accompanied by discussion brushing 
aside anything apparently not immediately relevant to it 
and embedding it in opinion and advice.
There are no precise measures of such losses and 
distortions, which are qualitative as well as quantitative. 
Government departments are characteristically what Downs 
(1967; 57) describes as "taller" hierarchies, with long
chains of command in which the more important the decision 
the higher in the hierarchy it is likely to go, the less 
time high-level officials have for it, the greater the 
compression of information and the greater the influence 
of opinion. Downs (1967; 112-30, 269) concludes that
repetitive condensation through many officials significantly 
distorts the final output. A model of hierarachical 
distortion of information formulated by Tulloch (1965; 
137-iil) through a bureaucratic hierarchy of seven levels, 
arrives at something of a reduction to absurdity - a loss 
of 98.4^  ^of the original data. Applying a modified loss 
factor Downs himself still arrives at a loss of 62^. Such 
degrees of lost meaning must cast doubt on the validity of 
decision-making. But as Downs points out, the high-level 
decision makers are aware of the dangers from their own
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knowledge and experience, and take precautions to inform 
themselves from other sources as a counter-balance. 
Nevertheless a proportion of original content is removed.
Frames of Reference
The decision-makers are themselves usually working 
within the frames of reference of the bureaucratic 
organisation; a bureaucratic frame and a wider political 
and social frame. Their skills of selection and reduction 
are professionally conditioned by bureaucratic objectives, 
personal and departmental. In hierarchical organisations^ 
where material rewards are not excessive» there are 
compensations of power and prestige in advancement, and 
few bureaucrats will deliberately prejudice advancement 
by the advice they give. They will tend to select and 
marshal their information to make it acceptable or to 
mention unpalatable courses without appearing to support 
them. Bias can be subtly mobilised by those who, like 
professional bureaucrats, are professional advocates, able 
to select, emphasise and argue those facts and elements 
of a situation which support a particular standpoint.
In so doing, however, bureaucrats are also concerned 
with departmental loyalties and policies, which Downs 
(1967; Ch. xix) emphasises as deeply affecting higher 
bureaucratic levels, to the point of ’’departmental 
ideology”. The interests of the department will be 
protected as far as possible in the formulation of 
bureaucratic conversion outputs. There is a power 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the political 
echelons of government, and this will follow within the 
bureaucracy the general principles expressed in our 
hypotheses, that is, that the negative potential for the 
bureaucracy will be restricted and transfer of power-content 
screened, so as to minimise the enhancement of power 
vis-à-vis the bureaucracy within the political echelons. 
Established departmental attitudes and policies will be 
especially protected. They are not casual incidents in 
activity over which mistakes can be casually explained; 
they are the result of positions adopted over time whose
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exposure to criticism might seriously damage the prestige 
of the department (and those responsible for it).
Governments come and go; departments are committed to 
continuing lines of policy and action, are often in 
contact with the public about them, and live close to 
administrative realities and possibilities. They are 
essentially in Ibhe business of making government work, 
and develop pragmatic attitudes, resistcint to changes 
of course not seen to develop from compelling circumstances.
Downs (1967; Ch.ix) formulates a Law of Increasing 
Conservatism by which "...there is an inherent pressure 
upon the vast majority of officials to become conservers 
in the long run". This is a form of inertia often 
associated with bureaucracy. Conservatism may involve 
the exercise of "will", which Deutsch (1963; 105)
conceptualises as a blocking mechanism to screen off data 
or impulses incompatible with internally labelled decisions 
and anticipated results. In its simplest expression it is 
"...the capacity not to learn" (Deutsch, 1970; 156) which
may generate a "deliberate cognitive impoverishment".
Perhaps we can call it a desire not to be confused by the 
facts beyond a certain point. Its bureaucratic manifesta­
tions may, however, be a form of stabilising mechanism, 
compelling change to justify itself irresist4bly, and to 
have a continuity with the past:
"The processes of institutional decision 
are documented, sometimes very fully,., 
minutes.. .record decisiori^ and sometimes 
reasons and dissenting views. It does not 
follow, of course, that what happened is 
fully explained by what is recorded; but 
it would require a high degree of cynicism 
to regard the record as irrelevant" (Vickers,
1965; 15).
But failure to absorb feedback adequately may be 
destabilising.
The wider political and social frames are not always 
conservative, and bureaucracies may be positive instruments 
of change. Eisenstadt (1967; 96-119) stresses the political
involvement of bureaucracy and its instrumentality in social
|^3
change in developing countries, Fainsod (1967; 233-67)
distinguishes among other types the party-state bureaucracy 
’...penetrated and controlled by the party bureaucracy... 
claiming a monoply of wisdom, intolerant of opposition 
and impatient to move ahead with the tasks...which they 
have set themselves". In such committed bureaucracies 
information is even more a means to an end, in which 
outputs are designed to reinforce objectives and protect 
bureaucratic policies from criticism.
Political echelons are not as a rule concerned to 
penetrate bureaucracy as much as to impose their ideologies 
on it, Deutsch develops his concept of will to include 
political will, in which (1963; 2^7) "If 'will' implies
the desire not to learn, 'power' may imply the ability 
not to have to do so". This is a limitation of ideology 
on deliberation, producing decisions rationally consistent 
in terms of political ideology but perverse in relation 
to information and advice. These may be selectively used, 
or simply put aside in favour of what are seen as 
indispensable political objectives.
Bureaucracy adjusts itself to such bounded decision 
processes. This creates an internal feedback variable, 
described by Easton (1965; ) as a "withinput", an
input arising within the political system itself rather 
than entering it from its environments. The more 
ideologically-bounded the political echelons of government, 
the more bounded their deliberations, and the less likely 
the bureaucratic advisers to put forward advice in forms 
in which they know it will be disregarded. The politicians 
set the internal frame of reference; for example, in a 
government dedicated to the idea of "privatising state- 
owned enterprises the bureaucracy is unlikely to put 
forward direct proposals for further extensive 
nationalisation.
Ideological "withinputs" influence conversion 
processes down the bureaucratic chain, but bureaucracy 
may seek to make its counter-arguments and information 
known through informal channels, such as "leaking
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4information to press or to politicians of other persuasions. 
This does not imply the abandonment of bureaucratic 
objectives, which may still seek internal means to modify, 
frustrate or defer political decisions. A percipient 
political figure in the United Kingdom has recorded the 
persistence and strength of the bureaucratic efforts to 
direct, push and cajole him, as Minister, into the line 
required by the Ministry, including the mobilisation of 
support from other branches of the bureaucracy. In the 
broader framework of government he notes the bureaucratic 
suppression and manipulation of Cabinet minutes in order 
to affect the way in which Cabinet decisions were inter­
preted .
Crossman was experiencing the influence of social 
controls within the British bureaucracy no less powerful 
than those of policy, reprimand, career prospects and 
others commented on by Warren Breed (1965) in the newsroom. 
These pressures are not remote in kind from those which 
Breed notes as the outcome of goal-oriented processes in 
the newsroom. But in the bureaucratic environment they 
are more consistent and subtle, absorbed through continuous 
contact with standards, aspirations, esteem for superiors, 
respect for continuity and precedent, conformity with wider 
policies, including those of other departments, and other 
influences within government. The dominant frame of 
reference is that of bureaucratic power, expressed as 
successful influence, and its preservation through 
political changes.
In maintaining its influence the bureaucracy alone is
continuously familiar with the full range of information
available, comprised within the typology suggested above,
which provides a flexible resource for information functions
Personal information may be misused, selectively and
confidentially; generalised information may be usêdc. to
'^ *The Grossman Diaries, pp. 51f 590 contain much-quoted passages. The bureaucratic behaviour which Crossman notes 
is systemic rather than personal, and would apply in almost 
any developed bureaucratic system.
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obscure or conceal awkward particularities; passive 
information may be activated or kept in the background as 
desired; classified information may be invoked to bar 
inquiry. Few topics which arise in government are without 
history and parallels containing information known or 
accessible to the bureaucracy. In the United Kingdom the 
papers of previous administrations of different complexion 
are known to bureaucrats, but (by convention) inaccessible 
to the incumbent political echelons. The bureaucracy 
controls such continuity of knowledge by indirect means.
Those who know where and how to find and use information 
within the government machine have an advantage over those 
who must rely on them for it.
The Transition to Public Outputs and the »Public Agenda'*
Bureaucratic conversion outputs are often for internal 
goverment use; they contain material and views which could 
be damaging or embarrassing to bureaucratic or political 
echelons. If intended as public output, therefore, 
information is mediated to deprive it as far as possible 
of such power-content• Suitable mediation may be suggested 
in bureaucratic advice in parallel with advice for internal 
use. The objects are to protect the department (retaining 
negative potential) or to present information compatible 
with the complexion and declared policies of government, 
adapted to the proposed channels of issue and anticipated 
public reactions (emphasising positive potential). The 
restraint of power-content passing into public hands is a 
restraint of public countervailing power. Power-content 
which cannot be withheld, or restrained may be submerged in 
appeals to patriotism, loyalty or support of whatever 
package of government policies is currently being presented 
as the solution to national needs, necessitating the 
endurance of temporary inconveniences or deprivations.
Such final conversion activities are sometimes loosely 
described as "defining" or "setting" the public agenda, the 
issues for public discussion, and the bases on wich it takes 
place. But the public agenda at any time consists of events 
and issues arising or continuing from environments beyond 
government control, as well as those which originate from
government. Many of the former force themselves there or 
are brought there by extra-governmental agencies, such as 
the press or interest groups. Widespread drug abuse, the 
collapse of a major financial institution, a riot in a 
prison, revelations in the press about the stationing of 
nuclear weapons, new types of evironmental pollution may 
all force matters on to the public agenda whose incidence 
government cannot regulate, though it may have to deal with 
them or declare a position. (Even in the most tightly 
regulated political societies a major disaster wuch as the 
Chernobyl disaster in the U.S.S.R. in May 1986 cannot be 
kept off the public agenda, if only because too many of 
the public have been involved and know).
Those matters which it originates for the public 
agenda are of course much more within government control, 
though many of them find their way there in the routine 
outputs of government. Agenda-control in the sense noted 
by Bachrach and Baratz (1963)» of keeping issues off the 
public agenda, is feasible where government has complete 
control of the circumstances as well as the items; but 
there is no cause to assume that this is more than marginal 
in modern societies where government and public are con­
tinuously and intimately involved with each other. (In 
societies where government has complete control of the 
instruments of public discussion an »'underground* agenda 
may be in circulation).
But the importance attached to information which finds 
its way on to the public agenda from government, or to 
which government makes a contribution from its own 
information resources, is indicated by the selection of 
channels, discussed in the following chapter in relation 
to types of information, and the organisation of specific 
points and facilities in government to deal with the 
transfers. This is a final stage; by the time that 
information intended for the public has reached the points 
of transfer it has already undergone several varieties of 
mediation within the machinery of government. It has been 
selected from the information potential (which alone
K1
implies the importation of bias - page 19 above) bound to 
be systemically conditioned within the objectives and 
frames of reference of those involved; it has been 
associated with other information similarly selected; 
it has probably been reduced, possible drastically, in 
original content and loaded with secondary comment and 
opinion the further it travels up the bureaucratic and 
political hierarchy of decision. At every stage power- 
content which might provide a basis for criticism at 
superior stages or react against the interests of those 
providing it has been reduced or removed, or overlaid or 
deflected by the emphasis of positive potential.
It would, of course, be an exaggeration to suggest 
that any content which might possibly be power-content is 
removed from what finally passes into channels of transfer, 
or that every fragment of information released by government 
is minutely scrutinised for it. Moreover, some of the 
channels, such as autonomous media and interest groups, 
may not accept it without question. But government outputs^ 
so far as a continuous cycle may be said to have a 
commencement point, are usually taken as the beginning of 
the theoretical information cycle. The extensive mediation 
within government is supplemented by further mediating 
influences in the channels which convey information from 
government to the public receptors. This phase of 
mediation needs to be examined before it is possible to 
assess what actually reaches the public and its probable 
effects on feedback into the cycle.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PUBLIC INFORMATION OUTPUTS
Government information outputs to the public are 
broadly either obligatory, leaving little or no discretion 
as to content and form, or voluntary, with issue itself, 
as well as composition, at government discretion. Outputs 
may be directly available to the public through government- 
organised channels, or indirectly, mainly through the media, 
which may be autonomous, or under government control, or 
subject to forms of government pressures.
Obligatory Outputs
Compliance outputs of basic legislation, backed by 
condign power, must be formally published and accessible 
to the public in the precise forms in which they have been 
passed into law before they can sensibly have legal effect. 
The mode and channels of output are therefore legally 
prescribed as a precondition of validity. The mode is 
print and the channels are direct: any member of the 
public must be able to obtain copies personally from 
defined official points or agents. This is the least 
mediated type of public information in issue. But it is in 
legal form and language, not readily intelligible to the 
lay public, and its direct public are legal and other 
professionals, whose mediation is necessary for the general 
public.
Extensive regulation having the force of law issues 
from departments of modern governments under delegated 
legislative powers, in execution of their functions. This 
follows legal prescription for publication and availability, 
but it affects the daily lives of the public at many points. 
It relates to conditions of welfare, pensions, employment.
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credit purchases, quality standards of food and goods, and 
other personal involvements. It brings the public into 
frequent direct contact with officials and government 
offices. It is formulated by the responsible departments, 
whose discretions may be incorporated in it.
Again, the legal form is rarely suitable for direct 
public use, and departments supplement it by what can be 
called secondary compliance information, in print, defining 
and explaining obligations or entitlements and the associated 
bureaucratic procedures. This is issued through depart­
mental or other government offices, and possibly distributed 
widely through libraries and voluntary bodies.
These are nominally voluntary outputs of public 
information though extensive administrative systems could 
hardly function without providing this guidance. But 
content and form are subject to the systemic mediation of 
official interpretations within limits. The public sees 
these outputs as authoritative and definitive. They can 
also be seen as a diffuse but positive form of bureaucratic 
socialisation within the political system; not a 
consciously conceived form of political influence, but part 
of a background of habituation, the continuing relationship 
between the individual public and ’'government", which is 
always there. Mediation of transactions through the 
bureaucratic machinery, particularly by personal 
application for e.g. welfare and unemployment benefits 
strengthens "authority". This effect is likely to be 
strong and direct in smaller and less literate societies 
in which personal guidance from low-level bureaucrats is 
easily transformed into instruction.
Mediation may lie deeper than the texts. The emphasis 
of secondary compliance information may be manipulated to 
suit administrative and political objectives. Presentation 
and distribution may be affected by political considerations, 
such as parading the availability of benefits, or emphasisirg 
those available to particular sections of the community 
which government may wish to reach (and influence). 
Bureaucracy can hinder the application of measures which it 
cannot stop but does not like by producing little or
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complicated guidance. Bureaucratic mediation easily 
develops into a form of control which, even if detected, 
is at bureaucratic discretion not easily challengeable in
Qthe courts. Forms of mediation adverse to the public are 
often detectable only by the expert experience of such 
mediating services as citizens* advice bureaux, legal 
advice centres and similar public- oriented organisations 
which grow up to mediate between the public and the 
bureaucracy.
Compliance outputs of all kinds attract little media 
attention after the appearance of basic legislation unless 
some facet of administration, general or individual, 
becomes news rather than administration, in some overt 
injustice or minor scandal.
Other obligatory outputs bind government rather than 
public, though they concern the public in a collective 
political sense. Government is commonly bound by law or 
established convention to make public periodic reports and 
accounts of institutions and activities managed by 
government or supported by public finance. This is an 
aspect of accountability, the obligation of government to 
expose its activities and responsibilities to public 
judgement. Outputs of this sort may have substantial 
power-content for the public, which automatically enters 
the public agenda. Accompanying voluntary outputs of 
information may manipulate their positive or negative 
potential in government's favour. Power-content which 
cannot be disguised or retained may be weakened by 
tactical devices, such as publication during holiday 
periods, or timed to be overlaid by some more striking 
information or event. Content and implications are 
generally conveyed through the media, which can provide 
interpretation and comment of their own.
b* Goverment refusal in the Untied Kingdom to publish in­
ternal codes of practice (the "A-Codes”) prescribing hidden 
rules and criteria on certain welfare benefits is a classic 
example of bureaucratic retention of power-content. Some of 
the criteria applied in secret have become known and widely 
criticised, affecting official policies (Michael, The 
Politics of Secrecy. 1982; 13). Hidden bureaucratic codes
are common when bureaucrats are empowered to make rules 
affecting the rights and treatment of individuals.
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Voluntary Outputs
Compliance and associated voluntary outputs are basic 
public information. Even if discretion is often circum­
scribed by obligation, government can exercise it in the 
content, form and presentation of the voluntary components, 
and will do so as a systemic routine.
But beyond this governments maintain a volume of 
voluntary outputs in routine reports of departmental 
activities, minor official committees, cultural, research 
and other government bodies, with little overt political 
significance except a public relations content. Neverthe­
less, they seek diffuse support for government in the 
impressions which they present to the public, and may be 
used as vehicles for communication of government policies 
and emphases. Departmental annual reports are strong on 
achievements, muted on derelictions; committee reports, 
if critical and unable to be kept from circulation, or be 
tendentiously summarised, will be accompanied by expressions 
of concern and review, in order to forestall enhancement of 
public countervailing power. There are few activities of 
government which do not have the opportunity in publishing 
information to seek to turn it to government (often 
bureaucratic) account, and to reinforce public acceptance 
or approbation.
These outputs are an index of the importance which 
government attaches to communication with the public, and 
may become part of the public agenda. But they are diffused, 
with selective readership, and do not constitute any co­
ordinated attempt to influence the public through information 
unless they deal with matters of central importance to 
government. An indication of this is the low standard of 
co-ordination of information output to be found in government, 
in which developed central information and publishing systems9are rare, even in long-established states._________________
^’Cherns (1979) reviews in detail the publishing and informa­
tion systems of twenty governments, and comments on widespread 
inadequacies. The U.S.A. and the United Kingdom, with the 
"old” Commonwealth which inherits many of its practices, are among the best organised. Bibliographic reference is generally 
deficient. In Eastern Europe it is difficult even to iden­
tify government publications; they are not differentiated 
by the state publishing houses.
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Reliable statistics of public information outputs are 
difficult to find, and even more difficult to compare, 
because of differences in government organisation and 
administrative practice. The United Kingdom, among the 
most prolific government sources of public information, 
has an output of around 8,000 sale publications per year. 
But about 2,000 of these are separate formal and compliance 
documents which would find publication in many other states 
through the single vehicle of an official gazette. A 
further 4^ ,000 or so have a parliamentary origin, including 
many accountability documents which might not appear from 
this source elsewhere. Among the remaining 2,000 are not 
more than about ten per cent from central departments of 
government, and of these perhaps half which could be said 
to be part of any deliberate intent to set or influence 
the public agenda (on which many of the subjects would 
appear by force of circumstance). These figures of sale 
publications through a central government agency exclude 
what Johansson (1976) estimated at a further 25,000 
published documents issuing from individual departments in 
pursuit of their own policies and interests (including 
voluntary compliance outputs).
Organisational diffusion of this kind is common to 
most governments. In relation to population, editions of 
most official publications are small. In the United 
Kingdom, with a population of some fifty-five millions, 
editions not in some continuing series are exceptional if 
they exceed 5,000, and are commonly less than 3,000.^^
Even so, for lack of central organisation governments 
fail to make the most positive use of their voluntary 
information outputs. It is not easy in most countries to 
identify and obtain official publications, or to gain 
library access to Ihem. In a survey on the availability of 
official publications in libraries^ covering fifty-six 
countries, Cherns (1983) identifies a very heavy library 
dependence on government deposit as the principal means of
Author's personal experience. Few governments have any 
organised information of this kind. Clues can sometimes 
be found in printers' imprints. For example, the letter 
"K” in imprints of U.K. government publications indicates 
125 copies. K 20 means a print of 2,500 copies.
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acquiring government publications. Deposit is far from 
universal, but fifty-three per cent of libraries surveyed 
rely on it for over seventy-five per cent of these 
acquisitions. Mechanical and administrative deficiencies 
seriously weaken the effectiveness of such library 
collections. They also tend to be concentrated in academic 
and institutional libraries (an indication of the scope of 
their readership) which are not natural sources of first 
resort for the public at large. Public libraries are 
poorly served in comparison, and in all types of libraries 
guidance to this complex body of material is indifferent; 
nor do supply procedures often make available to library 
users publications of current interest.
Parliamentary Outputs
Nominated or elective assemblies also vary widely in 
their information outputs. Those with more of a formal and 
symbolic significance than a real function of legislation, 
debate and enquiry have sparse outputs; others with more 
deeply involved roles within the political system often have 
a profuse information output in their reported proceedings 
and published documents. They have an input of information 
from executive government, which may lead them to seek more. 
They may contain an opposition, seeking to force disclosure 
of information. Government supporters as well as opponents 
seek information on behalf of constitutents and interests.
Many parliamentary assemblies retain much independence 
within rules and procedures of a constitutional body on 
whose support the government of the day usually has to 
depend, and must often persuade rather than coerce.
Parliamentary debates are closely documented and usually 
published verbatim. Arguments, as well as decisions and 
resolutions can thus be publicly followed without systemic 
mediation of the direct output. Participants contribute 
information inputs. Committees may range widely over the 
activities and performance of government, recording their
*An analysis by Hennessey (1979) of relationships between 
libraries and the political system emphasises their social 
setting and need for public funding. The tentative conclusion 
that .libraries seem to be specially vulnerable to politi­
cal influences, direct or Indirect...” is not convincing in 
relation to library collections of official publications. The 
many deficiencies are predominantly administrative. But vir­
tually no research has been done in this field.
transactions in detail. This is public information from a 
maj or branch, of government which attracts attention because 
of its status, adversarial and uninhibited context, and its 
symbolic position as a representative body. This output 
is, however, highly specialised in form, not publicly 
oriented in presentation of complexities of debate and 
procedure, the language isjformal^he subject-matter is 
involved, and the recorded forms of verbatim proceedings 
are often difficult to follow. Committee reports may be 
mines of public information, containing evidence, 
submitted papers, views of expert and knowledgeable 
witnesses, and summary reports, sometimes with dissenting 
reports. But the texts have very limited circulation 
outside the narrow and selective circles of organised 
interests.
The main means of public dissemination of parliamentary 
proceedings are the media, and in some countries they are 
broadcast in whole or in part, or on specially important 
occasions. Selection may have a political significance, 
and the ready availability of authentic texts as a check 
on media and other reports is important. Cherns (1979; 
4.72-81) notes widely varying national practices in 
availability of parliamentary debates. These are 
indicators of the importance of the parliamentary body 
in the political system.
Direct Government Outputs to the Media
Voluntary information in printed form, including 
parliamentary output, is a direct government output in the 
sense that it can be obtained in original by the public.
But in terms of day-to-day communication, it is conveyed to 
the general public by the media, for its news value. A 
substantial further voluntary output is not designed for 
direct communication to the public, but is communicated to 
the media.through, the information offices of government 
departments and media contacts with parliamentary institu­
tions. "Media releases” or announcements are made at 
press conferences and accompanied by specific briefing.
These are news as well as information occasions. Tunstall 
(1971; 163-65» 173-88) emphasises the importance and
variety of government as a news source. He also draws
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attention to the organisation of government public relations 
methods geared to the interests and technical requirements 
(e.g. press times) of the media, and providing readily 
usable material.
At the centre of government the formal media 
conference at, say, the Prime Ministères Office is a means 
of releasing and propagating news and views of major 
political interest in government rather than purely 
departmental affairs. In political systems with a 
relatively independent parliamentary body this may be 
complemented by a parliamentary "lobby”. This privileged 
corps of specially accredited media correspondents is given 
access on a largely unattributable basis to items of 
political news and speculation which readily find their 
way into the media as an expression, however disguised, of 
authoritative views. Briefing often deliberately obscures 
precise sources, lending itself to manipulation and 
suggestion. It is also selective, official spokesmen have 
access to information which may be concealed, emphasised or 
distorted, in consonance with official goals. Skilful 
spokesmen set the stage for media comment on the information 
made available. These are the final stages of government 
mediation, in which the potential for influencing the public 
agenda is carefully assessed within government.
For the media the criterion of selection is news value, 
and direct access to sources of government information 
charged with political interest naturally has more news 
value than information on routine affairs. Pressures may 
be exerted for this reason on correspondents whose use of 
information may offend the powers behind the sources which 
control access. Margach (1978; 14-0-58) gives accounts of
such pressures in the United Kingdom, particularly under the 
Wilson governments of 1964.-1970 and 1974--1976. Though 
Tunstall (1971; 186) suggests that the relationship between
organisational sources and the media is collective, and that 
in practice facilities cannot be withdrawn from one corres­
pondent "...unless he lacks the minimal support of his 
competitor-colleagues", there must nevertheless be some 
desire among correspondents not to court such conflicts.
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Each item released through these channels within 
government has been considered from the point of view of 
its public power-content and negative or positive potential 
for government, and its scope and presentation framed 
accordingly. This constitutes probably the most 
deliberately managed body of government information output. 
Tunstall (1971; 173-201) explores the background in British
government, including the contacts which may take place 
outside the scope of official briefing between selected 
journalists and government officials. Government 
information offices are usually staffed by specialists, 
often themselves with a journalistic background, who are 
familiar with media needs.
An analysis of media releases from departments of the 
United Kingdom government over a three-month period. Table 1, 
indicates, however, that the flow of departmental informa­
tion to the media tends to deal with day-to-day administra­
tion and public relations rather than with high politics.
But it provides the media with the "subsidised” stream of 
ready-made "news" and comment to which Gandy (1982; 234.»
302) has drawn attention. Around twenty to thirty media 
releases per day from government departments, of interest 
to general and special publics in some way, is a distribution 
of departmental and government objectives for which a wide 
circulation is assured. The fluidity with which media 
releases can be used by government is indicated by the 
United Kingdom distribution arrangements organised to reach 
target areas or combinations of media interest.
The releases cover a very wide varie'fy- of departmental 
responsibilities, referring to the day-to-day work of 
départments, aiming at publicity for achievements and 
ministers' statements and speeches, and drawing attention 
to significant changes and innovations, within the 
department's scope of operations and to the issue of 
particular publications. They do not contain major 
political statements or comment, for which political rather 
than administrative channels - e.g. the Parliamentary Lobby, 
briefing at the Prime Minister's Office - are used. Notices 
in the routine context of releases from the Prime Minister's 
Office - a centre of political information - concern petty 
formalities•
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Leakage Outputs
Even officially "unattributable” sources of 
information may carry a government authenticity which 
appears in some form ("informed sources", "sources close 
to the Prime Minister"). They are supplemented by "leaks", 
disclosures of formally constrained information from within 
the government machine, s^paks may be authorised or 
unauthorised, but are outside organised channels of 
communication. Leaks are used by government (internally 
authorised) as a means of testing public reactions or 
creating public impressions without official commitment, of 
mobilising advance support for some course of action or 
frustrating the mobilisation of support by political 
opponents, or preparing the ground for release of unwelcome 
information. In this light they have a function in 
maintaining stability by reducing shock effects. Unauthorised 
leaks tend to be destabilising, indicating unresolved 
conflicts within government, within or between bureaucratic 
and political echelons, and casting doubt on the credibility 
of government.
Authorised leaks may have departmental rather than 
general government origin, a mark possibly of limited 
interests, but also of intra-governmental conflict in which 
departments seek to enlist public sympathy as a means of 
internal influence. Defence departments under financial or 
organisational pressures within government are a common 
source. Covert departmental support blocks action against 
sources. A controlled power-content is conveyed to the 
public for a manipulative purpose.
Unauthorised leaks may have a variety of personal and 
interest-inspired causes. As the right of government to 
suppress or manipulate information has come increasingly 
under question, the "whistle-blowing" leak has increased - 
an unauthorised individual reaction of political or personal 
conscience against news management beyond the bounds of 
individual acceptability. A representative of senior
civil service levels brought this type of dilemma 
into the open in 1981:
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"Faced with instructions to present government 
policy in a way that suppressed relevant facts 
or involved lying» could it be argued that a 
civil servant was the trustee of Parliament 
and the public when ministerial policies 
failed to take their interests into account
........... ? " 12(Ward, The Times. London, 13 April 1981).
The British civil service has maintained a traditional 
stance of political non-involvement, but "whistle-blowing" 
may have more politically motivated objectives where the 
bureaucratic and political lines are less tightly drawn.
Leaks of all sorts depend heavily on the news values 
of the media, to give them public circulation. As they 
convey power-content which the public would not obtain 
through normal processes, and may be dramatic in timing 
and substance, revealing political scandals, penetrating 
the veils of official secrecy and confidentiality, and 
involving ^lite persons, they are natural news. The media 
are sometimes the prime movers in them. By nature leaks 
tend to be directed at those media channels likely to give 
them currency; presentation to the public is often in the 
form of a media "scoop" loaded with sensationalism, which 
may multiply the intrinsic power-content of the information 
they contain.
Of the major types of government information outputs 
the obligatory outputs of regulation and the voluntary 
outputs associated with them are the least mediated form of 
public information within government. But even these 
outputs are not used by many of the general public without 
some further mediation by professionals and public-oriented 
organisations. Though the scope for bureaucratic mediation
Changes in the social composition and background of the 
British civil service and its increasing politicisation at 
senior levels have since intensified the dilemma, with more 
leaks from individual bureaucrats and a cause célèbre of prosecution and acquittal under Official Secrets legislation, 
This exhibited in the public arena details of manipulation 
of information for the public, through Parliament, at 
ministerial levels. (Ponting, The Right to Know; The Inside 
Story of the Belgrano Affair. 1985)•
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is limited and may be challengeable, existence of 
bureaucratic discretions does leave room for some systemic 
manipulation of positive or negative potential and control 
of power-content. (Restraint of power-content is also 
implicit in hidden codes of rules applied by bureaucracy).
These extensive transfers of government information 
to the public are virtually ignored by the media, for which 
they rarely have news values. They have no active political 
significance. But as a general affirmation of authority 
they must have a stabilising influence within the political 
system. Too many individuals are involved for public codes 
of practice to diverge radically from public habituations 
and expectations without a broad feedback to government in 
terms of demand which could not be lightly ignored. Changes 
are therefore likely to be slow and cautious. From 
government's point of view they may involve many voters who 
normally express no political demand. From the point of 
view of the individual there must be hesitations about 
strong expressions of political demand which might endanger 
the system, rather than the government, on which increasing 
numbers are substantially dependent for benefits and 
assistance •
Other published government outputs cover the complete 
range of government activities and interests. Without 
necessarily endorsing Downs' assumption of economic 
rationality as the basis on which citizens inform themselves, 
it is reasonable to accept his expectation (Downs, 1957;
229) that they delegate a large part of the task to 
specially interested groups and persons, and also use the 
"subsidised" information in the mass media (it is 
subsidised by government, in Gandy's sense, as well as 
by advertisers, in Downs'). Information with the most 
political interest, and corresponding news value, relates 
to the actions, decisions and proposals of government. 
Parliamentary outputs will follow the same channels to the 
public. The texts of individual publications will have a 
limited and specialised direct readership; the salient 
points for the general public will be picked out by the
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media.Finally, the media carry to the public the 
information transferred to them by media releases and 
briefing from government information offices, parliamentary 
lobbies and other media points of contact with politicians 
and bureaucrats.
Thus, except for mainly administrative and specialised 
outputs, most information from government travels through 
media channels. By the time it actually reaches the 
public it has undergone possibly extensive systemic media­
tion within government in processes which are obscured from 
both public and media. The media, however, are not 
necessarily simple dissemination vehicles for government. 
They may add dimensions of mediation, beyond the government/ 
media interfaces, which need examination. These may result 
in significant differences between information which 
government releases for public information and what is
actually received by the public.
(In order to consider the full context of mediation
some assumptions already implicit above about the 
transfer of information and the position of media in 
relation to government are further discussed in Chapter 
Seven)•
13»There arerareoccasions when the text of a government 
publication acquires a high news value on its own account, 
and it becomes a best-seller. One such example in the 
United Kingdom was Lord Denning*s Report (Cmnd 2152,
Session 1962-63) on the Profumo scandal of 1963. All-night 
queues formed outside government bookshops awaiting^ publication. Government presses were kept running in order 
to cope with the unassessable demand - well over 100,000 
copes were sold within days. Many requests were received 
from foreign publishers for translation rights. The coidination of élite personalities, government, parliament, 
sex, suicide of a principal character, ruthless judicial 
revelation and a flavour of espionage stoked a public 
imagination, already well-supplied by the media, to the 
point of requiring the full, authentic text. (Author s 
note from personal knowledge).
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CHAPTER SIX
THE FULL PROCESS OF MEDIATION
5^ '^ i
Government and Media in Public Information Outputs
Information which may never become the subject of 
public outputs may be extensively mediated within government 
between bureaucratic and political echelons in the business 
of administration and decision-making, the systemic 
influences being confined to their relationship and power- 
interests within the structure and machinery of government.
Information outputs which leave the area of government 
are subject to further government mediation for public 
consumption. This is a continuation of systemic processes, 
aimed at influencing the public impact which the information 
may have. This mediation takes place out of public sight 
and is protected by sanctions against disclosure. The extent 
and provenance of the information involved is often 
unverifiable from other sources. The scope for manipulation 
within government of the information and of its public 
presentation is therefoie abundant. What is presented as 
public information reflects the ability of government to 
restrain the power-content, and thus the power, which it 
may transfer to the public.
The main channels of transfer to the public are, 
however, the media. Both government and media have the 
characteristics of organisations, and there are similarities 
in their handling of information. But there are radical 
differences in the environments, criteria and objectives.
For example, the abundant volume of general information 
input to the media requires drastic selection for use, in 
order to keep it manageable. Tunstall (1971; 16) estimates
that over nine-tenths of material available to a national 
news organisation each day is not used. Nothing is said to
6^
be as dead as yesterday’s news. Both the figure and the 
circumstances are inappropriate to government information; 
what is not immediately usable is stored in some form, and 
it may later add value to other information, acquire added 
values itself or be reactivated. Government is gathering 
information, not seeking and selecting ephemeral news.
The continuities of interest and policy which are the 
systemic concern of gatekeepers and goals in government are 
of a different order from those in newsgathering and 
selection for transient news products, whose content is not 
continuously absorbed into future decisions and policies.
Nor are those in news organisations concerned with the 
intention to deprive information of news value (and power- 
content) which often motivates government mediation. The 
interests of government are to shape its public information 
outputs as closely as possible to its purposes, by manipula­
tion of content, presentation, evasion, distortion or 
suppression if necessary. The instinct of government is to 
withhold what it need not disclose or gains no advantage 
from revealing. Its interest is to embed fact in secondary 
information and comment in order to influence its reception 
and impact. The systemic interest of the media is to reveal 
what government tries to conceal, and its professional ethic 
(if not unvarying practice) is to distinguish between fact 
and opinion.
The systemic differences between government and media 
as information-handling organisations may narrow virtually 
to extinction in political systems where the media become 
an arm of government, conveying ’’public information" in 
whatever form government wishes it to be received by the 
public. In political systems with autonomous media the 
relationship is far more variable and the systemic 
differences are marked. The media determine over a wide 
field just how government information which they receive 
is passed on to the public.
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Thfi Government/Media Symbiosis and its Tensions
The dominance of the media as the main channels for 
final transfer of government information to the public is 
established by their capacity for reaching mass audiences 
very quickly. For government they have become prime 
instruments for conveying the forms of persuasion by which 
governments seek to maintain their support and authority 
and attempt to manufacture consent. The importance attached 
by government to media channels, where they are autonomous, 
is illustrated by the degree of organisation developed for 
the specific purpose of passing information to them.
Steinberg (1980; 38-39) notes within U.S.A. government;
’\..at least 3,000 government workers whose 
principal goal is the generation of public 
information that produces or reinforces an 
impression of government competence and 
efficiency, or results in the adoption of 
a preferred perspective on some policy".
A British House of Commons Select Committee Oi.C. 509,
Session 1976-77; 67) noted more than a thousand specialist
"information officers" in post in the civil service at the 
beginning of 1977, engaged in dealing with public relations 
and with the media.
The importance attached by media to government as a 
news source has been illustrated by Sigal (1973; 120-29)»
who identified 58.2 per cent of 1,14-6 stories beginning on 
page one of the New York Times and Washington Post as coming 
through routine government channels (41«7 per cent through 
press releases and conferences). Background briefings added 
a further 7.9 per cent. He concludes that "The routine 
channels for newsgathering thus constitute the mechanism for 
official dominance of national and foreign news in the two 
papers". Gandy (1982; 3* 62) expresses this routine supply
as an information subsidy to the media in terms of economic 
rationality, reducing journalistic costs and thus increasing 
the probability of use. In short, information systematically 
supplied to the media is reliable and cheap for them to use. 
Economics are not, of course, the only consideration.
Because of its élite personalities and the important events 
in which it is involved, government is a natural source of 
news values.
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There are clear symbiotic implications for media and 
government. But the symbiosis has inbuilt advantages for 
government, which not only controls the supply of informa­
tion, but prepares it for media consumption behind screens 
whose penetration (e.g. through unauthorised leaks or 
investigative journalism) in itself makes news. However 
autonomous the media, government will attempt to extend 
its influence on public information as far as it can towards 
the public itself, through the media channels. The 
temptation to use these advantages for internal as well as 
external government purposes is strong. Sigal (1973; vii) 
examines the question of officials* use of the press to 
accomplish government aims, drawing it into the governmental 
process, and involving parts of government in exercising 
pressures on other parts through it. Though he concedes 
that circumstances make the practice more intensive in the 
U.S.A. than in the United Kingdom, tactical use of the media 
by government is common.
The further the process can be carried, the more likely 
that power-content which may be released can still be 
influenced beyond the government/media interface and public 
countervailing power restrained or confused. But the attempt 
may result in unintentional loss of control, confusing 
government itself, as well as media and public, with a 
consequent danger of detaching decision-making in government 
from realities. Confusion of basic information with 
feedback from government-induced leaks, or with statements 
to the media designed to influence comment in order to put 
pressure on other parts of government, does not add to the 
clarity of the messages and their origins.
Sigal (1973; Ch. viii'and 159) illustrates from the 
history of the 1962 Skybolt missile controversy, in which 
the international scale, the rapid movements and message 
interchanges of statesmen, and the press reports inspired 
by interests within government created at times a "...big 
blooming buzzing confusion". The organs of public informa­
tion in both government and media were manipulated to create 
mazes of misunderstanding, puzzling rather than informing 
the public, whose interest had been put on one side.
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Sigal (1973; 195) concedes that while the traditional
independence of the U.S.A. press from direct forms of 
control has hardened, its susceptibility to government news 
management has spread. Galnoor (1975) places the media 
among those organisations within society uneasily "...faced 
with the conflict between symbiotic and independent 
relations with the government". That conflict need not be 
resolved in favour of government. Autonomous media, at any 
rate, are not supine recipients of information handouts from 
government with a ’hypodermic" effect. They have close enough 
experience and contacts with government to try to correct 
what they see as overt distortion, and their professional 
goals incline them towards interpretive balance. They may 
cast enough doubt on information from government and motives 
behind it to modify or even reverse the positive or negative 
potential derived from government management. They may 
augment or even restore power-content which has been reduced 
or removed. The mere exposure of manipulation in government 
outputs adds power-content of its own.
There is, in fact a tension within the symbiosis, 
rooted in the differing objectives of government and media, 
which tends to move media to opposition simply in a perceived 
role as proponents of public interests versus government. 
Further, in competitive political societies one party or 
political interest may attain a dominance which leaves the 
media, particularly the press, the only effective 
opposition, examining and criticising the government's 
public information outputs, or lack of them, almost as a 
surrogate for an effective parliamentary opposition. This 
role is mainly for the press, because broadcast media, 
however apparently independent, are subject to some measure 
of state franchise which enables government to exercise 
pressures on them which compromise autonomy (Smith, 1976;
Ch. v).
The press itself may be predominantly oppositional in 
ownership or policy towards governments of particular 
complexions, and become identified to public as well as 
government as the mouthpiece of specific political interests 
or sympathies. This may influence treatment of information 
as news to an extent which compromises professional goals
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in the public eye. The press may not merely correct or 
modify government presentation of information for the 
public, but add its own oppositional mediation. Government 
information which reaches the public is thus liable to be 
confused and compromised by "loaded” potential and possibly 
misleading power-content. The press is as capable of 
"managing" news as government is of "managing" information, 
and as the ultimate channel of communication has the last 
word with the public. If government has the advantages of 
information, the press retains those of presentation.
Circumvention of the Symbiosis
Circumstantial problems of public information expose 
the tensions within the government/media symbiosis.
They appeared in unusually acute form between federal 
governments and media in Canada and Australia from 1968 to 
1974.. In both countries the long supremacy of one party 
and political interest gave way to a brief period of rule 
by rival parties long excluded from office. These had come 
to see the media as permanently biased against them. They 
therefore attempted to by-pass the media and communicate 
more directly with the public, through comprehensive 
organisations for public communication specially established 
within government. These organisations were, however, 
widely perceived as partisan, they inevitably attracted the 
hostility of the press, and they failed to establish a 
coherent place or rationale in communication between 
government and public. They collapsed after brief periods 
for these r e a s o n s . M e d i a  channels may also be simply 
inadequate to the task, in which they have an accepted role 
but no binding duty. The Canadian and Australian experiments 
chose to identify the media for these reasons among others 
as a positive barrier between government and public, biased, 
self-serving, irresponsible and frivolous, preventing
^’Cherns (1979, 1981) gives detailed accounts of these episodes, particularly in Canada, where they were given much 
intellectual background in a government-commissioned study 
(Task Force Report on Government Information, 1969). He 
also notes the residue of improvement which they left in the 
flow of administrative information to the public.
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government information from reaching the public which needed 
it.
Though unsuccessful in their declared objectives, these 
experiments direct attention to the problems of information 
transfer from government through channels dominated by 
ideologically or otherwise hostile media, using, rather 
than transferring government information, to give incomplete 
or distorted public information as a political rather than 
an organisationally systemic output. It would be facile 
to dismiss these two situations as passing oddities deriving 
from exceptional local conditions; similar tensions arise 
elsewhere between government and autonomous media, whose 
criticism is easily seen as inimical by committed 
politicians in and out of power.
The possibility of media inadequacies which might 
impede government was mooted many years ago, by Siebert 
(194.8) in a brief discussion of "Communications and 
Government" in the U.S.A. context, in which he suggested 
explicitly "...direct contact between the government and
the people through government instruments...... The
possibility that additional information and ideas may 
reach the public is great". He did not hesitate to 
suggest that the federal government might own and promote 
a national radio network, parallel with the commercial 
networks. He did not, however, pursue these ideas, or deal 
with the inevitable perception of propaganda outlets for 
government which such services would readily attract. It 
is difficult to see government as the people's champion in 
relation to its own information. Cognitive and motivating 
information in government have a natural affinity.
Siebert's suggestion of a government broadcasting 
network was made before the general advent of television as 
a medium of public influence greatly intensified political 
suspicion of partiality to which broadcast media are 
particular liable. Smith (1976» 202) suggests the reason:
"politicians tend to be guilty of a kind of 
categorical fallacy when they look at broad­
casting organisations; they find it hard to 
understand an organisation which is wholly 
owned by the public but eludes the grasp of 
the politician. They fail to understand the
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full range of pressures which play upon 
the broadcasters, of which they are only 
one, and indeed oie which the broadcaster's 
traditional journalistic ethic drives him 
to obstruct”.
The problem is wider than the particular political 
circumstances of Canada and Australia in the 1970's. It 
relates to what may be called "outreach” by government to 
transfer information direct to the public in its own forms, 
focused on the individual, in parallel with or over the 
heads of the media. The media have become government's 
main channels of public communication. But they are aimed 
at general audiences, are selective in what they communicate, 
possibly tendentious beyond their systemic interests, and 
liable to be seen by government as inimical to its public 
information objectives.
The Full Process of Mediation
But, in now accustomed moulds in modern states, the 
full process of mediation which government information 
undergoes in its transfer to the public is complex in 
itself and largely indirect in its final stages. The 
routine and diffused outputs of information for the public 
may be a broad and unspecified basis for assent rather than 
positive affirmation of consent. Most of them reach the 
public through mediating channels. Political information 
outputs persuasively seeking specific consent come from a 
limited range of specially framed documents, from the 
proceedings of parliamentary bodies in which government 
actions and proposals are debated, and from the political 
centre - cabinet and senior ministers, through media 
conferences and parliamentary lobbies or correspondents.
If specifically departmental they may be inserted into the 
otherwise routinely administrative flow of news items from 
departments, possibly in ministers' speeches or declarations, 
or fed into known sympathetic media ears through selective 
contacts. Autonomous media may be drawn into government 
manipulation of these outputs as far as government can 
influence them through its symbiotic relationships.
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The variety of relationships which press and broadcast 
media may have with government ensures that what the public 
ultimately receives as public information has been subjected 
to mediation in passage from government which may signifi­
cantly alter its content, form and impact as a basis for 
influencing the agenda of public affairs. Yet what reaches 
the public is the substance for evaluation and feedback 
involved in choice or consent. It is the theoretical basis 
of adjustments to the course on which the polity is steered, 
if the information cycle is to run its full course.
There is a final influence which neither government nor 
media may be able to judge. The final penetration and 
impact information from government on the public are 
problematical, dependent on the vagaries and degree of 
public interest and of commitment to public affairs.
Many of the public are likely to have non-participant 
orientations to political life, though they may retain a 
keen "spectator” interest in it as presented by media 
channels which constantly bring it to their ears and eyes.
For others the sports or entertainment review may be the 
only media content they absorb. Politically conscious 
consumers of news and information are likely to be already 
conditioned by education and experience to set political 
attitudes through which information is finally filtered, 
adding personal interpretation to that already present 
from government and media.
The importance of opinion-leaders and the two-step
flow of communication through which media information reaches
the mass of the less or casually participant population has  ^ ^ ,Berelsonbeen well established by the work of Lazarsfeld /and Gaudet
(194-8) and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1956). And it is, in the
end, the political interest which the individual public may
develop :m^^articular items of government information - in
the form/through the channels in which they have arrived at
this destination as public information - which determines
its impact. Chaffee (1975) emphasises the importance of
diffusion in the information cycle, of public understanding
of what government is doing. For those whose political
orientations are minimal, or entirely subject, political
information from government, however, persuasively framed.
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and with whatever degree of media comment, falls upon deaf 
ears •
The receptors of public information who attach 
political values to it are no more value-free in their 
assessments than the mediation which the information 
undergoes from government and media en route. The full 
process of mediation passes at the point of public reception 
out of the influences which government and media can bring 
to bear on it. So far as it has an influence on feedback 
into the information cycle it may reflect influences other 
than those which result from mediation. But an overt feed­
back response may not - indeed does not - complete the 
output of information processes. The final element of 
information in the system may be what the public thinks but 
does not express through any political channel. This may 
be an accumulation of feedback absorbed and unexpressed 
within the limits of habituation. This has a potential for 
discharge which may be activated by some accretion of 
apparently little significance. The public may shrug its 
shoulders at political inadequacy, scandal and manipulation 
up to a point; but the last increment may be too much.
An accumulated discharge of feedback may wrench the 
steering from its accustomed hands, or at least cause a 
hurried adjustment of course, a possibly destabilising 
change.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
In order to consider the processes of mediation at 
their fullest, the discussion in Chapters Five and Six has 
been, with some reservation, in terms of autonomous media 
within political structures - systems and institutions of 
government - in which government distributes information 
and power-content to the public over wide areas of its 
activities and responsibilities. General theories and 
models of the political system in the abstract are eclectic 
enough in principle to accommodate any kind of political 
structure within their generalities. But in associating 
theoretical constructs with the actual information processes 
of systems of government we cannot go very far without 
beginning to make assumptions and beg questions about the 
relationships within systems of government which can produce 
very different outputs of public information. The transla­
tion of theoretical concepts into processes of government 
requires differentiation between systems of government and 
their characteristics.
Labelling systems of government as democracies, 
dictatorships or otherwise involves semantic and subjective 
distinctions. The political and governmental systems of the 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., for example, look very different from 
each other’s viewpoints. Even similar systems of government 
and institutions may vary widely in their working structures 
and internal relationships. In order to consider information 
transfer between government and public the need is for some 
broad definitive distinction between systems which determines 
the characteristics of government and public information. A 
cardinal distinction between competitive and non-competitive 
political and governmental systems will illustrate 
determinative features of their internal information
relationships which can be generally applied. For these 
purposes competitive systems are considered as those in which 
the public (electorate) is able to exercise a periodic 
choice of government among freely competing political parties 
and have free access to autonomous media, that is, media not 
controlled by government. Non-competitive systems are 
considered to be controlled by one political party, not to 
offer political choice, and to have non-autonomous media,
controlled by government.
There is no absolute division between classes of 
systems in these terms. Free political competition may 
produce a dominant party, not large and powerful enough to 
govern without the co-operation of other parties, but able 
to frustrate the formation of any government in which it does 
not have the dominant role. The information relationships 
are the outcome of political relationships.
Elements and features of government are common to all 
systems, competitive and non-competitive. Their balance in 
relation to the essential characteristics of the system 
produces the information relationships between government 
and public and determines the channels of transfer and 
possible influence on the steering. All governments contain, 
elements of bureaucracy and political echelons. They have 
features of accountability^ ideology, expectations and 
habituations developed within government and public.
Apter (1965); 24.3) rates accountability of government -
answerability to a group other than itself - as a structural 
requisite of government generally, its degree indicated by 
the influence and control exerted over government by non­
governmental and quasi-governmental bodies (including 
political parties) and patterns of consent. The degree of 
accountability is essentially a product of political 
competition. A public required to exercise political choice 
has an expectation of information about government performance 
and policies as a basis for it. It may not make its choices 
entirely on that information and its evaluations of it, but 
will have the outstanding features somewhere in mind, even if 
in a narrow personal rather than broadly political sense.
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Where political choice is exercised there are political 
channels, e.g. an opposition, through which the demand for 
accountability may be expressed. An opposition may be an 
alternative government; its function is to criticise and to 
propose alternatives. It requires accountability informa­
tion which enables it to perform that function. The more 
competitive the system, the stronger the public demand for 
information, through competing parties, is likely to be, 
and the greater the habituation of government to provide it 
(in content and form as favourable to itself as possible).
A public required merely to affirm support of a single 
party, accustomed to government by that party as fixed, 
remote, uninformative and arbitrary, handing down only 
authoritative, compliance outputs of information, and 
statements rather than explanations, has no call and does 
not expect to be admitted into information about government's 
performance and processes. If the party in power cannot be 
dislodged there are no pressures on it to produce information 
through which it can be held accountable, to nourish any 
public countervailing power. Public information is reduced 
to what government wishes to issue; and it acquires no 
habituation to provide more.
Information. Actualities and Political Competition
Accountability and ideology are major variables in the 
degree to which information within the political system 
diverges from actualities, that is the facts and situations 
related to them in the information environments as far as 
they could in theory be objectively ascertained. Government 
is constantly drawing primary inputs of information from its 
environments. As noted above (p. 32) defects of origin or 
collection may cause divergence from actualities at that 
stage, and these pass into government’s information potential 
and may cause further divergence. Facts and situations in 
the environments may be unkown and unperceived until some 
event brings them into relationshipiiwith government.«.
As government and public information are subj ected to 
the processes of mediation discussed in Chapters Four to 
Six, the greater tends to be the potential divergence of 
content and form from actualities. The tendency is systemic
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Six, the greater tends to be the potential divergence of 
content and form from actualities. The tendency is systemic
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and inevitable; without it the raw material of primary 
information entering government would often have little 
organised significance in the purpose for which it is used. 
The degree to which divergence may occur and develop is 
largely a function of accountability and ideology within 
the system of government.
Political competition tends to limit divergence of
government and public information from actualities.
Accountability and voluntary government outputs expose
15information and may initiate demand to supplement it.
Despite government monopoly of much of its information, some 
can be checked against actualities in the information 
environments. For example, government claims to be in 
control of inflation will not be accepted in face of 
steeply rising prices and tumbling value of the currency. 
Government statistics suggesting that nuclear reactors 
constitute no significant environmental hazard may be 
contradicted by independent medical evidence of the 
incidence of radiation-associated disease. Interest groups 
have specialised information sources, and are often 
suppliers of primary information to government.
Government’s need for credibility, availability of 
alternative information, the doubt and scrutiny of autono­
mous media and a watchful opposition help to limit 
divergence of government and public information from 
actualities. Demand for access by right to government 
information is a phenomenon of competitive political 
systems, and where established is a check on government 
information at source. The strength of limitations on 
divergence depends on the effectiveness of political 
competition and the channels through which demand can be 
expressed and challenge to government mounted.
Divergence may be present in government management
of public information outputs as part of the attempt to --------------------------------- — -----------------------
A justification of the retention of information within 
government in the Belgrano Affair (footnote 12, p.6l above) 
put forward by the then British Minister for Defence in 
November 198^ was that; ”...it was quite apparent to me 
that the more information we provided the more it would be 
argued yet more information was needed” (Ponting, 1985» 
preliminary quotation).
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generate a supportive, or at least not hostile feedback. 
Transfer to the public by autonomous media^and public views 
otherwise conditioned,are countervailing influences to 
attempts at feedback management; there is a potential 
discrepancy between feedback which reaches the steering 
and the feedback which government may try to manipulate for 
it (both will diverge from the actualities). If response 
is close to the feedback actually reaching the steering the 
polity will naturally have a slightly erratic course in 
relation to actualities. A strong government ideology and 
information management may accentuate the effect of such 
deviations to the point of inconsistency with actualities; 
but this will tend to be corrected in the following further 
information cycles which result from steering responses.
Competition does not necessarily enhance stability, 
which does not always depend on information. Stability may 
be jeopardised by competing ideologies or confused circum­
stances with which government is unable to cope. Political 
objectives of parties within the system may not be oriented 
to stability. Nevertheless, reasonable correspondence of 
information with actualitiesrls an aid to continuous self­
correction by adaptation, without the potential instability 
which could arise; from lack of correspondence,to a point at 
which the actualities themselves may force sudden and 
disruptive change.
Moreover, the processes of circulation, digestion and 
feedback of information within competitive systems take time, 
as well as restrict the freedom of action of government.
There is a relationship between the power which government 
distributes with public information and the power it may 
need to retain to cope with acute or sudden stresses calling 
for arbitrary action. In times of acute stress, such as war, 
competitive systems tend to restrict their normal conventions 
of competition and information. Chaffee (1975) draws 
attention to Siebert’s proposition (1952) that government 
constraints on the press increase in times of stress on the 
total political system. Constraint is limitation of the 
transfer of power-content, leaving less ability to criticise, 
with government freer to act as it sees fit. Information to 
the public tends to call for diffuse rather than specific
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support, within a framework of consensus on the need for 
constraint itself.
Non-competitive political systems are marked by 
exclusive ideologies, highly centralised power and 
correspondingly low accountability. Government projects 
ideologically determined information, virtually deprived 
of power-content, through channels dedicated to that purpose, 
in order to produce an amplifying, reinforcive feedback 
(Deutsch, 1967; 287) of diffuse support rather than of
specific demand. In the absence of competing or independent 
elements wiihin 1he political system public information may be 
subjected to extremes of the hypotheses stated at p.29 above. 
Non-autonomous media are completely a branch and instrument 
of government. It follows that the public must be 
insulated by physical and technical controls from other 
sources of information. Schramm (1976; 105-4-6) gives an
account of the complete integration of media into the 
apparatus of the state, of the technical restrictions, uses 
of broadcast media and the absence of the news criteria and 
goals which characterise autonomous media in competitive 
systems.
This is conditioned power - persuaded belief - in 
intense form, with condign power ready to suppress manifest 
disbelief and its expression, even individually. Condign 
power need not be openly coercive; it can be exercised in 
subtle and indirect ways, through constraints on education, 
employment, opportunity or admission to power-holding circles. 
Given the non-competitive structure and strong, unopposed 
ideologies of such political systems these characteristics 
and the constraints to which they give rise are systemic, 
and pervade the outlook of bureaucracy, government and 
public. Habituation of the public to the information it 
receives is heightened by the absence of alternative informa­
tion or ideology.
Divergencies between information circulating from 
government and the actualities of the information environments 
may be very wide, but the public has no political channels of 
identifying and penetrating them. They may be insulated from 
the effects by artificial rates of exchange, internal pricing 
systems and other forms of control extending into every
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activity. Divergencies which cannot be disguised are 
ideologically rationalised in terms of objectives and 
hostile influences, in order to maintain support. In the 
weakness of channels of demand and the extent of public 
habituation to government outputs, feedback from the public 
is hardly effective; the internal information cycle which 
may influence the steering is confined within elite circles.
So long as those who control the steering can make 
enough pragmatic adaptation to reconcile the operation of 
the system with the actualities of the environments, and 
remain in complete control of public information, non­
competitive political systems can be very stable and 
persistent. Stresses in the environments whose actualities 
cannot be rationalised in terms of ideology, such as economic 
breakdown,whose effect cannot convincingly be disguised, may 
lead to the growth of critical (negative) feedback with a 
potential to modify sheering. Information may be illicitly 
circulated which conflicts with the information from govern­
ment and undermines its credibility. But the political 
system permits the ready use of condign power and rationalises 
it in order to maintain the system. The importance attached 
to the suppression of illicitly-circulated information in 
ideologically-dominated, non-competitive systems emphasises 
the role of completely-controlled public information.
Israel as an Illustrative Example for Study
Within the framework of the generalised theoretical 
models, actual systems of government can produce complex 
patterns of information transfer between government and 
public and deal with feedback and adaptation in different 
ways. The balances of systemic and other mediation in 
government, the interests and location of power, its use of 
constraints, the strength of ideology, the autonomy and 
effectiveness of the media and the ambient political culture 
ensure that the differences between government and public 
information and their effect on the steering of the polity 
present no consistent pattern in the real world. The 
complexity and interdependence of the factors at work can 
be illustrated only by examination of their operation in
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actual political systems and cultures.
A non-competitive political context would, however, 
afford an illustration of self-steering through total 
control of information rather than of response to it. It 
would demonstrate projection of ideologically determined 
information from government with a minimum of power-content, 
through non-autonomous channels, in order to produce an 
amplifying feedback of diffuse support, rather than of 
variable and specific demand. The information cycle is 
closed. Such a study in the techniques of information 
controlvDuld not adequately illustrate the more complex 
interactions to be found in competitive systems, whose 
steering is closer to actualities because of the independent 
pressures of accountability and autonomous media.
Adequately illustrative systems are not plentiful.
Systems at extremes can only present over-emphases. Long- 
established systems often lack the dynamism of newer 
societies not yet settled into firm patterns of political 
culture in which development and interaction of variables 
can be followed at close range. New and developing states 
tend to have unstable political systems and cultures in which 
information generation and transfer are circumstantially 
haphazard.
Israel has been selected as a state with a political 
system and culture particularly illustrative for this study. 
Though comparatively new (established 194-8) it is more 
developed than most other new states, but still developing 
at a rate which facilitates identification of changes. An 
elective system and free political competition which produce 
a tendency towards fragmentation and factionalism have 
nevertheless been marked by an unusual political stability. 
The political culture has a strong eastern European in­
heritance, remote from immigrants from Moslem lands without 
political experience or tradition in their countries of 
origin. Their influence is still being absorbed into the 
social and political framework. Ideological authoritarianism 
was a powerful factor in development, and ideological 
symbolism is a factor in much public information.
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The external pressures of hostility from Arab states, 
and occasional war, maintain exceptional constraints on 
public information, and afford cover for political manipu­
lation. The autonomous press accepts a voluntary measure of 
control by co-operation with government; it has strong 
party parallelisms. The media virtually command the channels 
of communication between government and public, but political 
attitudes to them retain strains of authoritarianism. The 
broadcast media are subject to direct political pressures 
which may limit their expression. Public opinion has not 
altogether accepted the Social Responsibility role of the 
media in areas of national sensitivity. The state is 
persistently confronted with information problems rooted in 
its structural peculiarities and ideologies. It has a 
particular problem in relation to the West Bank of the 
Jordan, which generates divisive internal differences across 
established party lines.
This unique mix of factors tests and illustrates the 
hypotheses advanced. Comparison and analogy with the far 
more settled pattern of institutions and information transfer 
in the United Kingdom will distinguish some of the special 
influences at work. Some information analogies can be drawn 
in relation to the West Bank and Northern Ireland, though 
the political circumstances are very different. Comparison 
will also illustrate the variations in the patterns of 
information generation and transfer which can develop within 
the range of competitive political systems. Israel and the 
United Kingdom occupy different positions in this spectrum, 
but what they have in common will help to identify the 
essential divergence between competitive and non-competitive 
systems which finds expression in the information relation­
ships between government and public. The comparison should 
also throw light on the applicability of theoretical models, 
in relation to the requirements for stability and response 
to change in the political system, and may suggest new ways 
of approach to some problems of government communication 
with the public.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ISRAEL; THE INHERITANCE OF THE STATE
The Zionist Impulse
The characteristic features of government, political 
system and power in Israel, and the ambient information 
environment, were formed before the creation of the state 
itself in May 194-8. The patterns of government and public 
information in the present-day state are fully explicable 
only in the light of the pre-state history and organisation, 
and its dominant Zionist content.
The history of Zionism and the settlement movement to 
which it gave rise, first in Ottoman Palestine and then, 
from 1920, under the British Mandate from the League of 
Nations, are extensively documented. Modern works by Lucas 
(1974^ ), Sacher (1976), Safran (1978) and Isaac (1981), among 
others, continue the story into the development of the state, 
while Frankel (1980) presents an ’’anatomical” survey of its 
features and institutions. The summary which follows is 
concerned mainly to identify aspects of history and develop­
ment which bear significantly on government and public 
information in the present-day state.
The pre-state Jewish community in Palestine, usually 
known as the Yishuv (lit: settlement), numbering by 19i^ 8 
not more than 65QOOO in a Palestine population of some 
2,000,000 was exceptionally highly organised and substantially 
self-governing. It had a degree of structural differentiation 
in institutions, political parties, bureaucracy, communica­
tions media and an electoral, representative system more 
characteristic of a state than a community. Its institutions 
were recognised by the territorial power and maintained 
formal relations with it. An elected Assembly (Asefat 
Hanivharlm), constituted in 1920, became the effective
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instrument of community government, through its executive 
organ, the Va'ad Leumi (lit: National Council). It was 
juridically recognised in 1927 by the Mandatory Government, 
and became the Knesset "fisrael (lit: Assembly of Israel). 
Through the Jewish Agency affairs were conducted with the 
Mandatory Government (Lucas, 1974-» 136-37). Institutions
provided quasi-state services of health, education and 
welfare. The Yishuv "government” had its own defence 
organisation. It allocated authoritative values for the 
Jewish community, in the sense that "...a policy is clearly 
authoritative when the feeling prevails that it must or 
ought to be obeyed" (Easton, 1953» 13» 133)* It controlled
the principal channels of information output and of its 
dissemination to the public through.the Yishuv press.
Though the Yishuv lacked the formal territoriality and 
legally coercive powers of a state, it had de facto elements 
of the former. Jewish settlements carried on intensive 
agricultural colonisation of particular areas, on land owned 
by community institutions, supported by funds channelled 
through the community. There were Jewish urban areas, and 
Tel Aviv was a wholly Jewish city. These territorial 
identifications were strong enough to be the bases of pre- 
194-8 British and United Nations partition plans.
The driving force of the Yishuv was secular Zionism. 
Though a tenuous religious and messianic Jewish connection 
with Palestine had been maintained in some form over the 
centuries, secular Zionism, a movement which incorporated 
religious elements, but whose aspirations were fundamentally 
social and political, was the mainspring of modern Jewish 
"redemptive" settlement in Palestine, and the subsequent 
establishment of the state. Its intellectual roots were in 
the socialist doctrines with which Europe, particularly
Tsarist Russia, was fermenting in the late 19th century. 16
‘About five million Jews thai lived under Russian rule, 
largely segregated by law in the Pale of Settlement, along 
the western borders of Russia. They were subjected to 
crippling legal and economic discriminations, and direct 
official persecution which reached its peak from 18§2 onwards. 
A large proportion became pauperised (Lucas 1974-, 5-7).
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The pogroms of the 1880's in Russia and the reconciliations 
of Marxism and Zionism in the works of two socialist-Zionist 
philosophers, Borochov (1881-1907) and Syrkin (1867-1924.)* 
provided the practical and intellectual drives. Theodor 
Herzl (1860-1904), who saw in the Dreyfus trial of 1894 the 
failure of Jewish assimilation, legitimised Zionism as a 
political movement on an international scale, convening the 
first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897.
The formative process of Zionist settlement began in 
the 1880»s. It was marked by surges of immigration, of 
which five are usually distinguished between 1882 and 1947, 
each known as an aliya (lit: going up; by usage: 
immigration to Palestine). The Second Aliya in particular, 
from Russia (1904-1914)* included many young and fervent 
socialist-Zionists, influenced also by the ideas of the 
1905 Russian revolution. They brought exceptionally strong 
and tenacious ideological drives, and were determined to live 
by them. The Third Aliya from eastern Europe (1919-1923) 
contained similar elements.
These pioneers set in motion an intensive process of 
social mobilisation based mainly on agricultural collective 
(kibbutz) settlements. Ideologies of collectivity and 
redemption were institutionalised as a form of secular 
religion expressed in disciplined action and submergence of 
self which established its members as a social and political 
elite. The Second Aliya threw up charismatic figures; it 
provided the founding fathers of the state whose idôological 
convictions, key organisational positions and roots and 
associations in Zionist pioneering were to dominate the 
Yishuv and then the state. Later waves of aliya particularly 
the Fifth Aliya of the 1930»s, with its refugees from Germany, 
brought artisan, middle and professional classes less 
purposeful and dedicated, and correspondingly more bourgeois 
in political orientation. There were other forms of 
agricultural organisation, less collective and socialist than 
the kibbutz. But the ^ideologies of the Second and the Third 
Aliya retained the organisational and practical command which 
they had early established.
Safran (1978; 140-47) traces the pre-state evolution of
the multi-party system from the need of the entirely voluntary
85
Zionist movement to maximise membership, and therefore to 
accommodate all views. This was accomplished through full 
proportional representation, which became the established 
system for election of Zionist Congress delegates and for 
allocation of posts in the supporting bureaucracy. Thus 
everything became allocated numerically on party and faction 
strength. The system was reflected in the Zionist organisa­
tion of individual countries, and "...when their members 
emigrated to Palestine they brought with them the party, 
baggage and flag” (Safran, 1978; li^ 7). Some twenty parties
competed within the Yishuv for membership, influence and 
institutional power, in intense ideological factionalism 
fuelled by the intellectual stimulus of a new society.
The Organisation of the Yishuv
Lucas (197i4; 124.-35) notes the piecemeal progress of
institution-building during the pre-state period. Each 
major party tried to establish "...as comprehensive a range 
of institutions as it could, a kind of non-territorial state 
of its own, but within the framework of the overall Zionist 
efforts" (Elazar, 1976; 228). This containment was vital
in face of the mandatory government and the growing threat 
of Arab violence. These "secondary centres" formed a 
complex network of party support.
Two forces grew to dominate the organisation of the 
Yishuv, the Histadrut and Mapai. The Histadrut (lit; 
Federation; by usage, the normal term for the Hebrew 
equivalent of the General Federation of Jewish Workers in 
the Land of Israel) was a 1920 federation of Labour groups, 
but a supra-party organisation, open to all. It organised 
the provision of work for new immigrants, as well as social 
welfare schemes, particularly the Kupat Holim (lit: Sick 
Fund), a comprehensive system of health insurance and 
treatment. It ran a bank, schools, workers* colleges and 
training schemes, sports organisations, pension and 
provident funds, a daily newspaper and other publishing 
activities. It controlled the labour exchanges. In 1924 
it established the Hevrat HaOvdim (lit: The Workers* 
Society), in form a capitalist enterprise, as the owner of 
the Histadrut assets and enterprises. As the country*s 
dominant manufacturer and public works and building cortractor
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(a major source of work for new immigrants) the Hevrat 
HaOvdim ensured for the Histadrut an economic base, 
financed by ploughed-back profits.
In 1929 a number of Labour groups came together as 
Mapai (Hebrew acronym for Israel Labour Party), and in 
1930 Mapai gained control of the Histadrut: "The political 
ascendancy of the labour movement virtually placed control 
of the capitalistic economy in the hands of the labour 
bureaucracy". (Lucas, 1974^ ; 128). By 1933 Mapai
dominated the principal institutions of the Yishuv and 
commanded the economic infrastructure and the major sources 
of information. The Histadrut became a valuable source of 
patronage for Mapai's politically active members. Galnoor 
(1982; 115) notes that: "The Histadrut attracted politicians,
especially at the middle level..... Party members were paid
for their work in the Histadrut, while their activities in 
the Party remained voluntary". It may be added that they 
therefore had very strong personal reasons for not dis- 
jleasing the Party. Fig. 4 indicates the extent and 
ramifications of the organisation, and thus the range of 
information which it commanded, as well as the scope for 
patronage. It was the main secondary centre of the Yishuv, 
in some respects more powerful than the primary "government" 
institutions (Shapira, 1977; 74-89).
Other parties developed their institutional bases until 
party was pervasive in education, medicaü insurance, banking, 
youth movements and economic enterprise. Perlmutter (1970; 
4-5) SLlilistrates the correspondence in the Yishuv of political 
and social mobilisation and institutionalisation during 
periods of high immigration, such as 1920-1940. An intricate 
political and institutional network allocated positions of 
influence. An extensive bureaucracy developed, not on 
premises of merit, even-handedness and public service, but 
on allegiance to party or faction,the pervasive basis of 
proportional representation, or "party key" on which offices 
and resources were shared out.
This system of power-sharing drew all elements into the 
coalition by giving them a practical stake in the allocation 
of influence and resources. The Yishuv achieved "...a stable 
political order via the dynamics of fulfilled expectations.
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an integrated stratification system, felite accommodation, 
and the mitigation of structural, institutional and 
ideological differences”. Zionism provided the consensus 
which restrained factionalism from disintegrating the 
institutional structure (Perlmutter 1970; 4-)» Though in
1935 the militant right-wing Revisionist party broke away 
from the Zionist leadership it was no real challenge to it.
Despite its institutional complexity the Yishuv was
managed by a small power elite. It is often referred to as
an "intimate society". There were close intellectual and17aliya ties, often further bound by close kinship ties.
The party organisations themselves had many roots in the 
kibbutz and other settlement movements, of which leaders 
and officials remained members. A limited circle of leading 
personalities were to be found at the centre of, or closely 
connected with all major decisions and activities. This 
institutionalised "establishment" was entrenched in the 
Yishuv by the 1930's. Family, workplace or settlement ties 
and contact with party officials kept touch throughout the 
system, which had exceptional political and social cohesion.
The Yishuv also possessed defence capacity and a press. 
Lucas (1974.; 167-84) traces the evolution of the former,
the Hagana (lit; defence), from settlements' early self- 
defence needs into an organised community defence system, 
as conflict developed from the 1930's with the British 
mandatory power as well as the Arabs, and ultimately as a 
political instrument for the Yishuv. Though poorly equipped 
it became virtually an underground army, whose penetration 
of the community, and intelligence sources within the 
structure of the mandatory government gave it exceptional 
value as an information channel for the Yishuv authorities.
^'^•Davis (1977; 76-77) traces kinship relations within a
group of families, at the heart of Yishuv affairs, coming 
from the area of Minsk, in the Russian Pale of Settlement. 
Elite and informal networks are to be found in most societies; 
in the small society of the Yishuv they were especially 
penetrative. See also Lupton and Wilson (Manchester School 
of Economic and Social Studies, XXVII i(l959)’^old boy net" revealed in financial regulation in the United 
Kingdom by the British Bank Rate Tribunal of 1957.
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and as a channel for clandestine activities, such as 
organisation of illegal immigration (i.e. without government 
certificates). The community was habituated to the 
protection of information; many questions were not asked; 
information was not given. These attitudes became embedded.
Press and Information
The press reflected the community's origins; no 
political party on the eastern European model was complete 
without its newspaper, periodical or broadsheet. The 
Jewish population was almost entirely literate and the 
party press was an important means of political communica­
tion and maintenance (Galnoor, 1982; 227, 231). Major
Hebrew dailies became firmly established - Table 2 - 
associated with or run by the main political parties. The 
press fulfilled both party and community functions. "The 
ideological preoccupation of Hebrew newspapers.during the 
Mandate, and their close connection with Jewish institutions, 
meant that they considered themselves the mouthpieces of 
the different branches of the Zionist movement rather than 
the conveyors of information" (Goren, 1979; 88). They were
vehicles not so much for news as for communicating party 
decisions and speeches for discussion by party branches, 
institutions and members. Most journalists worked in the 
party press. Party officials could double as editors, and 
contributors were often not journalists but party leaders 
and intellectuals, some with a notorious contempt for the 
press as such, to whom the party newspaper was simply a 
vehicle for party purposes (Wolfensohn, 1979; 6; Goren, 1979;
87, 98).
In addition, there was a strong working liason between 
main Yishuv institutions and the press, especially through 
the Jewish Agency's Political Department, which gave policy 
directives. As external pressures tightened (a 1933 Press 
Ordinance imposed licensing of printed media, and direct 
government censorship was introduced in 1936) the Yishuv 
press functioned as an arm of the community authorities for 
information control and mobilisation, in accordance with 
Zionist policy. Voluntary co-operation was formalised in 
1942 in the Reaction (or Response) Committee, comprising the 
Editors of main newspapers, accepting voluntary censorship
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Title
Haaretz (The Country) 
Hebrew
Davar (Word) 
Hebrew
Ownership
Private
Yediot Aharonot 
(Latest News) 
Hebrew
Palestine Post 
English
Histadrut
(ïiabour Federation)
Private
Hatsofe
(The Watchman)
Hebrew
A1 Hamishmar (On Guard) 
Hebrew
Haboker (The Morning) 
Hebrew
Herut (Freedom)
Hebrew
Editor (Agronsky) with 
private backing. The 
Jewish Agency had about eight 
per cent voting rights
National Religious Party/ 
Mizrahi
Mapam party 
(United Workers)
General Zionist Party 
Herut party. Right-wing
Comment
The oldest major daily, founded 1919.Israel's prestige paper, independent, 
highbrow and investigative. Widely read 
by the "establishment", professional and 
middle-classes. Good overseas news services.
Founded 1925 as the daily of the Labour 
movement. The left-wing orientation 
nevertheless allowed a good deal of 
editorial freedom, and non-editorial 
criticism of Histadrut policy.
Daily, founded 1939. Right-wing and anti- 
Soviet leanings, but many views accommodated. 
Israel's first mass circulation newspaper.
An English-language daily founded in 1932 
(after 194-8 became the Jerusalem Post). 
Provided a platform for the Yishuv to the 
Mandatory Administration, the diplomatic, 
foreign and journalistic community.
Generally Labour sympathies, but wide 
range of views.
Founded 1938 as the daily paper of the 
orthodox religious parties; partisan 
circulation.
The party organ, founded 1943» ideological 
in character; partisan circulation.
The party journal. Middle-class orientation.
The party organ. Ideological; partisan 
circulation.
c.
Sources ;
Hebrew was not the mother-tongue of the majority of the Yishuv population, and a variety 
of minor productions catered for linguistic groups - various European languages.
Newspapers were normally published early in the morning. Yediot Aharonp.;^  nominally an 
afternoon paper, was on sale by mid-morning. There were no "Sabbath' editions: Friday 
issues carried "weekend" supplements.
Closely partisan organs had a limited circulation; but the main newspapers (first four) 
had much cross-readership among an almost totally literate community. Most readers oi 
Haaretz took at least one other paper.
Nyrop (1979; 309); Frankel (1980; 140-^47); Newsview (8 June 1982); present
Jerusalem Post management.
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and acting in concert against the mandatory government in 
the agreed interests of the Yishuv, sometimes successfully 
defying, by collective action, censorship and punitive
measures (Gorent 1979» 89-90).
In what amounted by the 1930*s to a revolutionary 
struggle the Yishuv press was authoritarian rather than 
libertarian, used "...to inform the people of what the 
rulers thought they should know and the policies the rulers 
thought they should support" (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm,
1976; 2). The Jewish community numered less than a hundred
thousand households; short and rapid internal communications 
enabled every Jewish community and settlement to receive the 
daily newspapers within hours (Galnoor, 1982; 223)« Radio
was not yet a serious competitor to the press in information 
dissemination.
The flow of information between the Yishuv "government" 
and its public inevitably reflected the political organisa­
tion. Information input was "filtered" through party and 
ideological machines, especially if it might be the basis 
of allocation of community resources. The effective 
machinery of government was manned by party-affiliated 
bureaucrats; Galnoor (1982; 181-83) notes their influential
gatekeeping role in Mapai, in the exchange, report and co­
ordination of information through party organisation and 
channels. He adduces this organised information flow as a 
positive factor in Israeli political development. In the 
web of party and personal objectives it would inevitably have 
been susceptible to systemic distortions. The manipulation 
of information, of its positive and negative potential and 
its power-content, was built into the political structure.
The information which might reach the Yishuv public through 
its party affiliations could hardly be unscathed.
Information expectations of the community "public" were 
limited by its support of the Yishuv leadership in consensus 
(though not always unwavering) about community objectives.
The intimacy of the society as a whole meant that much 
information passed by inter-personal contact. It was 
understood that there was voluntary community censorship, 
and that information was manipulated in the press for 
community purposes.
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Transition to the State
On withdrawal of the British power in May 194.8 the 
sheer speed and pressure of events - the first a war for 
survival - virtually imprinted the complex political 
patterns of the Yishuv on the new state. Overnight, the 
dominant party became the basis of the new government and 
Knesset (Assembly); Yishuv institutions became the basis 
of the new state administration; the senior bureaucracy of 
the Histadrut became the senior bureaucracy of the new state. 
As the state organisation expanded to meet new demands, the 
political and bureaucratic systems expanded, willy-nilly, 
with it, on the established party key basis. Thus, the 
framework of the Yishuv became legitimised as the framework 
of the state. Yishuv leaders moved to crush any appearance 
of separatism, to unify armed forces, and to impose the 
supreme authority of the state whose leadership they now 
assumed. It was natural for those in power to see the 
continuation of that power as a necessity in face of 
critical situations which demanded action, and for the 
Yishuv to accept it.
Mass immigration, into the early 1950*s, succeeded the 
armistice agreements of 194-9 with surrounding Arab states.
It drastically altered the social composition of the state, 
whose population had been predominantly Ashkenazi Jews (lit; 
German; by usage European) with mainly central and eastern 
European cultural, political and educational experience.
By the end of 1951 the new state had more than doubled its 
Jewish population, absorbing the remnants of European Jewry 
and whole new communities from Moslem countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa, to whom Israel's war with the 
Arabs brought persecution in their countries of settlement. 
Jewish communites from Moslem countries, accustomed to the 
tolerated but inferior status given to non-Moslem communities^ 
had no significant political experience; the ideologies of 
pioneering Zionism and the drives which these created were 
unknown to them. The majority were Sephardi Jews (lit: 
Spanish; by usage; descendatits of Jewish refugees from 
16th century Spanish and Portugese persecutions) with low 
educational and cultural levels by Ashkenazi standards.
This mass immigration was for the most part destitute.
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flooding into the small country left financially and 
otherwise chaotic by the British withdrawal, and recently 
disrupted by war (Lucas, 197 4^; 270-73).
Whatever the social problems, the political pattern 
remained unbroken. Immigration and absorption processes 
"... enforced a strict party key that assigned immigrants 
to party representatives on the basis of each partjf's 
existing electoral strength" (Isaac, 1981?. 113). Medding
(1972; 226) notes that employment and housing were often
allocated on party criteria. A verdict looking back from 
the 1965 and 1969 elections was able to conclude that 
"...the Israeli political establishment and major political 
blocs derive power equally from the old Yishuv and the new 
Israeli constituencies, and the process of voter institu­
tionalisation favours the aggrandisement of the establishmeit
parties" (Perlmutter; 1970; 4-3).
Their grip was strong. Functions, values and systems 
which they had organised for their adherents penetrated 
deep into daily life and could not be changed overnight, 
even if there were any agreement on change and its 
direction. Party machines and leaders were entrenched and 
self-perpetuating. The state - a novelty - inevitably made 
its own demands in relation to what are normally state 
functions, such as education, employment, defence, law, 
health and welfare, water resources and social insurance.
But the grip of party on some basic services was not broken, 
especially on the health services, a stronghold of the 
Histadrut, whose sick fund, embracing some ninety per cent 
of the insured population, remains crucial to its membersh^ 
and influence. However, over the years many party 
institutions, though nominally independent, became heavily 
dependent on government subsidies.
The Decline of Consensus
For some twenty years after 194-8 the state was driven 
by the urgent needs of survival and nation-building, and 
government was sustained by the impetus of the Yishuv, its 
organisation, leadership and ideologies. Notwithstanding 
the many pragmatic adaptations of ideology which had to be 
made, the Mapai/Histadrut combination was able to dominate 
the political scene on the basis of a consensus about
9^
national needs and objectives.
The ideologically - infused leaders who had brought 
the state into being maintained a tight grip on the 
political machinery. Goodman and Landau (1975; 179) have
suggested an elite of about five hundred people as the 
decision-makers, many of them pre-state leaders or their 
selected successors. Nyrop (1979; 1A3) puts the number of
the political elite in 1978 within this circle at about two 
hundred, the majority professional party politicians —  
"askanim”. These were the leaders, the ideologists, the 
party and Histadrut. ’’apparatchiks" who had common roots of 
origin, immigration, the kibbutz and the Hagana, who had 
worked closely.with each other over the years in various 
capacities. They controlled information and mobility within 
the institutions and parties; they trained and nominated 
their successors in the same mould. Élite circles were not 
exclusive, but entrants needed more than ability; they had 
to demonstrate party loyalty and to command support from the 
top. Inevitably they were supported by functionaries and 
time-servers who looked to patronage for their rewards - a 
system most conveniently exercised behind the scenes.
Beneath the surface there were changes. Eisenstadt 
(1985) has analysed in detail the influences which began to 
transform Israeli society, as events, the integration of the 
now Sephardi majority and the weakening of Zionist ideals, 
with the achievement of their main objectives, exerted their 
influence. The dramatic victory of the Six-Day War of 1967 
relieved the immediate pressures on survival, but brought 
new - and divisive - problems of acquisition of territory 
with a million Arab inhabitants. Thenceforward there was 
a move away from the traditional ideological differences 
towards polarisation around the question of peace, security 
and the future of the occupied territories.
Galnoor (Arian, 1980; 122-23, 126) identifies the
Yom Kippur War of 1973 as the event which shook the surival 
capacity of the political system as shaped in the Yishuv, 
though "...as a catalyst for processes of transformation 
which had already begun". Above all, a failure of 
government and public information shattered the passive 
trust of press and public - a voluntary abnegation of
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countervailing power - in military and political leaders 
and organisation. The Meir government, forced to resign in 
197/1, was the first to be brought down by public pressure 
rather than political manoeuvring. As consensus was eroded 
so was the power of Mapai and its coalition allies. New 
demands for administrative organisation and economic and 
political reform began to emerge, no longer completely 
controllable from the political centre through the networks 
of secondary institutions which were the habitual channels 
of information and negotiation, out of public sight.
Political competition was sharpened by the advent of new 
parties and a more fluid political environment.
Loss of political certainty eroded the confidence of 
the bureaucracy and government, and a no longer entirely 
manageable Knesset began to show signs of independence which 
resulted in unaccustomed government reverses amd some loss 
of control of Knesset committees. Government began to rely 
more on appointed committees and inquiries to strengthen its 
hand, and some of its authority passed to the Attorney - 
General and the courts, as it sought similar authoritative 
backing for its actions. Independent investigation of 
various public scandals, and especially the Agranat 
Commission Report (197/t) on the mismanagement of the 1973 
war, brought into the public arena information of kinds 
never before displayed, undermining the credibility of the 
political and military establishment. Broadcasting, which 
had been removed from direct government control to that of 
a public authority in 1965» and television, introduced in 
1968, brought events more.directly to the public eye, opening 
up public interest in the information which lay behind them.
As political procesaes became more visible, government 
began to lose its historical control of information which 
confined circulation to ^lite circles on the basis of 
selection and need to know - i.e. the retention of power- 
content in the hands of the power-holders. In the more 
fluid and uncertain political environment leaks of informa­
tion from government at all levels, exploited by a press 
often linked with contending parties and factions, and more 
professionally Independent as the power of central government 
loosened, became a normal feature of the political system.
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which no government has been able to stop. The failure of 
government to settle contentious issues firmly on a 
governmental basis encourages departments and their 
ministers to press their cases on the public, usually by 
using the media.
In the political "earthquake" of the May 1977 election 
the Mapai-led Alignment was overthrown by a new power.group, 
the centre-right Likud coalition, heavily supported by 
younger and Sephardi voters, whose basic ideology was 
assertively nationalist and populist. The Camp David 
Accords of 1979 with Egypt and the evacuation of Sinai 
which followed in 1982, the problem of the West Bank, towards 
which Likud policy has been openly annexationist, the 1982 
Lebanon war and its involvements, the runaway inflation and 
economic crisis of 1983 and 198ii, resulting from Likud 
economic policies, brought Israeli society to a complete 
polarisation. The Lebanon war exposed dangers of mis­
management of government information and of its concealment 
even from the Cabinet, further diminishing public confidence, 
strengthening the influence of the media, and eventually 
bringing down the government. In the election of August 
1984- neither Mapai nor Likud was able to form an effective 
government. Under acute military and economic pressure 
they were forced in September 1984. into an uneasy joint 
Government of National Unity. T his has temporarily post­
poned the underlying conflicts which will determine whether 
the political system can adapt itself to new situations 
successfully, or will undergo possible violent transformdd.on.
Questions of government and public information have 
been intimately involved in the events of the last decade or 
so, and still retain strong characteristics from the Yishuv 
structure and habits. But the media, in particular, have 
strengthened their influence, while the Knesset has failed 
to communicate itself to the public, partly because of its 
inbuilt information deficiencies (discussed in Chapter Ten). 
The examination of the generation and transfer to the public 
of government information, in and through major institutions 
of government, which follows, and of the underlying attitudes 
of government and public, will provide a test of the three 
hypotheses stated (p.29) in nn actual political environment
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under stress. In a wider setting it will help to assess 
the applicability of political theories and models in an 
operative political and social environment.
As discussed by Shapiro (Arian* 1980; 23-37)* Goodman
and Landau (1975* 165) the outstanding feature of the
Israeli political system until the 1970*s was the dominance 
of one party in the competitive* multi-parly political 
environment. The "dominant party" identification* 
associated with Duverger (1967)* relates to a party which 
may not have an outright electoral majority* but attracts 
a much larger number of voters than any other party* 
commands a concentration of ideological and material 
resources and is able to- inspire wide public identification 
with its political philosophy* "identified with an epoch". 
Shapiro holds the Yishuv conditions to have been ideal for 
the emergence of such a dominant party* in Mapai* with its 
command of the Histadrut and Jewish Agency and its powerful 
and practically expressed Zionist ideologies.
Continued into the state* this domination was a 
strongly stabilising influence. Goodman and Landau (1975; 
171) attribute the maintenance of political stability 
partly to the external threat to national existence* partly 
to the need for cabinet coalitions between main political 
groups (or "camps")* on the model of "consociational 
democracy" put forward by Lijphart (1969). Despite deep- 
rooted differences,the political leadership showed a strong 
tendency to accommodation and consensus. Shapiro (1980* 
30-31) also emphasises the control of information about the 
activities of the Mapai party machine as a factor in 
stability - "...the general public was not aware of just 
how pervasive the machine was in the political system..
The information which began to emerge as the dominance of 
Mapai crumbled in the 1970»s hastened its decline; it had 
been based substantially on the public's uninquiring faith. 
Thus the power-content of the information newly obtained by 
the public strengthened its countervailing power against a 
party machine in which confidence was eroded.
tf
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CHAPTER NINE
GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION OUTPUTS
Composition and Organisational Characteristics of the 
Bureaucracy
Nachmias (1978) has discussed the bureaucratic culture 
of Israel, Aspects of bureaucratic structures and 
relationships have been examined by Katz and Eisenstadt 
(1960), Globerson (1970, 1973), Robinson (1973), Dror (1971), 
Danet and Hartman (1972), Katz and Danet (1973) and Caiden 
(1970). Galnoor (1982; Ch. vi) has emphasised the 
communication role of the bureaucracy in Israeli politics 
and society and its non-bureaucratic roles and behaviour in 
the absorption of new immigrants.
Preparations made in 194-8 to create a state bureaucracy
with qualities of professionalism and detachment in mind
were immediately brushed aside by partisan pressures and
the urgencies of survival (Sherf, 1959; 113). The
bureaucracy was heavily and tenaciously politicised in the
image of the Yishuv, By 1954- some forty-four per cent of
senior civil servants came from the political organisations
and institutions of the Labour sector (Globerson, 1970; 53).
At lower levels particularly the bureaucracy absorbed many
new immigrants. Reuveny (1974-J 24) notes that by 1953
about thirty-five per cent of civil servants were new
immigrants, and that this recruitment did not lack a
18political content.
Distribution of public offices was a central payoff 
to supporters and coalition partners, and the dominant 
political element was Mapal, In the early days of the state
Nachmias (1978; 51) notes the same phenomenon in the
U.S.A,, where .patronage was interwined with the integra­
tion of large immigrant populations".
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"...services were performed chiefly for the party faithful 
...certain ministries became hardly distinguishable from 
party cells" (Fein, 1967; 189). "Politicians in Israel,
especially members of the smaller political parties believe 
that the Israeli civil service is the administrative arm of
the Mapai party" (Robinson, 1970; 51).
Since 1951 a Civil Service Commission has substantially 
reduced political abuses in appointment and promotion and 
has encouraged professionalism. But Frankel (1980; 112-13)
notes that the proper procedures for filling posts are still 
often circumvented. For example the State Controller's 
Report No. 36, for 1985, draws attention to the "rigging" of 
application procedures by the Prime Minister's Office in 
order to ensure the appointment of a particular candidate 
(reported in the Jerusalem Post, 12 May 1986, p. 6).
Political preference or acceptability is often the criterion 
for circumvention of the rules. Transgressions of this 
kind against public probity occur in other countries, but 
seem to cause a minimum of public offence in Israel - an 
aspect of public attitudes to administration. At senior 
levels of the bureaucracy patronage is both a valuable 
political resource and a means of reducing personal and 
political incompatibilities.
On the organisational level the exigencies of coalition­
building result in allocation of ministries, as well as jobs, 
to parties or factions, to transfer of functions between 
ministries to remove them from control of a coalition partner, 
and to creation or maintenance of superfluous organisations 
in order to create jobs. Dominant coalition partners have 
retained control of central ministries, such as Finance, 
Defence and Foreign Affairs. The Ministries of the 
Interior and Religious Affairs have been virtually the 
preserve of the religious parties, who hold a politically 
balancing position, and are packed with their adherents
(Frankel, 1980; 112).
Galnoor (Arian, 1980; 138-39) notes that while
politicisation is not precisely aligned to party there is 
a significant link between the minister's party and the 
most senior bureaucrats in ministries; also that bureaucrat 
display greater loyalty to their own ministries than to 
the civil service as a whole. Moreover, bureaucrats are
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closely involved in a wider political sense in relationships 
with secondary centres and pressure groups, almost all of 
which have strong political affiliations* At the highest 
levels of the bureaucracy appointments have been subject 
to "...ability to function in the labyrinth of ministries, 
secondary centres, parties and affiliated organisations" 
Oalnoor, 1982; 213).
Political influences and sympathies are likely to be 
strongest in major departments of direct political importance, 
and weakest in those post-state areas of bureaucracy, such 
as the Central Bureau of Statistics and the National 
Insurance Institute, which are by function apolitical, with 
activities often closely prescribed by law. In the second 
Likud government of 1981-84-, however, political encroach­
ments upon higher bureaucratic appointments increased. The 
directorship of the National Insurance Institute, for 
example, was given in 1982 to Likud nominees. In Likud 
eyes, of course, this is seen as part of a redress of the 
over-weighting of appointments with Mapai nominees during
the long dominance of that party.
No firm central control or co-ordination of the Israeli 
bureaucracy has been achieved. It is inhibited, above all, 
by the political system which makes ministries virtually the 
fiefs of parties within the ruling coalition. Functional 
overlaps, especially in the control and disbursement of 
funds are complicated by the tenacious survival from the 
Yishuv of the Jewish Agency^^ which maintains departments 
paralleling some government departments, with quasi- 
ministerial status, but no direct government control. 
Disarticulation is built into the bureaucratic organisation.
It is compounded by the disinclination of coalition 
governments to arrive at firm common policies in areas of 
contention, leaving ministers and departments to duel in 
public, mainly through the media. The committed
^^'This body, once the representative channel of the Yishuv to the Mandatory Government, has become the major fund-raising 
channel from diaspora communities. Its power rests on disbursement of large funds in immigration, settlement and 
education (Frankel, 1980; 250-54-).
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ideological bent of the political echelons within depart­
ments fosters areas of bounded consideration, projected 
downwards from senior levels which have a survival need 
to be responsive to immediate political demands.
Thus personal, organisational and political influences 
pervade the bureaucratic structure. They affect the 
collection or co-ordination of information which might 
result in unpalatable advice. Ministries and jobs 
controlled by the religious parties are unlikely to expend 
effort on gathering or publishing information which does 
not reflect favourably on maintenance of their purposes. 
Information about the disbursement of funds may contain 
political sensitivities, and is often fragmented and 
obscured. It would be difficult to obtain comprehensive 
information within the Ministry of Religious Affairs about 
the full extent and variety of state financial support for 
religious institutions. During the long period of Mapai 
dominance it would have been similarly difficult to find 
or obtain complete information in the bureaucracy about the 
direction of funds towards some kibbutz and associated 
activities. Under the Likud government of 1977-84 there 
was little desire or intention to gather or produce full 
information about the extent of financial support for 
controversial West Bank settlement, which passes through 
many governmental channels, sometimes in deliberate
obscurity.
The Information Base and Conversion Influences
The characteristics of the bureaucracy and its political 
direction are thus reflected in government's information base. 
But there are other important variables in this, in terms of 
efficiency in reaching the population sources from whom much 
of it comes, and in their affective orientations or feelings 
towards government and towards the bureaucracy perceived as 
its agent. Political affiliations run deep, government tends 
to be regarded as a hostile institution (a deep-rooted 
inheritance from the diaspora), taxation of all sorts is 
very heavy, regulations on personal and business life are 
numerous and onerous. Machinery of enforcement is generally 
inadequate to its task. In consequence information evasions 
flourish. Personal and corporate financial information has
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to be regarded with reserve, and there must be reservations 
about related inputs to -the National Insurance Institute 
and welfare networks, as well as to other government 
agencies. The phenomena are not peculiar to Israel, but
. X 20the influences are strong.
The information base is also unusually widely 
deployed, through state-owned enterprises and military 
industries. Bureaucratic access to information is thus 
extensive, but often indirect, through sectional interests 
which may be loosely articulated to central government. 
Moreover, the origination in party institutions of what is 
effectively national information deprives the bureaucracy 
of important information at first hand. The Kupat Holim 
(Sick Fund) of the Histadrut is almost a national health 
service, and, as such, an important source of information 
input to the bureaucracy. It is difficult to believe that 
some kinds of information, especially about the utilisation 
of funds, flowed as readily into Likud governments, whose 
objective was to force the Kupat Holim into public ownership, 
as into Mapai governments.
The information base must also be affected by internal 
bureaucratic standards. The Israeli bureaucracy retains a 
persistent reputation for petty inefficiencies (Nachmias, 
1978; 112). Galnoor (1982; 217) charitably observes
that tiere is enough slack in the Israeli system to leave 
room for administrative ineptitude, which Caiden (1970; 38
et seq.) puts more graphically in terms of **...a variety of 
styles related to position, experience, age, political 
ideology and personal ambition*’. Nachmias (1978; 155 ©t
seq.) concludes that the Israeli bureaucracy is histori­
cally socially unrepresentative, unduly attractive as an
*^^ ’Nyrop (1979; 186-87 )reckons Israelis in the late 1970»s
to be "Probably the most heavily-taxed population in the world", with a mixlmum marginal rate of sixty-nine‘per cent 
operative at an annual income of less than the equivalent of USi5l0,000. Indirect taxation was also extremely heavy. 
Spot checks of tax returns in 1976 indicated that tax 
liabilities of the self-employed were often double those 
indicated by the taxpayer. Information bases built on 
such foundations were bound to be unreliable.
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employer to less-educated groups seeking job security. 
Professional standards are affected by such factors.
Added values of co-ordination and association of 
information within the bureaucracy must also tend to be 
limited by weakness of common rule administration and the 
consequent flaws in accumulated administrative information, 
which may require conversion into political information 
and advice. Galnoor (1982; 207) emphasises the historical
roots of the ambiguity, or flexibility, of bureaucratic 
administration in the social tutelage role of the bureau­
cracy in the earlier days of the state. Nachmias (1978;
94.) notes the frequent contact of individual Israelis with 
the national bureaucracy in this centralised polity and 
their dependence in both vital and trivial matters on its 
decisions. Katz and Danet (1973) and Katz and Eisenstadt 
(1960)deal more fully with the subject, and the former note 
the particularism in bureaucratic responses. This is likely 
to affect the recording of accurate information.
Inefficiencies, disarticulations, lack of departmental 
and inter-departmental co-ordination, changes in political 
control and the bounded consideration which results add 
their influence. The information potential of the 
government, the base for formulation of information and 
advice in conversion processes which may ultimately affect 
the steering of the polity, may therefore be incomplete or 
unbalanced. It may also be overriden by the strength of 
party ideologies present at ministerial levels and at the 
higher bureaucratic levels at which parties are able to 
influence appointments. It would not be possible to 
quantify the factors involved, which are not unknown in 
more developed countries. In terms of administration they 
must be judged against the tasks which the bureaucracy has 
had to tackle, its history of social involvement and the 
very rapid pace of development, which has often called for 
improvisation and ingenuity and encouraged particularism. 
But in terms of steering the polity, intelligent political 
judgement must often be as reliable a guide to decision as 
the quality of information available from bureaucratic 
sources.
1 0/,
Bureaucratie Outputs of Public Information
The formal compliance outputs of the Israeli bureau­
cracy in legislation, delegated legislation and other 
regulation are published in Reshumot (lit: Records), the 
government gazette. They are mediated to the public 
mainly by the bureaucracy itself in its working contacts, 
through legal and professional channels or media.
Secondary compliance information, explaining and 
interpreting the primary compliance outputs, is not profuse. 
It issues mainly free from the National Insurance Institute 
and the Ministry of Labour and Welfare, and to a lesser 
extent from departments, such as the Ministry of Immigration 
and Absorption, involved in information to individuals in 
personal relationships with the state. It is generally 
simple in language and structure, broadly explanatory 
rather than detailed. Israeli administration is involved 
in complex systems of exceptions, exemptions and circum­
stances for special treatment, difficult to codify in 
general terms, and in often confusing ad hoc changes for 
which no time is allowed to prepare and distribute clear 
public information. Government intervention in economic 
life is exceptionally widespread, with systems of grants, 
rebates, subsidies and special treatment difficult to 
absorb and interpret. The affected public tend to seek 
solutions through personal negotiation or political 
channels. There are few definitive "rule-books", and 
constant changes of rule which make issued guidance^ in 
some areas (e.g. immigration and absorption) notoriously 
unreliable.
All this gives the bureaucracy, of course, a power 
derived from command of information. Galnoor (19®^ 320,
326) comments on the difficulties of access to information 
for individuals who do not know how to make use of party 
or political channels, and on similar difficulties for 
organisations which try to be independent of the established 
networks. The communal penetration of the Israeli bureau­
cracy and its intimate contacts with established party and 
institutional networks have left little scope in Israel for 
the tier of voluntary organisation which often grows up to 
mediate administrative information to the public, and thus
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to constitute a public countervailing power in its own right. 
It is consistent with the centralised power of the Israeli 
bureaucracy and the extensive coverage of secondary centres 
that this kind of possible focus of public power barely 
exists.
Citizens' Advice Services are an example. The 
Ministry of Labour and Welfare contains a small organisation 
known as SHIL (trnasliteration of a Hebrew acronym for 
Sherut le'yeutz la'ezrach, lit: Service for Citizens'
Advice) which covers the country through some thirty local 
offices staffed mainly by professionals and specially 
trained volunteers. A citizens' advice service which has 
full internal access to operative bureaucratic rules is 
apparently in a strong position for its purposes. However, 
as a government unit, SHIL has no authority to communicate 
this information against bureaucratic wishes, though it can 
and does institute legal proceedings against government 
departments in appropriate cases. But clearly its position 
as part of the bureaucracy, controlled by funding if by 
nothing else, limits its potential for information output. 
The service is not well-known or heavily used, probably 
because there is no general bureaucratic disposition to 
develop an internal focus of criticism.
What would elsewhere be independent interest and 
pressure groups are, similarly, in Israel part of the 
government secondary centre organisation. Galnoor comments 
(in Arian, 1980; 239) that "Even consumer protection
groups belong to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
the Histadrut and the local authorities". In a Knesset 
debate on voluntary work on 1 June 1985 speakers suggested 
that substantial allocations of funds for voluntary 
organisations were swallowed up in bureaucratic super­
structure "...the antithesis of voluntary work" (Jerusalem
Post, 9 June 1985 p.3).
The bureaucratic output of reports and accounts from 
departments, state-run enterprises and institutions required 
to publish regular material in specified form (e.g. Bank 
of Israel) is often limited in circulation and imperfectly 
available to the public by sale or otherwise. Some of it 
is agenda-setting in importance to debate in the Knesset
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and discussion in the media. Statistics have a special 
importance in government, and the well-developed outputs of 
the Central Statistics Bureau are exceptionally well- 
organised and available. Many direct voluntary outputs 
are specialised, e.g. agricultural advice, teachers' 
manuals from the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Public accessibility to special material on subjects 
Qf current interest or controversy is often difficult. 
Departmental and advisory committee reports are rarely 
published; their findings communicated to the media may 
be in departmental summaries which investigative journalists 
sometimes find garbled and misleading in relation to 
conclusions not to the department's liking. Research and 
similar departmental information circulates within and 
between government departments, and to lists of outside 
specialists built up over time and updated by personal 
contact (Sources: Departmental officials, press reports 
and observation). The assumption is that there is no wider 
public interest. In a small community this may be con­
venient and economic for government; but the immediate 
bureaucratic objectives are uppermost. In keeping with 
this is the marked absence of public discussion documents 
intended to brief or to elicit considered reactions from 
the public, or of "popularised" summaries on important 
questions which would indicate any felt need to communicate 
with the public about them. The deeper reasons may be 
political; what seems a public lack of interest is both
cause and effect.
Indirect Information Outputs and Departmental Spokesmen
Indirect government information outputs are maintained 
through departmental spokesmen, whose role in Israel 
government departments is as elsewhere: to tell the public, 
via the media, what the department and its minister want 
it to know. A comment by Galnoor (1982; 24-9) indicates
a subjective conditioning of attitudes; in a 1971 survey 
almost all the twenty-five spokesmen contacted thought the 
amount of information distributed by the government, as 
well as their own department's information policy, was 
Adequate" or "very adequate":
ID7
and discussion in the media. Statistics have a special 
importance in government, and the well-developed outputs of 
the Central Statistics Bureau are exceptionally well- 
organised and available. Many direct voluntary outputs 
are specialised, e.g. agricultural advice, teachers' 
manuals from the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Public accessibility to special material on subjects 
of current interest or controversy is often difficult. 
Departmental and advisory committee reports are rarely 
published; their findings communicated to the media may 
be in departmental summaries which investigative journalists 
sometimes find garbled and misleading in relation to 
conclusions not to the department's liking. Research and 
similar departmental information circulates within and 
between government departments, and to lists of outside 
specialists built up over time and updated by personal 
contact (Sources: Departmental officials, press reports 
and observation). The assumption is that there is no wider 
public interest. In a small community this may be con­
venient and economic for government; but the immediate 
bureaucratic objectives are uppermost. In keeping with 
this is the marked absence of public discussion documents 
intended to brief or to elicit considered reactions from 
the public, or of "popularised" summaries on important 
questions which would indicate any felt need to communicate 
with the public about them. The deeper reasons may be 
political; what seems a public lack of interest is both
cause and effect.
Indirect Information Outputs and Departmental Spokesmeii
Indirect government information outputs are maintained 
through departmental spokesmen, whose role in Israel 
government departments is as elsewhere: to tell the public, 
via the media, what the department and its minister want 
it to know. A comment by Galnoor (1982; 2^9) indicates
a subjective conditioning of attitudes; in a 1971 survey 
almost all the twenty-five spokesmen contacted thought the 
amount of information distributed by the government, as 
well as their own department's information policy, was 
Adequate" or "very adequate":
3Û7
"...They did not favour a law to clarify 
the people*s rights to know or the boundaries 
of government secrecy. Most of these spokes­
men were previously newsmen and their attitudes 
reflected a high degree of satisfaction with 
the general state of affairs and the relationship 
between the government and the media".
No views appear to have been sought elsewhere on the 
question.
Most information in formal releases is routinely 
administrative and public relations, in which spokesmen 
act for their ministers as well as their departments, in 
distribution of texts of Knesset speeches and apologetics.
For example, the sudden burst of activity by the Ministry 
of Tourism Spokesman in promoting the Minister's activities 
abroad after he had been publicly criticised for his absence 
from an important domestic evert in November 1985 drew some 
press comment (Jerusalem Post, 22 Nov 1985 p»2.). Table 3 
indicates the generally routine content. Otherwise as 
elsewhere, official spokesmen do much behind the scenes to 
foster support for their departments' decisions and actions. 
The political affiliations of Israeli journalists help them 
in selection of suitable channels for release of information. 
In the context of bureaucratic and political sensitivities 
spokesmen need to move cautiously. Projected releases may 
find themselves blocked by departmental or political 
interests (Source: discussion with departmental spokesmen) 
and the public may remain in ignorance of developing 
situations until they break surface in other - often 
political - forums.
The Information Center
One government department, the Government Information 
Center (Merkaz HaHasbara), is specifically concerned with 
production of public information, and has acquired some of 
the functions of a general government publisher. Its output 
includes some secondary compliance material, on aspects of 
personal and family law and rights, and the Government 
Year Book. By origin, however, it is a specialised unit 
with an essentially educational output. Its expressed 
principal information role is maintenance:
"...strengthening the identification of the citizen with
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TABLE 3
S U B J E C T - n A T T E R  OF PRESS
HEALTH
RELEASES
I S R A E L I  nilMISTRY OF 
S u b j e c t  " F l a t t e r
( S E P T .  -  M0\/.1982)
Mumber o f  R e l e a s e s
M o t i c e s  a b o u t  s e t t i n g - u p  and r e p o r t i n g  
o f  c o m m i t t e e s
N o t i c e s  a b o u t  l a y i n g  o f  c o r n e r - s t o n e s  
f o r  new h o s p i t a l  d e p a r t m e n t s ,  e x t e n s i o n  
o f  e x i s t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  e t c .
P o l l u t i o n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  and t e s t s ,  
e v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p r o v e m e n t s
H e a l t h  and h a z a r d  w a r n i n g s
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
i n c l u d i n g  d o c t o r s '  e x a m i n a t i o n s ,  d e n t a l  
p r i c e  l i s t s
H e a l t h  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  L e ba n o n  ( i n  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  o c c u p i e d  a r e a s )
T e c h n i c a l  n o t i c e s
C l o s u r e  o r d e r s
N o t i c e  d i s o u r i n g  e x t r e m e  o p i n i o n s  a g a i n s t  
a b o r t i o n  e x p r e s s e d  by D r .  S a da n  ( a d v i s e r  
t o  F l i n i s t e r )  i n  a t e l e v i s i o n  i n t e r v i e w
Announce me nt  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F l e d i c a l  
C o n g r e s s  m e e t i n g  i n  I s r a e l
lA
12
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S o u r c e :  F l i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h  P r e s s  r e l e a s e s  ( i n  H e b r e w ) .
N o t e s .
a .  N o t i f i c a t i o n s  o f  c o m m i t t e e s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  e x ­
h a u s t i v e ;  t h e i r  r e p o r t s  a r e  m o s t l y  u n p u b l i s h e d .
b .  Flany n o t i c e s  a r i s e  f r o m l e g a l / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  F l i n i s t r y .
c .  The l a r g e s t  number o f  n o t i c e s  r e f l e c t s  c r e d i t  on t h e  
work o f  t h e  F l i n i s t r y .
d .  O n l y  one r e l e a s e  (on D r .  S a d a n ' s  v i e w s )  had o v e r t  
p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  f r o m  w h i c h  t h e  F l i n i s t e r  
h a s t e n e d  t o  d i s t a n c e  h i m s e l f .
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TABLE 3 (cont.)
SUBJECT-MATTER OF PRESS RELEASES 
ISRAELI MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (April 1986)
Only four releases were issued from the Office of the 
Ministry of Transport Spokesman during April 1986. Three 
were headed "Press Announcement" and one was headed 
"Announcement to the Public, though, of course, this was 
meant to be made through the press. The content of these 
releases is summarised below.
1. This press announcement summarised the Minister's 
participation in, and address to, a forum on road 
safety at the Ministry. The Minister aired the 
departmental policy to press for the institution of 
a national traffic police force. He notified and 
discussed budgets and measures for road safety 
improvements, and the Ministry's plans for 1986. 
names and appointments of leading participants were
given.
2. This announcement explained the projected construc­
tion of a new airport at Eilat, in the context of
a recent announcement by the Prime Minister on 
economic growth measures. Otherwise the announce­
ment dealt with acclamation of recent U.S.A. action 
against air transport terrorism, and detailed the 
Ministry's activities, plans and participation in 
international co-operation on the subject.
3. The third press announcement was a notification by 
the Minister to representatives of the driving 
schools organisation that vehicle licensing offices 
would not be closed during August. The Minister 
also announced that he hoped the Sadan Committee, 
expected shortly to present him with its report, 
had been asked to pay special attention "to some 
problems about driving examinations, on which he 
hoped it would provide solutions.
Z,. This announcement to the public, via the media, 
notified the closure of the Ministry's offices 
during the whole of the Passover period, and asked 
the public who required various services to arrange 
their business in advance of that time.
Comment.
These are routine types of m a i n l y  adminsitrative 
announcement, propagating the Ministry spol c 
some public relations benefit to the Minister and th 
assumption of credit.
Source.
Translated press notices in Hebrew Spokesman's Office of the Ministry of Transport, Jerusale ,
in April 1986. 110
the state - the democratic regime, its national destiny and
its struggle” (1982/83 Programme of Work p. 3).
The Center's stated functions reflect its origins as 
an administrative component of the Ministry of Education, 
established in 195A to produce material for the accultura­
tion of the then large numbers of new immigrants with many 
cultural backgrounds, but little civic education or Zionist
background :
"The Information Center disseminates 
information conducive to the knowledge 
and understanding of Israel’s past and 
present, its achievements and problems, 
its aims and policies. The Center contributes to civic education aimed at 
orientating the citizens and encouraging 
them to participate in public affairs and 
in the democratic process"
(Statement in English issued by Information Center).
The Center's status and its semi-independent functions 
shield it from excesses of executive interference, and it 
has been regarded as politically uncontroversial. The 
translated headings and detail from the Center's mid-1985 
publishing list at Table A indicate its concentration on 
state and Zionist topics, problems and history, and
background civic information.
About a million prints, including Arabic editions, 
are distributed annually, about eighty per cent free; only 
substantial material is sold. The educational system 
absorbs the majority, some of the publications being 
important reading for school examinations (Source: 
officials of the Information Center). In a small country 
this is a substantial activity, but barely concerned with 
the day-to-day processes of government and public 
information.
The Identification and Composition of Bureaucratic 
Printed Outputs
It is not easy for the Israeli public to identify the 
formal information output of the bureaucracy, or for 
anybody to assess its penetration. Sale arrangements» and 
distribution of free material, are not comprehensive, and 
there are no co-ordinated access tools, such as a current 
list of new government publications. Some newspapers note
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TABLE ^
PU BLI S HED OUTPUT OF THE INFORMATION CENTER
C a t a l o g u e  S e r i e s
Know Yo u r  P e o p l e
H i s t o r y  o f  S e t t l e  
men t
Do cu me nt s
M e e t i n  g s
Know I s r a e l
Wars o f  I s r a e l
Know
Know t h e  
G ove rnment
The Economy
The M i d d l e  E a s t
V a r i o u s  P u b l i c a  
t  i o n s
Maps
B r o a d s h e e t s  and 
P o s t e r s
S u b j e c t - M a t t e r
J u d a i s m  and Z i o n i s m  
Men and L e a d e r s
( U n t i l  t h e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  t h e  S t a t e )
F o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e »  
liiest Bank a u t o n o m y ;  Camp 
D a v i d  A c c o r d s  e t c .
A s e l e c t i o n  o f  l e c t u r e s  f o r  
s t u d y - d a y s  and m e e t i n g s  -  
m a i n l y  p r e - s t a t e  s u b j e c t s
F a c t u a l  b a c k g r o u n d  on a s p e c t s  
o f  n a t i o n a l  l i f e »  i n d u s t r y »  
p o p u l a t i o n »  w e l f a r e  p o l i c y  e t c .
A c c o u n t s  o f  v a r i o u s  c a m p a i g n s  
and s e l e c t e d  b i b l i o g r a p h y .  
S y m b o l i c  a c c o u n t s  o f  h i s t o r i c  
wa r s  and s i e g e s
S u r v e y s  and d a t a  on e . g .  d e ­
v e l o p m e n t  o f  G a l i l e e  and  
N e g e v ;  e d u c a t i o n ;  t h e  P . L . O ;  
p e a c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s
F a c t u a l  a c c o u n t s  o f  p r e s i d e n c y ;  
e l e c t i o n s ;  I s r a e l i  g o v e r n m e n t ;  
S t a t e  C o n t r o l l e r  and Ombudman;  
l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t
Consumer i n d e x ;  w a t e r  p r o b l e m s »  
c o n s u m e r  p r o t e c t i o n ;  u p d a t e d  
e c o n o m i c  m a t e r i a l
A c c o u n t s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  
c o u n t r i e s
I s r a e l  i n  N u m b e r s ;  The 1 1 t h  
K n e s s e t  and G o v e r n m e n t ;  
J e r u s a l e m  i n  Numbers e t c .
V a r i o u s
H i s t o r i c  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ;
I s r a e l i  r a i l w a y s ;  100 y e a r s  
o f  S e t t l e m e n t »  I s r a e l i  
I n d e p e n d e n c e  e t c .
Number o f  L i s t e d  
B o o k l e t s  e t c .
12
11
11
12
8
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TABLE 4- (cont.) 
rataloque Series Subject-POatter Number of Listed Booklets etc»
Books
Know the Law
Israel
Meetings
Others
Information and 
guidance on aspects of 
law and the legal system, 
women’s and personal rights.
Population; settlement; 
Economy; foreign relations
Mass communication; Zionism 
and State; War of 
Independence
V/ariety of books on special 
subjects - e.g. Eichman trial. 
Holocaust; Israeli/Egyptian 
peace treaty; Government 
Year-Book; Remembrance Day; 
collection of documents on 
State history
19
174
Source; Translated from Catalogue of Publicatio.^
available from the Publication Serv/ice of the 
Information Center - January 1985.
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the issue of significant government publications. Some 
departments with a specific publishing function (e.g, the 
Information Center) produce catalogues and lists from which 
their published outputs can be identified. The Central 
Statistics Bureau and the National Insurance Institute 
(which also carries on research) are the most professional. 
The incompleteness of bibliography and distribution would 
not, however, be much out of the ordinary in far more 
developed states, and this extends to the only comprehensive 
catalogue, Israel Government Publications, compiled annually 
by the State Archives. This covers publications deposited 
by law, but observance by department is admittedly incompleta.
The analysis at Table 5 from the State Archives 
bibliography clearly relates the preoccupations of the 
Israeli government with its published outputs. The main 
constituents are administrative and financial reviews and 
reports, technical agricultural publications, reflecting 
the importance of this highly organised activity, accultura­
tion and symbolic material, emphasising the history of 
Zionist ideology and pioneering and of military organisation. 
The Ministry of Defence and the Information Center have 
substantial education roles. Public "agenda-setting" 
information is notably lacking.
Information Outputs fromThe Political Executive: 
the Cabinet
Under Israeli law the Cabinet is a formally constituted 
body, with secrecy of its proceedings legally protected 
(Basic Law; The Government, Article 28). Authorised 
disclosures may be made (Yaacobi, 1982; 270-72), and it is
the practice for the Government Secretary to make a formal 
statement to the media following Cabinet meetings.
However, the peculiar circumstances of Israeli 
government have produced what Yaacobi, (1982; 274) calls
a "parallel culture" of leaking. The coalition structure 
which has become the basis of Israeli government as a 
result of proportional representation, with government, 
containing disparate elements, in which Cabinet seats are 
allotted to parties and filled by party nominees over whom 
the Prime Minister has little effective control, negates 
the principle of collective responsibility. Ministers
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TABLE
I s s u i n g  D e p a r t m e n t
A N A L Y S I S
N o . o f  
P u b n s .
o r  I S R A E L I  GOUERN01ENT 
Type o f  P u b l i c a t i o n
PUBLI CATI ONS -  1983
Ad mi n.  T e c h n i c a l  4 
R e p o r t s  T r a i n i n g
I n f o r m a t i o n  4 
E d u c a t i o n Comments
Gov/ernment P r i n t e r  
Reshumot ( R e c o r d s ) 14
C o u n c i l s  and  
C o m m i s s i o n s
14
The K n e s s e t 1 1
The P r i m e  M i n i s t è r e s  
O f f i c e
1 1
Adv/iser on Arab  
A f f a i r s
1 1
A t o m i c  E n e r g y 5
C om m i s s i o n  
S t a t e  Archiv/e 4 4
Gov/ernment P r e s s  
O f f i c e
3
C e n t r a l  B u r e a u  o f  
S t a t i s t i c s
69 69
Pri me M i n i s t e r * s  
C o u n c i l  on S t a t u s  o f  
Women
2 2
M i n i s t r y  o f  F i n a n c e 16 16
F o r m a l  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  l a u s »  
amendmentSf  d i g e s t s »  t r a d e ­
marks and p a t e n t s .  T e x t  o f  
I s r a e l / L e b a n o n  A g r e e m e n t .
The gov/ernment g a z e t t e .
R e p o r t s  o f  b o d i e s  a p p o i n t e d  
t o  e x a m i n e  s p e c i f i e d  i s s u e s  
( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  Kahan Commis­
s i o n  i n t o - t h e  Ev/ents in  
B e i r u t  R e f u g e e  Camps).
The s e r i e s  o f  v/erbatim r e ­
p o r t s  o f  K n e s s e t  Plenum  
p r o c e e d i n g s
S e r i e s o f  b u l l e t i n s and
t r a n s í a t i o n s  f o r  t h e
f o r e i g n p r e s s »  e x t r a c t e d
f r o m  t h e  I s r a e l i  m e d i a .
S t a t i s t i c a l  surv/eys and
t a b l e s on a l l  a s p e c t s  o f
I s r a e l i l i f e  and ac t i v i t y ,
C e n t r a l g ov e r n me n t b u d g e t s
f i n a n c e S» t a x a t i o n » p l a n -
n i n g  e t c .
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
N o . o f
I s s u i n g  D e p a r t m e n t  P u b n s ,
P l i n i s t r v  o f  D e f e n c e  
Av/iation I n d u s t r y  
I s r a e l  D e f e n c e  F o r c e s  
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  B r a n c h
Type o f  P u b l i c a t i o n
M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h 21 6
M i n i s t r y  o f  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  s 5 4
M i n i s t r y  o f  R e l i g i o u s  
A f f a i r s 1 1
M i n i s t r y  o f  F o r e i g n  
A f f a i r s 20 10
M i n i s t r y  o f  E d u c a t i o n  
and C u l t u r e 09 7
I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r 34
M i n i s t r y  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e 47 14
M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce  
& I n d u s t r y 13 12
M i n i s t r y  o f  J u s t i c e 3 3
M i n i s t r y  o f  L a b o u r  and  
W e l f a r e 43 42
M i n i s t r y  o f  t h e  
I n t e r i o r 13 13
M i n i s t r y  o f  T r a n s p o r t 30 29
S t a t e  C o n t r o l l e r ' s  
D e p a r t m e n t 24 24
M i n i s t r y  o f  T o u r i s m 4 1
13
10
81
34
31
Mos t  o f  t h e s e  a r e  t r a n s l a ­
t i o n s  f r o m  f o r e i g n  books on 
war s u b j e c t s  ( i n c l u d i n g  
n o v e l s )  u s e d  in m i l i t a r y  
e d u c a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  They 
a r e  n o t  meant f o r  o u t s i d e  
i n f o r m a t i o n •
A D r u z e  b u l l e t i n
I n c l u d e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  b u l l e ­
t i n s  i n  E n g l i s h  i s s u e d  by 
m i s s i o n s  o v e r s e a s
The M i n i s t r y  o f  E d u c a t i o n  
p r o d u c e s  a l a r g e  volume o f  
t e a c h i n g  a i d s  and g u i d a n c e »  
and b a s i c  t e a c h i n g  b o o k s .
The I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r ' s  o u t ­
p u t  o f  l a r g e l y  " s y m b o l i c ” 
p u b l i s h i n g  g o e s  m a i n l y  i n t o  
t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t e m .
I n c l u d e s  t h e  Karp R e p o r t  on 
J u d e a  and S a m a r i a .
I n c l u d e s  P r i s o n s »  P o l i c e  and 
E n v i r o n m e n t
I n c l u d e s  R a i l w a y s  and  
A i r f  i e l d s .
I n c l u d e s  one r e p o r t  a s  Com­
m i s s i o n e r  f o r  P u b l i c  Com­
p l a i n t s  (Ombudsman).  C o v e r s  
M u n i c i p a l i t i e s  and L o c a l  
C o u n c i l s  a s  w e l l  a s  c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
N o ,  o f  Ty pe o f  P u b l i c a t i o n
T • j. 4. P u b n s ,  I s s u i n g  D e p a r t m e n t A . ■
A m i n , T e c h n i c a l  & I n f o r m a t i o n  4 Comments
R e p o r t s T r a i n i n g E d u c a t i o n
M i n i s t r y  o f  E n e r g y  & I n c l u d e s  6 p e r i o d i c a l s  and 10
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 37 17 *18 2 t e c h n i c a l  r e p o r t s  i n  E n g l i s h  
o f  N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  f o r  R e -
s e a r c h  and D e v e l o p m e n t ,  and 
G e o l o g i c a l  S u r v e y s .
L o c a l  A u t h o r i t i e s 23 23
S t a t e  C o r p o r t a t i o n s  
E l  A1 1 1 The N a t i o n a l  a i r l i n e
S z o l d  I n s t i t u t e 3 3 A R e s e a r c h  f o u n d a t i o n
Mekorot  ( S o u r c e s ) 1 1 The n a t i o n a l  w a t e r  a u t h o r i t y
I s r a e l  E l e c t r i c  C o r p n . 2 2
Dead S e a  E n t e r p r i s e s 1 1
I s r a e l  P o r t  A u t h o r i t y A 4
Zim 2 2 The n a t i o n a l  s h i p p i n g  l i n e .
Remembrance A u t h o r i t y A 4 i The H o l o c a u s t  I n s t i t u t e  and Museum.
N a t i o n a l  I n s u r a n c e  
I n s t i t u t e I B 16 2
Bank o f  I s r a e l 29 26 3 I n c l u d e s  8 r e p o r t s  i n  E n g l i s h
I s r a e l  S t a n d a r d s  I n s t , A 4
S a f e t y  & H y g i e n e  I n s t . 5 5
I s r a e l  B r o a d c a s t i n g  
A u t h o r i t y 1 1
Museums 12 12 M a i n l y  c a t a l o g u e s  and  
m o n o g r a p h s •
N a t u r e  P r e s e r v a t i o n  
A u t h o r i t y 1 1
S e c u r i t i e s  A u t h o r i t y  
N a t u r e  P r o t e c t i o n
1 1
B r o c h u r e s  on s i t e s  and
A u t h o r i t y 30 30 t o p i c s .
I s r a e l  Ma na gement  
C e n t e r
C e n t r e  f o r  O f f i c e
1 1
M e c h a n i s a t i o n 1 1
724 403 153 168
N o t e s ; a .  P u b l i c a t i o n s  o f  M i n i s t r y  D e f e n c e ,  D e f e n c e  F o r c e s ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  E d u c a t i o n  and C u l t u r e ,  
a i me d  a t  s p e c i a l  r e a d e r s h i p s ,  a c c o u n t  f o r  186 p u b l i c a t i o n s  ( 2 5 . 6 ^ ) ,
b .  O f  t h e  168 p u b l i c a t i o n s ( 2 3 . 2^ o f  t h e  t o t a l )  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  " I n f o r m a t i o n  and E d u c a t i o n "  
95 ( 5 6 , 5 ^ )  a r e  f r o m  M i n i s t r y  o f  D e f e n c e ,  D e f e n c e  F o r c e s  and I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r ,  n o t  
meant t o  i n f o r m  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .  A f u r t h e r  30 (17. 8S{ )  come f r o m t h e  N a t u r e  P r o t e c ­
t i o n  A u t h o r i t y .
c .  T e c h n i c a l  and T r a i n i n g  p u b l i c a t i o n s  c o n s t i t u t e  2 1 , 1 ^  o f  t h e  t o t a l .
S o u r c e ! T r a n s l a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  f r o m I s r a e l  G o v e r n m e n t  P u b l i c a t i o n s  1 9 8 3 , p u b l i s h e d  by
S t a t e  A r c h i v e ,  J e r u s a l e m .
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perceive their primary loyalty and responsibility to the 
party which nominates them to their post, rather than to 
the Prime Minister who formally appoints them or to the 
government as such. They and their aides hasten after 
(sometimes even during) Cabinet meetings to keep their 
parties and the media informed, or to dissociate themselves 
publicly from Cabinet decisions which do not conform to 
their party's line, notwithstanding their own formal part 
in them. Leaks and public declarations are often at 
variance with the formal statements made by the Government 
Secretary. Press reports give almost verbatim accounts of 
exchanges across the Cabinet table, detailing arguments and 
disputes between Cabinet members and revelaing not merely 
the voting balance but the voting of individual ministers. 
They make it clear that the relations between Cabinet and 
iournalists are very close indeed, and that some members of 
the Cabinet must take profuse notes to pass on to their 
contacts.
The language of Cabinet communiques is, as would be 
expected, bland, exposing only positive political potential. 
For example, in the communiqué of the Cabinet meeting on 
8 September 1985, which discussed inter alia emergency 
economic regulations, the Prime Minister is noted as citing 
positive figures and situations for budget cuts, the national 
debt, economic growth, imports and exports and foreign 
currency reserves. All these subjects continuously figured 
in public and media discussion, in which they often appeared 
in a far from positive, if not fiercly controversial light. 
The Prime Minister's views are given prime exposure. In a 
series of seven Cabinet communique^ 's issued in September and 
October 1985 (1, 8, 22, 29 September and 8, 13 and 20 
October) he is personally quoted in twenty-four of thirty- 
seven items cited, of which he was present for thirty.
While the official communiques present the Prime 
Minister and the views of the dominant coalition partner 
in the most positive light, the public picture is modified 
by the leaks, statements, disclaimers and arguments reported 
in the press. They are concerned to make party and personal 
capital by disclosing information not given in the official 
communiques, by stressing its positive potential for
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informants and their parties and negative potential for 
others. In the knowledge that they will be reported in the 
press ministers are addressing in Cabinet wider audiences
than their colleagues. ^
Table 6 reproducesAcomments on the four items dea
with in the Cabinet communique dated 20 October 1985» 
selected at random, together with the following day’s 
reports in the .Terusalem Post. One item (travel tax) was 
not dealt with in the communiqué, the public, already con use 
bv newspaper information derived from conflxcting depart­
mental and ministerial statements which had been appearing, 
is still left in confusion about travel arrangements for
more than three weeks ahead.  ^ „
Table 7 reproduces the Jerusalem Post report following
the Cabinet meeting on 27 October 1985, preceded by the 
relevant extract from the official communiqué. Clearly, 
during the seven-hour debate mentioned in the newspaper 
account more views and arguments were aired than the news­
paper could report. But the exploitation of positive and 
negative Information potential by various elements of the 
Cabinet is evident. The framework is that of the Na lona 
Unity Government formed in September 1984, which centaine 
totally disparate elements (Alignment and Likud), formerly
apposition and Government.
ïaacobi (1982; 271-82) details some of the steps
Israeli governments have taken to try to protect Ca i
secrecy, without a great deal of success.
secrecy must be collective to be effective, and the whole
constitution of the Cabinet undermines the collective
conLpt. The device of turning part of a Cab net meeting
into a Committee on Security Affairs, with criminalinto a uommii .„„+ituted by the Likud governmentsanctions against leaks, instituted oy
in 1977, has been used to cloak
security censorship (though of course it as g 
uses). In recent years the most notorious example was 
transfer by the Likud government in May 1978 of the 
controversial subject of settlement in the occupied 
territories from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Cab
Committee on Security Affairs. Goren (1979; ^
points out that this "...technique tantamount to political
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TABLE 6
AND I T SA CABI NET COPIPILINIQUÉ:   ACCOUNTS IN THE PRESS
JERUSALEM, 20 OCTOBER 1985
CABINET COMMUNIQUE
AT THE WEEKLY CABINET SESSION:
A) THE DISCUSSION ON EFFORTS TO COMBAT UNEMPLOYMENT CONTINUED. THE DISCUSSION 
WILL CONTINUE AT A CABINET MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
B) THE CABINET DECIDED TO ABSOLVE THE SELF-EMPLOYED FROfl PAYING PARALLEL TAX.
C) AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE YITZHAK NAVON ANSWERED A QUESTION BY THE MINISTER OF 
SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT REGARDING TUITION AT THE UNIVERSITIES, AND REPORTED THAT 
THE MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE FINANCE MINISTER.
D) THE DEFENSE MINISTER REVIEWED RECENT EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN THE AREA OF 
SECURITY. THE REVIEW WAS GIVEN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A MINISTERIAL DEFENSE 
COMMITTEE.
Comments ( R e p o r t s  r e p r o d u c e d  from J e r u s a l e m  P o s t , 21 O c t o b e r  1985)
Katsav: At this rate w ell have 150,000 unemployedby ’86
By ILAN  CH AIM  
Jcnisalciii Post Reporter
With some 120,000 people jobless 
and an 8 per cent national unemploy­
ment level. Labour Minister Moshe 
Katsav yesterday presented the 
A )  caj)inet with his plan to combat un­
employments
No ^cis ión  was taken, other than 
to put it on the agenda for next week, 
when Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
w ill be back from  his trip to 
Washington.
“ W e must begin immediately with 
programmes to foster economic 
^ow th, if we are to prevent worsen­
ing unemployment,”  Katsav told re-
porters alter the cahiuei sebsu>ii. It 
the present trend continues, Katsav 
warned, there may be 150,000 job­
less by next August.
Katsav’s plan focuses attention on 
the plight o f development towns, 
whose unemployment rate o f over 54 
per cent is alH>ut seven times the 
national average.
The major points o f the plan in­
clude: beefing up vocational training 
programmes, both at government 
centres and at work places them­
selves; providing tax breaks for in­
dustry to encourage hiring; granting 
incentives for new investment, parti­
cularly in small factories in develop­
ment towns; providing special job­
training programmes for demobil­
ized soldiers; and deporting the 
country’s estimated 10,000 illegal 
foreign workers. Katsav has esti­
mated the cost o f implementing the 
plan at $21 million.
Interior Minister Yitzhak Peretz 
said it would cost about $750 per 
person to locate and to expel illegal 
workers. The $7.5m. it would cost 
would be well worth the price, 
Peretz was reported as saying, since 
this would be an economical way to 
create thousands o f jobs.
Finance Minister Yitzhak Moda’i
rejected Katsav’s unemployment fi­
gures without elaborating, but »aid 
that any government solution to the 
unemplo3rment problem would re*> 
quire another budget cut to encour­
age industry to create jobs. The 
extent o f  the cut mentioned was 
reportedly about $S00m., to' be 
made in January.
A t a parallel discussion o f the 
p rob lem , H istadrut S ec re ta ry  
General Yisrael Kessar yesterday 
told a meeting o f the Histadrut cen­
tral committee that government- 
initiated public works projects may 
be the only way to effectively combat 
unemployment,
Though t h e  m a t t e r  i s  s t i l l  u n d e r  C a b i n e t  d i s c u s s i o n ,  w i t h o u t  any d e t a i l  i n  t h e  C a b i n e t  Communique,  
f '^'inisters d i s p l a y  t h e i r  a r g u m e n t s  i n  p u b l i c  t o  make p a r t y  and d e p a r t m e n t a l  p o i n t s ,  one M i n i s t e r  
d e j e c t i n g  a n o t h e r ' s  f i g u r e s .
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H) Employers to pay 
health funds 
0.5% more
By ILAN  CHAIM  
Jerusalem Post Reporter
The cabinet yesterday agreed on 
the final form o f the government's 
bill to raise employers' contributions 
to their workers' health funds, by 
voting that the 0.5. per cent increase 
would apply only to employers, not 
the self-employed.
The ministers voted 10 to 8 in 
support o f Justice Minister Moshe 
Nissim's objection to applying the 
raise in the employers' premium 
(mas makbil) also to the self- 
employed. “ W e can't ask a poor 
shoemaker to pay more tuxes.'' Nis- 
sim W.1 S unoted as savin»
A ll the Likud ministers voted with 
Nissim. except Finance Minister Y it­
zhak Moda'i, who abstained. Moda'i 
argued against the increase o f tax for 
the employers as unwarranted and 
reportedly said that the $18 a year 
per self-employed person that the 
increase would have involved was' 
“ not serious."
The 0.5 per cent increase wjts 
intended to reap some S.^ 5 million a 
year for the country's health care 
system, wiping out a Health Ministry 
deficit that has disrupted medical 
care for over a year. The bill is to be 
presented to the Kne.sset today, 
where it is expected to pass easily.
T h e  exc lus ion  o f  the sel f- 
employed from the bill will mean a 
loss o f about $3m. in revenue, a sum 
that will have to be made up by the 
government or other sources if the 
health care deficit is to be completely 
eliminated.
The n e w s p a p e r  r e p o r t  p u t s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
i n  i t s  c o n t e x t .  But  i t  a l s o  s u mma r is es  
t h e  C a b i n e t  d i s c u s s i o n  and d i s c l o s e s  
i n d i v i d u a l  v i e w s  and v o t i n g .  ( P a r a l l e l  
t a x  -  mas m a k b i l  -  i s  l e v i e d  a s  a 
h e a l t h  s e r v / i c e s  c o n t r i b u t i o n ) .
C) Won’t end strike until M oda’i meets them
Arrests as student protest turns violent
By GREER FAY CASHM AN 
Jcnualem Post Reporter
More than a dozen students, in­
cluding Eyal Yaffe, chairman o f the 
National Union o f Students, were 
vrested yesterday when strike ac­
tion at university campuses across 
the country erupted into violence. 
A ll those arrested were later re­
leased.
Students demonstrating against 
high university tuition fees blocked 
am ss to university entrances and 
disrupted traffic in streets adjacent 
to the campuses. The union rejected 
an appeal from Education Minister 
Yitzhak Navon to call o ff the strike.
The only institute o f higher learn­
ing in which students did not strike 
was Hadassah Community College, 
whose student body is not affiliated 
with the union. Science Minister 
Gideon Patt yesterday suggested 
that a wrong form o f fee linkage had 
been calculated by the Treasury and 
the rate should be $900 as demanded 
by the students.
Students say that they will call a 
halt to the strike as soon as Finance 
Minister Yitzhak Moda'i agrees to 
meet with them. But Navon backed 
Moda’i’s stand that the strike must 
end first. A  change in fees will take 
several days to implement and 
Navon wants to get students back at 
university as soon as possible.
The C a b i n e t  Communique has no r e a l  
me a n i ng  w i t h o u t  m e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
b a c k g r o u r d o f  c o n t r o v e r s y  o v e r  s t u d e n t  
f e e s ,  w h i c h  was t a k i n g  up much s p a c e  
and t i m e  i n  t h e  m e d i a .
D) M e n t i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t e r i a l  D e f e n c e  C o m m i t t e e  i m p o s e s  s e c r e c y  on t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  and
t h e r e  a r e  no s u b s t a n t i v e  p r e s s  r e p o r t s .  H o w e ve r ,  two d a y s  l a t e r  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  D e f e n c e  g a v e  
a b r i e f i n g ,  f u l l y  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  p r e s s ,  t o  A l i g n m e n t  ( i . e .  h i s  own p a r t y )  M . K . s .
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Ministerial committee to fix travel tax
Post Economk Reporter 
The cabinet failed to decide the 
level o f travel tax after November 13 
at its meeting yesterday, and autho­
rized the M inisterial Economic 
Committee to decide. The current 
tax o f $114 plus 20 per cent on tickets 
is due to end on November 13.
Finance Minister Yitzhak Moda’i 
said last week that he now favoured 
maintaining the current rate. An 
earlier proposal from the State R e­
venue Administration had been to
abolish the 20 per cent ticket tax and 
raise the travel tax to $228. Moda’i 
feels that this will benefit long­
distance travellers and discriminate 
against those going shorter dis­
tances.
The ministerial committee will 
now have to make a final decision. If 
a new proposal is not brought to the 
Knesset Finance Committee by 
November 13, the travel tax will 
lapse.
T h i s  i t e m  i s  n o t  m e n t i o n e d  i n  t h e  
C a b i n e t  Communique,  t h o u g h  t h e  s u b j e c t  was 
c a u s i n g  p u b l i c  c o n f u s i o n  and i n c o n v e n i e n c e  
f o l l o w i n g  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  s t a t e m e n t s  p u b l i s h e d  
by t h e  ( M i n i s t r y  o f  F i n a n c e  and i t s  F l i n i s t e r .  
The f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  was d e l a y e d  u n t i l  a l m o s t  
t h e  l a s t  moment,  w h i l e  g ov e r n me n t  a r g u m e n t s  
c o n t i n u e d  and t r a v e l l e r s  and a g e n t s  d i d  n o t  
know any c e r t a i n  d e t a i l s  f o r  maki ng t h e i r  
f u t u r e  t r a v e l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
122
TABLE 7
THE CABINET MEETING OF 27 OCTOBER 1985  
COMMUNIQUE AND P R E S S  REPORT 
»
JERUSALEM, 27 OCTOBER 1985
CABINET COMMUNIQUE■ i
AT THE WEEKLY CABINET SESSION: !
r
THE PRIME MINISTER REPORTED ON HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, AND ON
HIS MEETINGS WITH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS, AS WELL AS ON '
HIS TALKS WITH THE HPJ^ DS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. i
THE PRIME MINISTER DETAILED THE STANDS HE PUT FORWARD WITH RESPECT TO THE 
IMMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.
HE ALSO REPORTED ON A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS ON ISRAEL-U.S. COOPERATION.
IN HIS TALKS IN THE UNITED STATES THE PRIME MINISTER PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL 
WHEREBY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD CALL ON THE PARTIES 
TO THE CONFLICT TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN THE WAKE OF THAT CALL DIRECT 
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE SIDES.
"the PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE PERCEIVES A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S 
TNTERNATIONAL SITUATION AT THIS TIME, A CHANCE FOR THE REJECTION OF THE PLO, AND 
FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. *
FOIJiOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS THE CABINET HELD A DISCUSSION.
Comment
The r e a l  s u b s t a n c e  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  m e e t i n g  i s  b r u s h e d  a s i d e  i n  t h e  l a s t  i t e m  o f  t h e  Communique,  
T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  o r  n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  h e a d s  o f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ' s  r e p o r t  w h i c h  was n o t  a l r e a d y  p u b l i c  
k n o w l e d g e .  The f u l l  and d e t a i l e d  r e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  J e r u s a l e m  P o s t  o f  20 O c t o b e r  ( o v e r l e a f )  c o n v e y s  
n o t  o n l y  t h e  d e t a i l e d  p u b l i c i t y  g i v e n  t o  C a b i n e t  p r o c e e d i n g s  on o c c a s i o n s »  b u t  a l s o  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  
o f  p a r t y  p o i n t - m a k i n g ,  d i s s o c i a t i o n  and p e r s o n a l  b y - p l a y  w h i c h  i n f e c t s  I s r a e l i  C a b i n e t s ,  ev en in  
a s o - c a l l e d  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  N a t i o n a l  U n i t y .  The r e p o r t e r s  c l e a r l y  h a v e  t h e i r  e a r s  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t h e  
C a b i n e t  t a b l e .  T h e r e  i s  no p r e t e n c e  a t  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a c o l l e c t i v e  f r o n t .  The p u b l i c  i s  r a t h e r
y»
more f u l l y  i n f o r m e d  t h a n  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  c o m m u n i q u e .
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By M ICH AEL EILAN 
and ASHER W ALLFISH
The Likud’s ministers presented a 
far from united front in the cabinet 
yesterday morning when Premier 
Shimon Peres reported on a “ drama­
tic”  change for the better in Israel’s 
international standing.
Vice Premier and Foreign Minis­
ter Yitzhak Shamir and Minister 
without Portfo lio  Moshe Arens 
accepted Peres’s idea for some sort 
o f international backing for peace 
negotiations with Jordan, but Indus­
try Minister Ariel Sharon emphati­
cally dismissed any international in­
volvement in peace talks.
The premier opened the meeting 
with a statement on his trip to the; 
U.S. His main success was, he said, 
in distancing the PLO  from the di­
plomatic process. He also reassured 
the ministers that the “ international 
support”  he talked about in the UN' 
General Assembly was not the inter-; 
national conference that Jordan i»  
demanding.
This was followed by a seven-hour 
debate on the peace process. The 
premier won the support o f the, 
majority -  the three religious minis­
ters and those o f the Alignment. But 
Peres could hot bring his statementj 
to a vote o f endorsement because 
Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir had 
told him beforehand that he would 
use his prerogative to bring the issue 
before the inner cabinet where the 
Likud and Alignment are stale­
mated.
Most o f the debate was calm. But 
Peres reacted sharply when Finance 
Minister Yitzhak M ^ a ’i vehement-
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ly insisted -  as he had last week -  that 
Peres had deviated from the guide­
lines o f the coalition agreement dur­
ing his U.S. tour.
A t this point Peres said angrily 
that he had not expected such crude 
criticism from the Likud while he 
was abroad. Peres said that when he 
was in the opposition, he had re­
frained from criticism while former 
Prem ier Menachem Begin was 
abroad. When Moda’i began to rep­
ly, Peres then cut the finance minis­
ter short saying: “ Stop talking, 
you’re reacting without even having 
read the (G en era l A ssem b ly ) 
speech.”
Housing Minister David Levy, 
who also criticized the premier, said 
that the proof that Peres had strayed 
from the coalition agreement was 
the enthusiastic response he got in 
the U.S. and Europe. “ They are not 
stupid,”  Levy argued, adding that 
they would have not gone out o f 
their way to praise Peres if he had 
stuck to the coalition guidelines.
Sharon smd that if he was in the 
Alignment he would want the Likud 
to stay in the government at least foi; 
the first month or two o f the peace 
process. Then elections could ^  
held. For this reason, he said, the 
Likud too should be interested in 
staying in the govenunent -  to en­
sure that there was no. deviation 
from the coalition guidelines.
Shamir and Arens were far less 
critical in tone. Talking about the 
favourable atmosphere created by 
the Peres trip, Shamir said he was 
worried that this atmosphere might 
be the result o f a mistaken assump­
tion by foreign statesmen that Israel 
was willing to attend an international 
conference. An  international con­
ference is the opposite o f direct 
negotiations...going to such a con­
ference is like agreeing in advance to 
withdrawal from all the territories 
and the creation o f a Palestinian 
state,”  he said.
Arens, who spoke immediately 
after Peres, said it was a pity that the 
cabinet did not hold a full-dress 
debate before the prime minister’s 
trip. Such a debate could have pre­
vented some misunderstandings, he 
said.
Arens said he opposed an interna­
tional Midde East peace conference.' 
But he would not object i f  the Secur­
ity Council gave its blessings to 
direct negotiations. The internation­
al role should not be extended any 
further, Arens said.
Economics Minister Gad Ya ’aco- 
bi said that whereas Peres’s trip had
bolstered Israel’s image, the interna­
tional standing o f the PLO  had dip­
ped as a result of recent terrorist' 
actions.
Y a ’acobi said that a continuation 
o f the status quo without progress 
towards some arrangement would 
mean the emergence o f a bi-national 
state. Even today, he said, the num­
ber o f children tram annually to the 
Arabs o f Israel and the administered 
areas combined exceeded the num­
ber o f Jewish children bom.
Shas Interior Minister Yitzhak' 
Peretz, who praised Peres for his 
achievements in the U.S., said Israel 
was now viewed by the world as a 
nation open to reason.
H e said the Shas movement 
favours the principle o f territorial 
compromise in Judea and Samaria.
When the National Religious Par­
ty minister o f religious affairs. Dr. 
Yosef Burg, asked Peretz just when 
the Tora Sages Council (which 
directs Shas) decided to favour ter­
ritorial compromise, Peres stepped 
in to prevent an argument which 
could embarrass the Shas minister, 
and suggested the two men talk 
about it privately after the cabinet 
session.
Bura lauded Peres for “ enhancing 
Israel’s image”  on his U.S. trip.
Israel had dealt the PLO  a military 
blow in the Peace for Galilee opera­
tion in 1982, he noted, but then the 
PLO  rebounded politically. Now the 
PLO  has sustained a political blow. 
Burg said.
Alignment Health Minister Mor- 
dechai Gur said history showed that 
a country should not follow a policy 
o f “ noes.”
Following the Yom  Kippur War, 
when the disengagement agree­
ments were negotiated at Geneva, 
an international framework was set 
up first and afterwards the involved 
parties negotiated directly, with the 
assistance o f the U .S., Gur said.
Peres created some real progress, 
Gur said, and now was the wrong 
time for the cabinet to get cold feet.
Shinui Communications Minister, 
Amnon Rubinstein, said that far 
greater international involvement in 
the peace process than Peres is prop­
osing had been approved in the past 
by Alignment and Likud govern­
ments alike.
Israel should keep the PLO on the 
sidelines o f the negotiations, he said.
Likud Justice Minister Moshe Nis- 
sim said that there was nothing 
wrong in the UN Security Council 
issuing the formal call for the parties 
to the dispute to meet and negotiate. 
But international auspices are un­
acceptable, he said.
12i,
censorship to deny the public information..." had been used 
by the former Labour governments. It is an attempt to 
curtail the possible growth of a public countervailing 
power which would be generated by disclosure of information 
on controversial public topics.
The effects on public information are both positive and 
negative. On the positive side the public, via the media, 
obtain a far more realistic view of the conduct of govern­
ment and the realities of coalition politics than they would 
have from the formal announcements, which gloss over 
disagreements. In situations where differences and 
incompatibilities between coalition partners make it 
extremely difficult for government to formulate clear 
policies and statements which can provide a basis for 
public discussion and opinion-forming, the prevalence of 
leaking adds a substantial, if sometimes confusing dimension 
to the public agenda. On the negative side, fear of leaks 
tends to drive Cabinet discussion underground, to small 
and informal bodies - "kitchen cabinets". The current 
National Unity Government has formed an official "inner 
Cabinet" of ten, but that barely protects its proceedings
against media disclosure.
Though widely used in other countries for political 
"kite-flying", or to soften up public opinion for reception 
of unpalatable news or measures, leaking has become 
institutionalised in Israel, as almost an imperative of 
circulating enough information to maintain the political 
system. Its prevalence suggests in part the inadequacy of 
official information outputs; but its immediate motivations 
are political and party manoeuvring, personal rivalry and 
ambition. Galnoor (Arian, 1980; 138) notes that the
bureaucracy, with its relationships with sectors and pressure 
groups "...is considerably involved in channelling informa­
tion to the media...". As elsewhere, the media are the 
indispensable channels for circulation.
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CHAPTER TEN
CASE DETAILS OF INFORMATION DEFICIENCIES
The brief selection of cases, with comment, which 
follows illustrates some of the deficiencies in public 
information which result from the preoccupation of the 
Israeli "establishment” with politicking, from political 
and administrative disarticulations, and disregard of 
day-to-day information needs of the public in its contacts 
with government. Some deficiencies are deliberate 
concealments and confusions of information for political 
advantage. The bounded considerations which flow from 
ideological fixations within government also have a 
tendency simply to ignore the possibility of a public 
need for or interest in information which affects it.
Public habituation to lack of information is a factor.
Personal experience of some situations is sometimes 
the only way to appreciate the lack of public information. 
For others the lack of any official source makes it 
necessary to study press reports. Some of these have 
their own bias. Reports from the Jerusalem Post are 
cited here. As a source this newspaper avoids the 
possible ambiguities and imprécisions of translation; 
the paper is, with minor exceptions, a balanced and sober 
source of information; its reports are well-informed and 
tend to have a concept of public interest which is sometimes 
lacking in more politically committed journals.
Case No. 11 (Information about the West Bank and 
Gaza) is somewhat extended because of its importance to 
the future of the country and the degree of deliberate 
concealment of information from the public for ideological 
purposes.
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CASE DETAILS
SOME EXAMPLES OF SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES 
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION IN ISRAEL
1. Summer Time - 1982-86
The government authority for summer time is the Ministry 
of the Interior, for many years until 198i^ the ministerial 
preserve of the National Religious Party (NRP), a minority 
grouping of the religiously orthodox in the mainly secular 
population, deriving power from its balancing position in 
various coalitions.
Public feeling is overwhelming in support of summer 
time,whose advantages have been long demonstrated in other 
countries. On its own merits the issue hardly makes a 
political argument. But NRP policy was to oppose summer time 
for religious reasons, though no publicly convincing case has 
been put forward. The Ministry of Energy, for obvious 
reasons - Israel imports all its fuel for power-generation - 
has been a constant proponent of summer time, producing and 
publicising figures and arguments in support. The govern­
ment did not resolve the policy issue because of the impor­
tance of NRP adherence to coalitions.
In April 1982 a private petition to the courts forced 
the hand of the Minister of the Interior (Dr. Burg), whom 
they severely criticised for failing to make a thorough 
study of the subject - i.e. the Ministry was not interested 
in information-gathering which might be unpalatable to its 
views. Dr. Burg then appointed a committee, whose report in 
December, 1983 was not published, though the substance was 
made known. Twenty-one of twenty-eight organisations, in­
cluding government departments, which testified were in 
favour of summer time; only three, including the Ministry
of Religious Affairs (another NRP preserve) were opposed.
Dr. Burg had little option but to accept the committee*s 
recommendation for a two-year trial with subsequent evalua­
tion of the results.
After the 1984- election the NRP, with reduced support, 
lost its command of the Ministry of the Interior to a two- 
member ultra-clericalist party (Shas), and Dr. Burg was re­
placed by Yitzhak Peretz, a rabbi with no previous political 
experience. Peretz first dragged his feet on review of the 
trial period, and then prevailed on the Cabinet, without 
public notice or consultation, to curtail it.
Despite a proposal by the Minister for Energy that 
summer time for 1986 should begin on 27 March» Peretz delayed 
the appointment of the review committee until late February. 
Its membership was generally considered "stacked", it had 
insufficient time to make a study, squabbled about the 
validity of evidence, was ignored by the majority of depart­
ments and organisations invited to testify, and reached no 
clear conclusions or majority. Its report, presented to 
Peretz on 1 April, and unpublished, was the opportunity for 
him to attempt to stifle the issue, without any consulta­
tion within government, by suspending the introduction of 
summer time for two years, during which further investiga­
tion was to be made.
The government still gave no lead, but private bills 
were put forward in the Knesset by l minority parties and 
applications were made to the courts. The NRP and other 
religious groups abandoned their previous opposition, sens- 
i ^  a public backlash (and having discovered that most of 
own members were in favour of summer time). The back­
lash took the form of widespread declarations by some 
municipalities, the Histadrut, the Manufacturers* Associa­
tion, banks and other large employers that they would intro­
duce their own versions of summer time. In face of likely 
confusion the government was eventually obliged to instruct 
the Minister of the Interior to introduce summer time, though
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several weeks of it were lost. Nevertheless p Likud members 
of the Cabinet absented themselves from the decisive Cabinet 
meeting, or abstained from voting, though known to agree with 
the decision, which they knew would be carried without them. 
Newspaper reports (e.g. Jerusalem Post, 21 April 1986, pp.l-^ 
detailed events at the Cabinet meeting, and the chagrin of 
Peretz, whose defence of his position avoided the religious 
grounds on which it was known to be based, in favour of de­
batable statistics of road accidents. He went so far as to 
attempt to deny the authority of the Cabinet in a decision 
which he claimed as the prerogative of the Minister of the 
Interior. An examination of the religious arguments (Jerusa­
lem Post. 10 April 1986, p. 10) left them with little appa­
rent substance. The attempt to impose the cancellation of 
summer time on the largely secular'majority, and in the end 
on even the religiously orthodox,appeared to be irrational 
bigotry by an ultra-orthodox faction.
The episode emphasises the ideologically bounded con­
sideration of a major government department, the failure of 
government bounded by purely political considerations to 
produce a policy ruling until public action virtually forced 
its hand, and the resulting public differences of view be­
tween two major ministries, in which the public were preserted 
with no authoritative and agreed information from government 
as a whole,while such reports as were commissioned were not 
published, the public being entirely reliant on the media 
for information.
2. Price Controls
In late 1984. the government applied extensive price 
controls, with other measures, in an attempt to arrest in­
flation, and these took immediate effect. There was, however, 
no mechanism for informing the public of the controlled maxi­
mum prices for goods which they were buying for their every 
day needs; administration had got into the habit of relying 
on the media to notify changes in the subsidised prices of 
a very limited range of commodities. For some time until 
the government could organise the printing and distribution 
of the official price-lists the public had to rely on the 
media for lists of controlled prices which they could not 
check against official lists at the place of purchase.
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3. Travel Tax»
The late 1984- measures included a travel tax 
complicated in its application by a separate ticket tax, 
value added tax, and consideration of exemption or partial 
exemption for Israeli citizens and permanent residents who 
were authorised to maintain foreign currency accounts.
Several government departments were involved, and bureau­
cratic disarticulations caused confusion in which individual 
travel agents were attempting to obtain decisions on 
individual journeys from officials in the headquarters of 
various government departments. Often no department could 
give a final answer, departmental answers were conflicting 
and unreliable, and were sometimes in conflict with conditioiB 
being imposed by lower-level officials at airports, who had 
to cope with the immediacies of travellers and flights. The 
arrangements were put into effect by departmental fiat before 
endorsement by the Knesset Finance Committee.
Changes in travel tax are particularly confusing for 
the public. Very many Israelis travel abroad, and have to 
make advance arrangements in ignorance of possible "instant 
government" measures which may affect them and which are 
often introduced without clear information. In October 
1985 the Ministry of Finance announced without warning 
that it would ask the Knesset Finance Committee to double 
the existing tax and make other changes. This was announced 
without the political clearance which was necessary - the 
Minister was abroad and his department tried to by-pass him. 
Newspaper reports (Jerusalem Post, 20 Oct 1985t p*l) 
disclosed that the proposal had been prepared and a 
memorandum drafted for the Finance Committee without 
consultation with the Minister. On his return he quashed 
the proposal. Premature publicity for an unsanctioned 
proposal may have been intended to force his hand, but was 
certainly publicly confusing.
These are examples of disarticulations of policy and 
administration, between departments and between a department 
and its Minister, in which the practical information needs 
of the public are not taken into account.
130
Z,. Health Ministry
Accused in the press of* having ^shelved” a departmental 
report, favourable to the Kupat Holim in an argument over 
the future of certain hospital services in Jerusalem, which 
might have conflicted awkwardly with its intentions. The 
report was stated to have come to the attention of other 
interests "by chance", i.e. probably leaked by Kupat Holim 
sympathisers in the Ministry. (Jerusalem Post. 25 April 
198i, p.3).
5. Education Ministry
The Ministry was demonstrated (Jerusalem Post. 20 Sept 
1982) to be manipulating published statistics in order to 
show its policies in a favourable light (thus casting sus­
picion on the reliability of its statistical claims in 
general). The Ministry declined to comment.
6. Foreign Currency Reserves
In August 1984. a public scandal broke over figures pub­
lished by the Ministry of Finance which were seen to contain 
book-keeping and "window-dressing" manoeuvres designed to 
obscure, shortly before the pending election, a drastic 
fall in foreign currency reserves brought about by the 
financial policies of the then Likud government. The 
principal device was the injection into the statistics of 
sums representing substantial holdings of foreign currency 
in commercial banks not previously included in the figures. 
With other expedients, all used with the connivance of the 
Bank of Israel (whose Governor had been appointed by the 
Likud government),this was clearly intended to disguise the 
steep fall in reserves. The Bank of Israel was accused by 
the Knesset Finance Committee of trying to conceal informa­
tion from the public before an election. The general credi­
bility of government economic information was not enhanced. 
Official statistics which should be unimpeachable were per­
verted to political purposes and their value undermined, 
though the public have no other reliable information on this 
question.
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7. Misrepresentation of Official Statistics for Political Purposes
The highly professional Director of the National 
Insurance Institute was dismissed and replaced in February 
1982 by a nominee of a small (two-member) faction (Tami) 
in the Knesset (Jerusalem Post, 10 Feb 1982)• In January 
1984. (Jerusalem Post> 27 Jan 1984.) the dismissed former 
head accused his successor of undermining credibility of 
the Nil reports by presenting routine statistics in a mis­
leading way in order to inflate their significance in 
assessing "poverty” and its extent to support his party’s 
claim to increased benefits fcr certain sections of the 
population. In noting the occasion (Jerusalem Post. 20 Jan 
1984.) a reporter exposed the ignorance of the Knesset 
Finance Committee about the basis and significance of the 
figures.
8. Unreliability of Official Information
The Minister for Tourism explains in a newspaper article 
(Jerusalem Post, I6 Oct 1985» p.8) why he and the Minister 
of Transport must be at public loggerheads over the question 
of charter flights to Israel. These increase tourism, but 
undercut the national airline (El Al). The ministers bandy 
antagonistic speeches and figures in public to support their 
positions, without any kind of objective study which would 
enable the public to form judgements, and without any clear 
policy decision by government, based on authoritative in­
formation which would enable a policy to be determined.
The Minister for Agriculture publicly blames the 
Minister of Finance for the current high prices of fruit 
and vegetables, by failing to increase price guarantees,
i.e. subsidies. Government policy is to reduce subsidies, 
and there are other explanations for the high prices, in 
trade which circumvents marketing, rules. But the 
Agriculture Minister, an old Mapai stalwart, is playing to his 
constituency of farmers,scoring off a political opponent (who 
is nevertheless in the same cabinet). No reliable informa­
tion is forthcoming from either side. (Jerusalem Post,
11 Sept 1985, p.2.).
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The Minister for Energy and Infrastructure defies the 
Finance Minister by signing a deal for oil exploration on 
terms opposed by the Ministry of Finance (Jerusalem Post.
28 April 1985» p.l). Again, government policy is at odds 
with itself, and the public have no clear understanding 
or information.
9. Government Departments and the Jewish Agency
Immigration is the subject of constant friction 
between the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and the 
Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency. Immigrants 
receive conflicting information and statements of assishance 
available, whose implementation is frustrated by non- 
co-operation between these two official bodies. The public 
is regularly bemused with differing estimates from these 
two agencies on which they erect policies and commit staff 
and public funds.
Examples:
b.
A meeting presided over by the Prime Minister 
on 21 April 1985 announced a scheme to double 
mortgage facilities to make room in govern­
ment absorption centres for Ethiopian 
immigrants, who are having to be accommodated 
in hotels. By mid-June none of the loans 
promised had been granted, though some 
immigrants had committed themselves on the 
basis of promises. Press investigation 
disclosed that plans had been secretly watered 
down by officials. Moreover many Immigrants 
who had moved from absorption centres on 
promises of increased rental subsidies for 
private accommodation had been let down, and 
"...the absorption authorities* credibility 
has greatly suffered" (Jerusalem Post, 12 
June 1985» p«2).
Housing stock for new immigrant families is 
a matter of co-ordination between the Ministry 
of Housing and Construction and the Ministry 
of Immigrant Absorption. In September 1983 
the former claimed a stock of 1»700 flats in 
hand while the latter claimed that the figure 
was only 400. Estimates used by the two 
Ministries were found to vary by a factor of 
forty per cent. Clearly» different bases were 
being used. Government information was faultj^ 
public information lacked credibility; no 
firm explanation could be given to families 
awaiting housing. (Jerusalem Post, 14 May 
1985» p.7).
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c. The Head of the Jewish Agency Immigration 
Department publicly criticises a Ministry of 
Immigrant Absorption plan for housing new 
immigrants, despite approval of his own 
department’s senior representative on a joint 
committee, and the endorsement of the Jewish 
Agency itself. (Jerusalem Post. 25 Oct 1985,
p • 2) •
d. Thousands of forms with potentially valuable 
information gathered from emigrants irierested 
in returning from abroad are reported to lie 
”untouched and unused" in a Ministry of 
Immigrant Absorption office, which has not 
even made them available to interested 
organisations. The lack of contact is asciibed 
t o ’long-standing conflict between the Jewish 
Agency and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption" 
(Jerusalem Post. 10 July 1984.). Information 
available is not used.
10. Channelling of Funds
The Ministry of Finance is accused by Alignment members 
of the Knesset Finance Committee of giving preferential 
loans, at the instance of the Finance Minister, to munici­
palities in the hands of the Likud and National Religious 
parties. (Jerusalem Post, 3 June 1982). The public cannot 
check for itself in the unpublished proceedings of the 
Committee. It takes the press report as no doubt accurate; 
but has little doubt that as much irregularity could be 
found in the actions of Alignment Finance Ministers. The 
Finance Committee has extensive powers to allocate public 
funds. Its allocations often come to public notice only hj 
indirect means.
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11. ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 
ABOUT THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
The Background
The Six-Day War of 1967 left Israel in military occupa­
tion of the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) containing an Arab 
population of over one million, excluding East Jerusalem, 
since annexed to Israel. The Camp David Accords of 1978 
envisaged an (undefined) interim form of autonomy pending 
final negotiations between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and elected 
representatives of the territories concerned. But this has 
remained a dead letter; no negotiating parties with Israel 
have come forward. The future of the West Bank particularly 
is crucial for Israel. It dominates, geographically, the 
heartland of the Israeli state. The broad options for 
Israel are either an Israeli-enforced unity, thus converting 
Israel into a bi-national state with a greatly increased 
Arab minority, or separate development for the West Bank in 
some form of federation or integration with Jordan, but with 
territorial and other safeguards for Israeli security.
From 1967 onwards, under Mapai-dominated governments, 
Israeli settlements were established along the lines of the 
Allon Plan, envisaging the return to Jordan of most of the 
Arab population of the West Bank, but with Israeli retention 
of strategic territory along the Jordan River. The Allon 
Plan was never formally adopted by the Israeli government, 
for political reasons, but by the end of 1978 some 5»500 
settlers, had been established in the West Bank areas de­
signated in it (Gilbert 1979; 113). From the mid-1970»s,
however, small numbers of ultra-orthodox settlers had esta­
blished unauthorised settlements in the high-density Arab 
areas.
The accession of the Likud government in 1977, with 
strong ideological orientation against any territorial con­
cessions on the West Bank, radically changed the settlement
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policy. From 1978. to 198^ 4 an intensive policy of settlement 
was pushed forward in high-density Arab areas, and in areas 
easily accessible as satellite developments of Tel Aviv 
(the West Bank boundary comes at one point within nine miles 
of the Mediterranean coastline) and Jerusalem. Extensive 
housing developments and road and administrative infra-struc­
tures were put into commission. Every sort of government in­
centive was given to settlers on the West Bank, with the aim 
of "creating facts" which would in time make the separation 
of the West Bank from Israel virtually impossible. Bahiri 
(198ii; 14 ) notes that the WBG territories had already be­
come largely integrated into the Israeli economy, and over 
35^ of the WBG labour force was employed in Israel, particu­
larly in building construction and agriculture. A leading 
expert on the West Bank (Meron Benvenisti, quoted by Bahiri, 
p.5) estimated in late 1983 a growth of 20,000 settlers from 
Israel since 1977 ; a rate of development which could make 
the Israeli commitment over 120,000 settlers 1995 (Bahiri,
1984; 16).
In the formation of the National Unity Government in 
September 1984 coalition commitments were given to the Likud 
about schemes already approved. But the political lead is 
held by Mapai, and the 1984 economic crisis in Israel was 
used to slow down development. Nevertheless the future of 
the West Bank, with its large Arab population, will determine 
the future character of the Israeli state, and opinion within 
Israel is deeply divided across traditional party lines. 
Radicalisation of the Arab population, and a fanatical Israeli 
settler element»which has to be sustained by army support and 
has developed a vigilante organisation, contain dangers of 
something approaching civil insurrection of Israeli settlers 
if negotiations over the future threaten thdr position.
Also since 1967 West Bank and Gaza, particularly the 
former, have absorbed Israeli military and other resources, 
in housing, education and other infrastructures which have 
been diverted from development of areas of Israel proper. 
Likud policies, and events on the West Bank have attracted
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hostile international attention, which reflects on the 
country generally. Israelis have therefore every good 
reason for needing to be well-informed about the 
administered territories on the West Bank. They will be 
called upon to make or support very difficult choices. It 
is of interest to examine what government information is 
available to the public about the West Bank and the issues 
which may arise there, and what effective countervailing 
power this transfers to them.
Information Sources
Very little coherent government information in terms 
of policy has emerged in recent years, except in the form 
of doctrinaire statements from ministers and individuals, 
rather than from Knesset debates or cabinet consideration. 
These are short on fact and long on emotional appeal. For 
example the (Likud) Prime Minister (Shamir), addressing a 
convention of the Federation of Builders and Contractors 
in late 1983 is reported verbatim (Jerusalem Post. 6 Dec 
1983, p.l): "Our assent at Camp David to discuss autonomy 
for the people in Judea and Samaria (note: the preferred 
Likud term for the West Bank, carrying emotional and 
historical connotations) does not mean that we have yielded 
the right to settle that region and develop it. We are 
building communities in Judea and Samaria and will continue 
to build up all of Eretz Yisrael" (lit: the Land of Israel, 
another unspecific and emotional term favoured by the Likud). 
But rhetoric on these issues is not an adequate substitute 
for the considered facts, for which the public is reliant 
on press and other extra-governmental sources.
A primary source of information about policy develop­
ment, together with the resources which must be devoted to 
it, is the decision machinery within government. Settlement 
policy beyond the 194^ 9 borders was controlled by the 
Ministerial Committee on Settlement, but the Ministry of 
Defence, which is responsible for military occupation (with 
the defence commitment which new settlements establish) 
makes some decisions, and is able to exercise military
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censorship. One of the first acts of the Likud government, 
in 1978, was to shift the responsibility for settlement 
policy from the Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministerial 
Committee on Security Affairs, automatically rendering its 
proceedings and decisions a secret whose breach carried 
criminal sanctions. This was apparently a deliberate move 
to reduce the amount of information available on the subject, 
and to cloak it with military security. There were protests 
from the press, and shortly afterwards a prominent Knesset 
member (Sarid) found his letter to the Minister of Defence, 
complaining that settlement information was being withheld 
from tha Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs, 
denied publication by the military censor. It was released 
after further protest. (Nyrop, 1979» 276, Goren, 1979*
l63-6ii).
These were attempts at censorship and secrecy at the 
fountainheads of policy, under the guise of "military 
security". But government policy cannot help being re­
flected in all sorts of official documentary sources. A 
decision to establish settlements involves the provision or 
requisitioning of land, the allocation of army resources for 
defence, of money from the housing budget, the education 
budget, the road construction budget, the absorption budget, 
and so on through all government departments involved.
Capital expenditures involve continuing commitments on 
budgets for future years. Government departments give 
income-tax and other advantages to settlers in the terri­
tories. There is no source of government information which 
attempts to take a composite view of the subject, still less 
to elucidate it for the public. Information flows to in­
dividual settlers, mainly through the inevitable network of 
secondary institutions which has extended itself to this 
activity - housing associations, religious movements, poli­
tical parties and the like - while the settlers themselves 
have formed representative bodies with links to relevant in­
stitutions in Israel proper, including many with influence 
within the Knesset, particularly its powerful Finance 
Committee.
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Often, it is not clear who has responsibility for informa­
tion in circulation, which is fed to the media by de­
partmental spokesmen unattribut ably or comes from ostensibly 
non-government sources. The Jerusalem Post. 27 Apr 1984. 
pp. 1 and 3 carries a report drawn up by the "Committee for 
the Renewal of Jewish Settlement in the City of the Pat­
riarchs" in great detail for settlement of 3,000 Israelis 
in five separate areas of Hebron, where there is very strong 
opposition to Israeli settlement. The city contains both 
Jewish and Moslem holy places, and settlement on the scale 
envisaged would commit the Army to defensive arrangements. 
Extensive security, housing and other plans are detailed, 
almost all of them requiring support and funds from govern­
ment, and creating a high possibility of communal tensions.
It is unlikely that government departments concerned were not 
consulted, including the military authorities. But officials 
in the Housing Ministry are reported not to have seen the 
plan, and to have no budget for it. It is similarly unlike^ y^ 
that the many Knesset members with links to West Bank sett­
lers would be unaware that the plan was being formulated, or 
that it does not have influential ministerial support. The 
Jerusalem Post for 5 Oct 1983 carries a long and detailed 
article about the new neighbourhoods being built and planned 
around Jerusalem. Government financing is heavily involved 
in these, and the information almost certainly comes from 
government sources.
A good deal of information about West Bank settlement 
development appears in the press. But there is a studied 
absence of coherent information) particularly on policy and 
planS) directly from government and with its authority. In­
formation percolates through various channels, in low key, 
without that authenticity. Official documents with relevant 
information have generally a controlled availability, and 
very few are on public sale. One of these is the complex 
Budget Book. So far as financial provision is either in­
formative in itself, or a reflection of policy, the Budget 
Book is of variable utility; projects may undergo fundamen­
tal financial reappraisal. The principal budgetary headings
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under which information is to be found are:
a. Ministrv of Communications: Details of budgeted 
expenditure on telephone and associated works. An 
indication of the locations and degree of develop­
ment of settlement.
b. Ministry of Education and Culture: Expenditure 
would be an important indication of settlement activity. 
However, it is very difficult to extract from the pub­
lished form the significant detail for the West Bank 
and Gaza.
c. Ministry of Transportation: Details of expenditure 
planned on roads and associated works - an important 
item of infrastructure.
d. Ministry of Defence: No significant information 
about the West Bank and Gaza, though an Army presence 
is associated with settlements, some of which are on
a quasi-military basis. Information in the Budget for 
Defence expenditure generally is deliberately obscure, 
for security reasons.
e. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs: Some in­
formation about the West Bank and Gaza activities can 
be extracted.
f. Ministrv of Housing and Construction: This gives 
some useful information about the scale of new build­
ings for settlers. Major housing programmes are in­
volved, particularly for the new suburbs around Jerusa­
lem and new West Bank cities (e.g. Ariel).
The Budget Book is not accompanied by any memorandum 
which deals with this aspect of government planning. Nor 
does any single government document attempt to do so. The 
Central Bureau of Statistics provides valuable figures of 
population movements and economic growth. Very little in­
formation is obtainable from other official or quasi­
official sources, such as the National Insurance Institute 
and the Histadrut. The Bank of Israel, which is virtually
a government department, produces an excellent annual 
report, with an economic survey of the West Bank and Gaza, 
and this is widely distributed, though not on public sale.
It is left to those individuals and institutions interested 
in the question to ferret out, associate and draw con­
clusions from the official information available in order 
to present any coherent picture. Some of these publish 
studies, e.g. Peaceful Separation or Enforced Unity;
Economic Consequences for Israel and the West Bank/Gaza 
Area (Bahiri, International Center for Peace in the Middle 
East, Tel Aviv, 198^) of academic quality. But by origin 
such documents do not carry government authenticity. The 
output of official information is largely under the control 
of the Ministry of Defence (who control the operation of the 
Military Censor), and the civil administration makes the 
information which it publishes difficult to obtain.
The Karp Report
There is a sensitivity on the part of the West Bank 
authorities, the settlers and many of the general public in 
Israel to news or published material about the West Bank 
which, in their view, can be exploited against the Israeli 
occupation. The history of the Karp Report is a bizarre 
example of the effect of these sensitivities on official 
information.
The Karp Committee was appointed by the Attorney- 
General of the then Likud government in April 1981, following 
a petition by fourteen Law Professors nine months previously. 
It was headed by Yehudit Karp, the Deputy Attorney-General 
of Israel. Its report was submitted to the Attorney-General 
in May 1982. It was passed to the Minister for the Interior 
in November 1982, and a committee, of three ministers (Defence 
Justice and Interior) was set up to consider it. Repeated 
requests by the Knesset Law Committee for the report to be 
read by them were fended off on the grounds that ministerial 
consideration was not yet complete. Yehudit Karp resigned 
her Committee appointment in frustration. Only on 7 February 
1984. did the Government Press Office release part of the 
report, followed by the bulk on 9 February, in an edited 
version in Hebrew. There was a good deal of International 
interest, and the London Times 8 February 198^ reported that
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Government Press Office efforts to publish a simultaneous 
English-language version "were sabotaged by the Public 
Relations Branch of the Justice Ministry”. A Government 
Press Office version in English did appear subsequently 
with about twenty names deleted. No uncensored version 
has ever appeared.
The report gave chapter and verse, despite systematic 
obstruction from the West Bank authorities, for the 
impression that Israeli settlers were under special and 
benevolent protection of the Army, and that violent acts 
against the Arab population, and disputes arising out of 
the arbitrary requisitioning of land under "security” cover 
were virtually immune from the normal processes of law 
enforcement by the police. The report was characterised 
by a former President of the Supreme Court as prudent, 
objective, balanced and restrained (Jerusalem Post. 15 
Feb 1984.» p. 8).
The release of this government-commissioned report by 
the highest official legal authorities was accompanied by 
extraordinary government reactions. Even before publication 
it was virtually dismissed around the cabinet table 
(Jerusalem Post, 7 Feb 1984^ ). Its fuller publication two 
days later was accompanied by a profusion of statistics 
from the Justice Ministry seeking to confuse and rebut its 
conclusions. The Justice Ministry was criticised for 
distortions, by other official sources. Yehudit Karp was 
publicly accused of political prejudice. Every official 
attempt was made to undermine this report, which did not fit 
the government*s ideologically bounded view of events on 
the West Bank. (The lawless nature of some settlement on 
the West Bank was revealed later in the year, when a number 
of prominent settlers were arrested, charged, and many later 
convicted of membership of an underground organisation and 
of committing and planning acts of violence against the 
Arab population). There was also substantial Army involve­
ment with the settlers* objectives which called into 
question the partiality of the military authorities.
In terms of government information and its transfer to 
the public the Karp report is a paradigm of attempts by 
government to suppress an unpalatable document which it had
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itself commissioned, and to discredit and undermine it when 
pressures forced publication on them. The vehemence of 
these efforts is an indication of the prevalence of 
ideological will in the Likud government about settlement 
on the West Bank over all considerations of fact and reason 
brought to its notice by its own highest legal authority at 
the instance of its chief Law Officer. Finally»release 
and publication of the Karp report did not mean that it 
was available publicly on sale, but that copies were made 
available to the Knesset, press and others with some 
special interest. The general public were therefore once 
more dependent on media reports and summaries r on this 
contentious subject these showed considerable difference of 
fact and emphasis - and on personal contacts with those 
"in the know". The only text accessible in Israel as a 
sale publication is the English version (as it appeared 
from the Government Press Office) published in the U.S.A. 
by the Institute for Palestine Studies).
The Israeli government is understandably reluctant to 
foreclose any options, against the possibility of eventual 
negotiations about the future of the West bank (particularly) 
and Gaza. Nevertheless, the options are limited, and some,
e.g. the Allon Plan, have been publicly displayed, even if 
not formally endorsed by government. It seems important that 
the Israeli public should be well-enough informed about 
situations, developments and their implications to be able 
to form judgements in good time about what may be the most 
far-reaching decisions for the future of the state they may 
ever have to make. They receive in fact no co-ordinated 
information from government sources, and their cognisance 
of events and options comes mostly from news, which by nature 
commonly relates to disturbances, and the ocQSgdonal 
informative or academic review. In the press or In the 
review pages of the newspapers. Power-content of Information 
which could restrict government*s freedom of action Is 
not only conserved within government, but obscured beyond
easy reach.
There are some analogies here with the United King om 
problem In Northern Ireland. These will be briefly noted 
in terms of public Information, in Chapter Thirteen. The 
circumstances are different, but both situations have 
information needs.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
INFORMATION INPUTS AND OUTPUTS OF THE KNESSET
Like most modern parliaments the Knesset confers the 
legitimacy which it derives from election on the legislation 
which it debates and passes; but it has little control of 
policy-making and decision, which have passed into the hands 
of the political executive. Norton (1985* 5-8) associates
scrutiny of legislative and executive action in parliamen­
tary bodies and attempts to exert influence over them as 
closely interdependent sub-functions of legitimisation. 
Information of high power-content and positive or negative 
potential for government is associated with these sub­
functions of a body which is not only part of the govern­
mental process, but contains elements of opposition and of 
enquiry not entirely subservient to the executive. To some 
extent, e.g. in reports of its proceedings, information 
within the parliamentary body naturally becomes public 
information. But the extent and value of this to the 
public are defined by the extent of the information outputs, 
the underlying degree of accountability between executive, 
parliament and public which informs them, and by the channels 
through which they reach or are accessible to the public.
Comprehensive accounts of the Knesset and its procedures 
have been given progressively during its existence by three 
of its officials, Rosetti (1966), Zidon (1967) and Sager 
(1985). Likhovski (1971) gives a more independent review 
of the Law of the Knesset in relation to its procedures.
But these works are concerned with procedure more than 
relationships, and so far as they deal with the latter are 
hardly analytical. Yaacobi (1982) gives much valuable 
working background. Others, such as Frankel (1980), give 
brief summary accounts of the Knesset in works of broader
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scope and limited depth.. There is little mention of 
penetration in them of the questions of information and 
communication which are vital to the effectiveness of a 
parliamentary body in the political system as a whole.
More than in most parliaments in modern politically 
competitive systems the Knesset membership is dominated 
by party. The voter in the Yishuv had the right to delete 
names from the party list of his choice, and names deleted 
on half the votes cast for the list dropped to the bottom. 
Under the state even this limited expression of preference 
disappeared. Votes are cast for the party or bloc, and 
the ballot contains only the Hebrew acronyms which are 
party election symbols. The party presents its list, as 
it stands, to the constituency of the whole country on the 
basis of full proportional representation (Sager, 1985; 
45-^6). Goldberg and Hoffman (Arian, 1983; 61-87) note
the tendency for the power of small, authoritarian nominating 
committees which have traditionally controlled party lists 
in the major parties to give way to institutionalisation 
of nomination on a broader basis.
Party organisation and ideology are nevertheless the 
foundations of Israeli politics, and the power of nomination, 
however acquired, is a potent party discipline. Knesset 
membership is the key to further patronage, including 
membership of Knesset committees. Also M.K.s have very 
extensive personal privileges, immunities and financial 
benefits. They have every personal and political reason 
not to fall out with their parties, unless they have the 
stature to face political exile, or take their chance, 
possibly with other disaffected colleagues or elements, of 
forming a new party which may gain Knesset seats (the 
threshhold is very low; only one per cent of votes cast is 
enough to gain a seat).
The strong links between party organisation and 
Knesset membership produce a high proportion of "askanim” - 
professional politicians, fiutmânn and Landau (1975; 181)
so identified about seventy-five per cent of 374- M.K.s, past 
and present. Mahler (1981; 39» li^ 6-56) notes that many
M.K.s held party office and had spent between eleven and 
twenty years in the party organisation before entering the
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Knesset, They were thoroughly conditioned to party 
supremacy, and identified themselves within the Knesset 
with their parties and factions rather than with government 
or opposition coalitions. Overwhelmingly (eighty-three 
per cent of those interviewed) they conidered themselves 
accountable to their parties, not to the public. It is 
generally conceded that many "party hacks" could not hold 
their seats in direct elections.
Information Facilities and Inputs to the Plenum
Members of the Knesset who want to inform themselves 
have sparse personal facilities. They have no offices, 
secretarial pool or proper legislative reference services. 
Parties have some office accommodation on the premises and 
dispose of small allowances and some secretarial help meant 
for Knesset business. Each M.K. can draw a small monthly 
allowance (currently equivalent to US;^ 200) for research 
assistants or secretaries, and about half of them are known 
to employ such help, usually university students in their 
spare time (Mahler, 1981; 98 et seq. and information from
Knesset staff). These limited personal facilities can be 
supplemented from the Knesset library, which maintains a 
margin of research staff on top of a permanent staff of 
eleven (in 1983). The Library deals with about five hundred 
information briefing requests a year - mainly from a limited 
number of M.K.s - and prepares perhaps a dozen occasional 
position papers on specific topics (e.g. the Camp David 
Accords of 1979), some of them for general circulation.
But the Library facilities are sparingly used by M.K.s, 
and a newspaper criticism by one of the more active (Weiss, 
Jerusalem Post. 27 Jan 1983) describes the Library as 
"desolate".
M.K.s thus neither have nor demand much assistance 
from Knesset services in informing themselves on the often 
complex legislative matters before them. Barker and Rush 
(1980),among others, have examined the certainly not 
excessive information available to British M.P.s. in a far 
more "information-intensive" environment of parliamentary 
services. Menhennet (1965)» Englefield (1965)* Menhennet 
and Pool (1967) and Coombes (I966)have displayed and 
examined the important part played by the British House of
Commons Library in providing research and information to 
M.P.s, The Knesset, even making every allowance for the 
comparative intensity and scale of activity, is not highly 
serviced for basic information and research, and there is 
little sign of general concern to improve its position.
Thecfemand from M.K.s is not present, a reflection of both 
membership and function. Scrutiny cannot be effective 
without information and study, and as Norton (1985; 6)
points out, influence is ineffective without scrutiny.
As a body (the plenum) the Knesset meets on three days 
per week, of which two are "government days". Atendance of 
many M.K.s is notoriously poor, the Knesset taking second 
place for many to their private interests and professional 
and other outside employments. There are no attendance 
requirements or records, or necessary quorum for business. 
"Party" debate time (the majority) is apportioned on the 
basis of party representation, and parties allocate their 
time to nominated speakers, who address the Knesset from 
the rostrum. The a^da is sometimes chaotically disrupted by 
procedural devices exploited by M.K.s, which consume much 
time to little purpose. Such proceedings are confusing to 
follow, and often go unreported by the media (Rubinstein, 
Jerusalem Post. 28 Feb 1986, p.6).
An agenda which is in effect a list of outstanding 
business for the session is Issued at the close of each 
week's sittings to M.K.s (at their desks in the Chamber). 
Items actually to be taken in the course of the following 
wedcare listed in an order paper (Seder HaYom. lit: Order 
of the Day) drawn up at the commencement of that week's 
business. It is the primary input of information about the 
business currently before the Knesset. Its technical status 
is as a press communique; it is the key for media, public 
and M.K.s themselves to the Knesset programme. Its content 
is perfunctory, as the translated specimen at Table 8 shows; 
some texts, e.g. legislative proposals, are separately 
circulated. In the nature of business the agenda is 
frequently and often confusingly/.arranged. Seder HaYom is 
not reissued, but partial revisions are displayed on the 
premises (Sager, 1985; 108-110).
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TABLE 8
No. 28 THE KNESSET 
ORDER OF THE DAY
For Sessions of the Knesset
10.5.82 - Monday at A.O p.m.
11.5.82 - Tuesday at 4--0 p.m.12.5.82 - Wednesday at ii.O p.m
1. Questions and Answers
2. Minister of Energy and Infra­
structure's review of the work 
of his department and debate
3. Courts of Justice Law (amend­
ment No.15) 1982
4.. Penal Code (amendment No.21)
19*0 (First Reading)
5. Local Authorities Law (rate^ 
relief for war-wounded soldiers 
and police) (amendment No.2)
1982
6. Planning and Construction Law 
(amendment No.19) 1982 
(First reading)
7. National Energy Authority Law 
(amendment) 1982
8. Nazi War Crimes Law (amendment 
No. 11) 1982 (First Reading)
9. Compensation for Road Accident 
Injuries Law (amendment No.5)
1982 (First reading) - con­
cluding debate
10. Civilian Damage (State Liability) 
Law (amendment No.3) 1982 
(First reading)
11. Neighbourhoods Rehabilitation 
plan - Members of the Knesset S. Arbeli-Almoslino, G. Cohen,
M. Vilner and M. Shltrit
(Translated from Hebrew original)
Two hours allotted for 
debate
Legislative Proposal
178
Legislative Proposal 
180
Legislative Proposal
179
Legislative Proposal
1579
Legislative Proposal 
1579
Legislative Proposal
1579
Legislative Proposal 
1566
Legislative Proposal 
1566
Two hours allotted 
for debate
IAS
The first reading of legislative proposals, on general 
principles, is held in the plenum, where M.K.s use 
procedural devices to widen the scope of discussion. But 
detailed examination is remitted to committee. The 
committee report is referred to the plenum for second 
reading, at which only dissenting members of the committee 
(and other Knesset members who have been allowed to 
register amendments) may debate their proposed minority 
amendments, and the committee chairman replies. Other 
M,K,s may not participate in this debate, their function 
being to vote at the subsequent third reading, which gives 
formal endorsement to the outcome of the limited second 
reading.
The Knesset receives virtually no organised informa­
tion from the executive by way of papers meant to inform 
its legislative or other debates, such as statements of 
policy or reviews of particular topics and situations. 
Important statements may be made by senior ministers to 
initiate debates, and are on the record, but they are not 
followed or illuminated by documents submitted to the 
Knesset with background information or statements of the 
arguments, facts and proposals for reference and evaluation. 
The Knesset has a void in information inputs of this kind. 
Such other documentary information as it receives comes 
from the output of government departments and of official 
institutions, such as the Bank of Israel, which may 
initiate debates. These may be put into the Knesset for 
M.K.s, with the Speaker's permission. But only those which 
relate to the formal business of the Knesset are "laid on 
the Table" and noted in the proceedings. Most of the rest 
can be identified in the Knesset Archive.
Only a handful of occasional and miscellaneous 
internal papers originating in the Knesset can be identified 
in any year from Knesset and State Archives. These are 
typically digests of the work of particular committees, 
drawn up for committee use and merely summarising informa­
tion already on record; House Committee papers on matters 
of internal management;^ notes of symposia and honorific 
occasions (e.g. visits of foreign dignitaries);- and a few 
hints and guides to M.K.s and journalists. Some of these
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papers are not fully circulated within the Knesset, and 
internal papers are not systematically noted in any series 
record from which they may be identified.
Thus government inputs of information to the Knesset 
are formal and limited. But as in other parliaments there 
is an input direct from the community, in complaints, 
attempts to recruit support and influence and requests for 
information. Many M.K.s are known to find this casework 
the most satisfactory part of their Knesset activities.
In the Israeli system the M.K. is not, however, the natural 
focus of a definable constituency of all interests and 
parties and this must limit the range of his casework to 
known particular interests and affiliations, personal and 
institutional. Question procedures, though often used only 
as a last resort to obtain casework information which other 
channels have failed to elicit, are some index to casework, 
and Frankel (1980; 16) notes the lack of a consituency
related to the individual as limiting the range and 
specificity of Questions asked in the Knesset.
Caspi (1982) notes another source of casework in which 
the press plays a leading role in furnishing M.K.s with 
material for many of their Questions. More than half the 
Questions asked in the Seventh Knesset (1969-1973) had the 
media as their stipulated source. Almost half of these 
were inspired by three main independent newspapers (Haaret^ 
Maariv and Yediot Aharonot) and thirteen per cent originated 
from party-dependent newspapers. In effect, the press, with 
various sympathies and affiliations, substantially determines 
the content of this part of the Knesset agenda. Caspi 
attributes this dependence to the absence of other efficieit 
information services.
Ministers take their time, sometimes many months, to 
answer written Questions. Sometimes they simply disregard 
or brush aside those which they find inconvenient to 
answer, (Jerusalem Post. 13 Jan 1985# p.3, 31 July 1986,
p.8).
The verbatim report of proceedings is an important 
information input to M.K.s themselves, particularly in 
view of the often minimum personal attendance, as the full 
and authentic record of plenum business. An immediate
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record, the so-called Stenographic Protocol, is produced on 
the premises within a couple of hours of debates and 
proceedings which it covers. It is unpublished, marked 
"unamended" and is meant for the internal use of the Knesset 
and for the media. M.K.s have the usual opportunity in 
parliaments to correct errors of grammar and style made in 
the heat of the moment, provided that they do not alter the 
sense of what they said. The Stenographic Protocol is not 
an output to the public, except as a media source.
Inputs To and Through Committees
The principal inputs of information into the Knesset 
are through its ten standing committees, and a feature of 
the committees is the extent to which some of them, 
particularly Labour and Welfare, and Finance, deal with 
executive as well as legislative or other deliberative 
business. Ministers, senior civil servants and invited 
experts appear before them. Committees are constituted 
generally on the party key basis; information given to them 
passes beyond direct government control. The Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee, though purely deliberative, 
is a body of great status, and membership, particularly the 
chairmanship, carries prestige and seniority. But Peri 
(1983; 177) points out that it carries little power
"...since political mobility in Israel is sponsored mobility 
pull from the top rather than push from below - the chair­
manship is subject to pressures to conform and adapt to 
cabinet policies". Members of this committee are privy to 
much classified information, must sign a declaration of 
secrecy, and cannot be replaced by their parties, as can 
members of other committees, for casual absences.
A great deal of information of high power-content for 
the committees themselves, as scrutineers of the executive, 
and for the plenum, passes through committees. Yaacobi 
1982; 60) notes the formal expression in Knesset regula­
tions of the right of committees to demand information and 
explanation from ministers, and, with their consent, from 
their civil servants. But Knesset Regulations are not part 
of the Basic Law: The Knesset, and committees do not have 
powers to compel attendance of witnesses. Conflicts of 
authority with the executive arise (as they do in the
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United Kingdom Parliament, for example) and ministers 
occasionally refuse to appear or to provide information, 
or let their staffs do so, though they are generally 
co-operative. Powers of the Knesset to set up standing 
committees to obtain information are virtually unused - 
they require government consent (Yaacobi, 1982; 62-6i^ ).
A fundamental limitation on committees is their lack 
of independent research and advisory facilities to test the 
information put before them. Most committees have to make 
do with a clerical/administrative staff of two; the Finance 
Committee has a staff of six, including economic and legal 
advisers. The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee has 
two part-time consultants in addition to its normal staff 
of two. Foir legal advisers serve the ten committees. These 
are restrictive levels of staffing, and committees often use 
the press as a source for their examinations. The input of 
government information into committees is largely in the hands 
of the executive. Lack of facilities may be more than 
incidental; a former chairman of the Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee is said to have suggested that one reason 
for it is the reluctance both of the Cabinet and departments 
to"...enhance the professional weight" of the committees 
(Peri, 1983; 183). The situation lends itself to bureau­
cratic manipulation of information put to committees, 
especially where there is a receptive chairman. A senior 
Minister and M.K. of long standing is reported as thinking 
that "Knesset members are being fed slanted data by experts 
appearing before their committees." (Jerusalem Post. 26 Jan 
1983, p.3).
Attendance at committees is notoriously poor; regular 
attenders have been estimated at twenty per cent of members 
(Sager, 1985; 12U)• Issues are frequently settled by the 
chairman and a handful of members. But Likhovski (1971;
183) notes that standing committees may and do delegate 
much of their work not concerned with statutory powers to 
sub-committees, and "...very little is in fact known about 
their work". Sub-committees, entrusted with specific tasks 
of study and drafting, may work more effectively than their 
parent committees, which tend to continue political debate 
in a smaller forum. But sub-committees are without the
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formal weight of the full committee in obtaining information 
from ministers and bureaucrats. The Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee is known to form numerous sub-committees.
Inhibitions on committee powers to obtain information 
come out perhaps most clearly in examination of the annual 
budget, among the most important and influential of 
parliamentary functions anywhere. Budget documents can 
display or obscure information with much power-content 
about the organisation and activities of government. In 
any government they tend to be technical and abstruse;
Israeli budgets are confusingly framed, and unaccompanied 
by explanatory material adequate to summarise and evaluate 
them in lay terms. The public relies, as elsewhere, on the 
press for evaluation.
In Israeli circumstances the Defence Budget accounts 
(in 1986) for about twenty-four per cent of the national 
budget. It goes no further in the Knesset than joint 
consideration by the fifty members of the Finance and 
Foreign Affairs and Security Committees, and for security 
reasons none of the documentary material may leave the 
committee room. Some sections are security-classified even 
for committee members (Peri, 1983; 227). Only four members
attended all four meetings of the joint committee on the 
1986 Defence Budget; twenty-three attended none at all, 
and nine attended only one meeting. Efforts to improve the 
system of examination meet solid resistance from the defence 
establishment (Jerusalem Post. 11 April 1986, p.3). The 
methods of preparation and monitoring of the Defence Budget 
have been much criticised, but the situation remains that 
"Although the defence budget devours the largest slice of 
the national budget and decisively influences the whole of 
society, it is determined and carried out in virtual 
independence from external influences of decision-makers 
in the civil sphere” (Peri, 1983; 230).
Meetings of the Knesset committees "...are not public 
unless otherwise decided by the Committee" (Knesset 
regulations. Article 75)* The media are occasionally 
invited into committee rooms for some presentational 
purpose ; otherwise committee meetings are closed. A 
verbatim record is kept, for committee use only, and a
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protocol (minute) is compiled by the committee clerk. This 
may not be circulated outside committee or referred to in 
the plenum (this rule is not inviolate: breaches are ruled 
out of order but nevertheless sometimes appear in the plenum 
record). Formal communiques may be issued at the close of 
meetings, at the chairman's discretion, laconically 
informative. Only formal decisions are remitted to the 
plenum, and these appear in its record of proceedings.
Thus major information inputs to the Knesset do not 
reach the plenum in any form in which they can be evaluated 
in relation to the adequacy of information requested or 
submitted as a basis for decisions. Nor can judgements be 
formed as to whether, or how far, Ihe decisions reached are 
consistent with, or even based on the information received. 
The information given to or collected by sub-committees is 
even further out of sight.
Verbatim recording and publication of committee 
proceedings in parliamentary bodies of small countries is 
not universal (e.g. Norway), particularly where parties are 
not numerous or dominated by ideology. There may be a case 
for unpublished discussion behind closed committee doors, 
to allow pragmatism to mitigate the formal rigours of party 
position. But in the party-ridden Israeli political 
system this appears to put a premium on manipulation and 
"deals” which might not otherwise survive exposure,
Committee procedures in the Knesset are often clearly used 
to withhold or maripulate information or its power-content 
in the interests of controversial decisions. When important 
legislation is being considered relevant committees become 
the focus for interest groups and others to put their cases
21,‘The extremely generous compensation, widely considered 
scandalous, awarded to some settlers in northern Sinai dis­
placed by the return of the territory to Egypt in 1982, is 
one example. In another, arrangements reached behind closed 
committee doors for channelling funds to certain religious 
institutions on lists controlled by individual committee 
members were so publicly scandalous that the Director- 
General of the Religious Affairs Ministry publicly dis­
sociated his Ministry from responsibility for the 
distribution of such funds "transmitted" through it but 
controlled within committee (Jerusalem Post Magazine, 3 Feb 
1984, pp, 4~5 )»
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to members. Selection of witnesses and evidence to be 
heard is largely at the chairman's discretion (Sager, 1985;
1 2 7 ) .
Information of a sort is not lacking, however,
Leaking from committees is so prevalent that even 
information from senior ministers to the Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committee is often given beforehand to the 
plenum or the media, d»n the supposition that it is best 
leaked in the form in which the executive wishes it to be 
known (Jerusalem Post, 20 May 1986, p.3). But real 
security material is generally respected, and a chairman 
of high standing has claimed that the Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee actually receives better briefing than 
the Cabinet itself, who "...wield the power of decision 
without being informed" (Abba Eban, quoted in Jerusalem
Post. 22 May 1986, p.3).
Information Outputs of the Knesset
The information outputs of the Knesset reflect both 
the limitations of its inputs and its attitudes to the 
public. The Stenographic Protocol undergoes little 
amendment i in a country so small it would involve 
trivial effort to deposit copies immediately in public 
libraries and, say, town halls. It would have as much 
authenticity as e.g. the British Hansard. It would serve 
more promptly as an information output to the public than 
the formal printed public record, Divrei HaKnesset (lit: 
Proceedings of the Knesset). This is not a timely record; 
in recent years it has been as much as fifteen months 
behind the periods to which it relates, because of a 
change in production methods. By mid-1986 it had recovered 
to a time-lag of only one month. But in Israeli circum­
stances interest in it by the time of its appearance is 
institutional and archival only. Some 4-50 copies are 
issued on subscription and by deposit to libraries which
request it.
As verbatim records the Stenographic Protocol and 
Divrei HaKnesset maintain high standards. Rubinstein 
(Jerusalem Post. 13 Jan 1985, p.3) notes a minor cover-up 
in the record for an erroneous remark by the Deputy 
Speaker. However, despite the Speaker's rulings to delete
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them, heckling interruptions in distasteful language, for 
which the ideological and personal differences which run 
through Israeli politics make the Knesset a notorious forum, 
mostly remain on record. Ministers occasionally use a 
permitted facility of having their material inserted in the 
record without having been delivered in the plenum.
The inviolability of the official record, is in fact 
upheld, though occasionally impugned. For, example, 
following an acrimonious debate on 23 September 1982 on the 
massacres in Beirut refugee camps, M.K.s supporting the then 
Defence Minister (Sharon) attempted to have corrections to 
his statements, put forward by another prominent M.K.
(Herzog), excised from the record. The Chair ruled that 
both the correction statement and the argument against 
including it should be recorded (Jerusalem Post, 24^  Sept 
1982; Divrd. HaKnesset, 10th Knesset, Session 122, p.3705)»
It is difficult to see that any other rational decision 
could be given in relation to a verbatim record (apart from 
ruling Sharon *s motion out of order); but the mere attempt 
suggests that some elements in the Knesset do not regard 
the official record as above party or personal interests, 
though there is no suggestion that it has been allowed to 
accommodate them.
The official record gives at present no information 
about the attendance or voting behaviour of M.K.s Unless 
specially requested no count of votes is taken, a simple 
“majority*' for or against being recorded. It is not unknown 
for M.K.s to speak for the record in one way, but vote in 
another. Likhovski (1971; 183) comments that Divrei
HaKnesset "...all but ignores" the existence of sub­
committees •
As a body, therefore, the Knesset has no significant 
and developed outputs of information to the public other 
that the formal records of its proceedings. The mass of 
detail considered by committees has no systematic outlet, 
and even the textsof various documents considered, such as 
legislative proposals, motions for the agenda and so on are 
not published in any systematic series of papers, though some 
of them, e.g. legislative texts find inclusion in the
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official gazette (Reshumot) - a publication controlled by 
the Ministry of Justice. The void of documentary outputs 
from the Knesset in terms of types of information without 
which neither Knesset nor public can be sufficiently 
informed to hold government to any continuous and detailed 
account lends point to Galnoor’s comment (1982; 67) that
the Knesset: "...serves as a public arena where outputs of 
politics, usually predetermined, are displayed and 
occasionally argued". This is more of a symbolic than of an 
instrumental role of the public display of information and 
distribution of its power-content.
The constraint of information to the plenum inevitably 
strengthens constraint of what is available when it might 
attract adverse attention. An instance is the Knesset budget 
itself, containing information about M.K.s’ salaries and 
allowances, and Knesset staffing and expenses. A joint 
committee (House and Finance) normally revises (upward) 
Ministry of Finance proposals. Details are obscured within 
broad headings, and supplied only to committee members. On 
the one budget on which it must be presumed to have full 
intelligence and which is under its own control the Knesset 
is notably unforthcoming with information, which it apparently 
does not care to expose to a public evaluation. The joint 
committee is reported to be "communique-shy" (Jerusalem Post, 
20, 25 Aug 1983, p.3).
The State Controller's Reports - A Knesset Input and Output
Only in the reports of the State Controller can the 
Knesset (and, through the media,the public) be said to be 
well supplied with documentary input as a basis for over­
sight, though retroactive , of the executive. The State 
Controller is the public auditor, whose powers run wherever 
public money is expended: his reports cover efficiency, 
management and probity in expenditure of public funds, bit are
not execiiive in effect. The breadth of the public sector in
22Israel gives the Controller an unusually wide scope.
22 . .......'There are currently (June 1986) moves to restrict the 
State Controller's remit to government departments only, 
thus putting a great deal of public expenditure beyond his 
reach.
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Since 1971 he has also been the public Ombudsman; and since 
1969 his remit has embraced the government finance extended 
to political parties.
The Controller is appointed for a renewable five-year 
term. Though office is regarded as non-political, and the 
term of serving Controllers has invariably been renewed, the 
last appointment, in 1982, was not free from political 
wrangling, and it would not be safe to put any public 
appointment in Israel beyond the reach of party influence. 
Attempts in the plenum to fix a term for a non-renewable 
appointment,less dependent on a politically consituted 
Knesset Committee, have been unsuccessful (Jerusalem Post,
1 Jan 1982, p.8).
There is some vetting of the State Controller’s reports, 
before publication, on security grounds. The Controller has 
made stringent criticisms of the defence forces’ mismangement 
from time to time, and expenditure of public money extends 
deeply into areas (e.g. military industries) with security 
sensitivities. Given the political and personal Interests 
which pervade Israeli public life and the kinds of mis­
management which the Controller’s reports habitually reveal, 
it is not unlikely that vetting goes marginally beyond 
strictly necessary limits.
Other influences can be exercised. Deference to the 
Knesset is generally considered to have been involved in 
the delay in publication of the State Controller’s 1981 
Report on Party Financing,which was held back until the 
Knesset had passed retroactive legislation to cover clear 
malfeasance in election overspending (not for the first time) 
by the major parties.
There is no reason to suggest that reservations on the 
Controller’s independence are more than marginal in effect, 
though they are politically exploitable. His Annual Report 
is a fully published document, displaying a mass of 
information about the operations of government which can be 
obtained from no other source, and would otherwise not come 
coherently or at all to Knesset and public notice. The 
effect is flawed by the regular repetition of past criticisms 
and the extent to which lack of action on them has to be 
deplored. The Knesset is not inclined to deal with some
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kinds of criticism, particularly of financial practices 
deeply ingrained in the disbursement of party favours. Alsc  ^
the will to press criticism to conclusions is vitiated by 
political factors. But the reports are a major media 
occasion, and they release into the plenum and the public 
arena a cumulative and substantial power-content with 
negative potential for the government, since by the nature 
of his function the State Controller is critical. Explana­
tions put forward by those criticised, produce more 
information, even if meant to deflect or evade rather than 
to inform.
The State Controller is an exceptionally full and 
independent source of information, but deals with the past 
on a limited remit. Clearly, the Knesset must be in general 
a much better-informed body than would appear from the other­
wise sparse information it receives from government or even 
its own committees. In an assembly of which about a quarter 
of members are ministers or deputy-ministers, and in which 
every member (ministers excepted) has a committee assignment, 
some with plural memberships, there is a flow and interchange 
of information through informal and interpersonal channels, 
as well as through parties. It must be doubtful whether the 
Knesset could function meaningfully without this. But these 
forms of communication lend themselves to manipulation by the 
way of selective use and restriction of power-content in the 
interests of control over the distribution of power by the 
executive. The element of intent to withhold information 
must be strengthened by the limitations on the normal supply 
of information to the nominally sovereign Knesset.
The Media and the Knesset
In the absence of timely, verbatim public reports of 
plenum proceedings and of any full reports of committee 
proceedings, the media dominate the communications of the 
Knesset with the public. There is no lobby system; the 
media maintain accredited Knesset correspondents, whose 
personal contacts and sources within the Knesset supplement 
the formal committee communiques. Despite the closed 
committee proceedings the media often carry very full
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reports of meetings, with apparently verbatim accounts, 
liberally spiced with ’reportage”, which could only come 
from committee members. Major newspapers run regular 
Knesset columns and occasional features in which Knesset 
behaviour and institutions are critically discussed, and 
underlying political motivations for current action and 
attitudes are analysed. This is a normal type of informed 
media comment and gossip.
Live television broadcasts from the Knesset plenum 
have been allowed since the inception of the television 
service in 1968. Excerpts from important debates may be 
included in the main television news, whose audience is 
virtually the whole population. But coverage is not 
regular; routine Knesset sessions, as in any parliament, 
can be dull and very sparsely attended. The cameras fasten 
mainly on the rostrum speakers, but are also allowed to 
roam into the chamber - a major complaint by M.K.s is that 
they are too prone to show Members nodding, and rows of 
empty seats.
The television cameras are occasionally invited to 
record brief excerpts which committees sometimes stage for 
presentational and publicity purposes. They also have the 
facility to interview M.K.s on the premises as they emerge, 
for example, from committee meetings. After a controversial 
and heated session, when members of committees are anxious 
to score points and emphasise their parties' positions, the 
resultant ’’images” and off-the-cuff comments can be 
revealing to viewers.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE ISRAELI MEDIA
The media are the principal channels through which 
political and much administrative information reaches the 
Israeli public. The Knesset, in particular, has virtually 
no other current public outlet. The degree of media 
autonomy, the working contacts of government and media and 
their attitudes to each other and the public are therefore 
crucial to the formation and transfer of public information 
at its final stages. The affective orientations of the 
public towards government as a source and the media as 
channels are no less important as influences on public 
receptivity and belief.
Constraints on the Media
The Israeli media are autonomous in the sense that they 
are not formally owned or directed by government. But they 
function under definable constraints. There is the historical 
constraint of co-operation with government which was exempli­
fied in the Yishuv through the Reaction Committee. There 
are the formal and legal constraints related to a continuous 
state of war and terrorist attack, internal and external.
There are constraints of ownership by and identification with 
specific parties. Finally, there are constraints of public 
attitudes, including the general attitudes of politicians, 
about the media role.
Continuation of the Yishuv press pattern helped to 
maintain established relations with government. Statehood 
brought no major changes to an already well-established 
press (Table 2). But a group of journalists broke away from 
Yediot Aharonot to start a new major daily Maariv (Evening) 
in 194-9* independent but with a right-wing inclination.
Many minor party and specialised periodicals are published,
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but Haaretz, Davar. Yediob Aharonot and Maariv have remained 
the "big four” of the daily press, followed by the retitled 
English-language Jerusalem Post. No precise circulation 
figures are provided in Israel, but Yediot Aharonot and 
Maariv, which have the largest circulations (the former in 
excess of 200,000), are reckoned to be read by some seventy 
per cent of the population. There is substantial cross­
readership (Frankel, 1980; 14.0-4-7, Galnoor (1982; 226-28)).
In 1983 a new tabloid.Hadashot (News), was established, with 
support from Haaretz; but this is a lightweight, catering 
for sensation and sport for young readers. Time and changes 
in composition of the population have brought a greater 
orientation towards the Sephardi element of the population, 
particularly in the mass-circulation newspapers.
The Yishuv role of the press as an instrument of 
government policy continued throughout the pressures of the 
early days of the state. Galnoor (1982; 2U5-U^) emphasises
its value as an instrument of legitimation for government 
and the political system, exercising self-restraint, with a 
high symbolic output in fostering solidarity and identifica­
tion with the political and organisational needs of the new 
state. This was not necessarily subservience; there were 
common goals.
Self-imposed limitations continued, through the 
Editors’ Committee, the 1953 successor to the Reaction 
Committee. But the relations of the press and community 
institutions in the common struggle of the Yishuv against 
outside power were not quite the same in the framework of 
a state with competing internal interests. Behind the 
screen of national interest in the Editors' Committee was 
now the power of government, within competitive politicstto 
manipulate Information for its own purposes, facilitating 
an insidious form of co-operation, aimed at voluntary 
suppression by the press of news which the government 
preferred not to see released. The regular and purposeful 
sharing of confidential information with the Editors, making 
them virtually accomplices in restricting the flow of 
information which it would be hard to cover by security 
rather than policy considerations, could be a means of 
restricting the release of its power-content into the
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political arena. The Editor of Haaretz, the major 
independent newspaper, eventually left the Editors’
Committee for a time in order to protect his freedom of 
action. Actual censorship sometimes transgressed into 
the realm of policy rather than security. Rationed news­
print seemed to find its way to papers favoured by the 
government, a question on which the Knesset inflicted its 
first defeat on the government in 1950 (Goren, 1979; 106).
There was a general sensitivity to press reports, even 
in the revelation of public scandals, which could be 
construed as inimical to the image or interests of the 
state. Moreover, the country was still officially at war. 
Goren (1979; 100-01, 111-12, 122-29 and Galnoor; 228-30)
give details of press manipulations by government sometimes 
in conflict and sometimes in connivance with the Editors ’ 
Committee, to keep information from the public or to give 
out false information. Galnoor also notes government 
control of newsreels, and the dependence of the media on 
official sources and their versions of events.
The autonomy of the press as a channel between 
government and public is inevitably compromised to some 
degree as long as the Editors’ Committee continues to be 
pervertible on occasions to political use; though in 
Israel’s position some form of government/press co­
operation on genuine security matters cannot be avoided.
The consequences are, in Goren’s view (1979; 100, 158)
that the Committee "...plays a vital part in conditioning 
newspapers to support the official line, thereby reducing 
their ability to play a meaningful part in criticising the 
government", and that on occasions "...it is instrumental 
in restraining rather than fostering the political debate". 
Goren's assessment that the logical, effect is "...greatly to 
reinforce the stability of the political structure" 
emphasises the relationship of information constraint to 
stability generally; in Israel a stability of conformity 
to the views of those who rely on their "inside" knowledge 
and position rather than on public discussion and feedback 
for steering the polity. Since Goren wrote, however, the 
press has become distinctly less co-operative with govern­
ment in matters which are not clearly security.
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Voluntary co-operation is backed by formidable legal 
sanctions. Galnoor (1977; 229-31) reviews the secrecy and
security restrictions on the media, and Goren (1979; Chaps, 
xiii, xiv) discusses specific cases involving the press. 
Shapiro (1982) gives a general account of security and 
censorshç in relation to the press. The formal legislation 
derives from the pre-194.8 British Mandate, carried into 
Israeli law. The Press Ordinance, 1933# and Defence 
Regulations (Emergency) 194-5 imposes press licensing and 
supervision by administrative order, and confer extensive 
powers of military censorship. Israel has no explicit 
constitution, and the balance of public and media rights to 
government information remains uncertain.
Had these potentially draconian provisions for control 
of information not been inherited, there can be little 
doubt that the State would have had to legislate on similar 
lines, against the background of constant military threat 
and geo-political isolation. Goren (1979; 9^) remarks that
retention of these inherited restrictions "...cannot be 
considered a mere oversight on the part of the legislators". 
The formal and rigorous powers of control over the press are 
now rarely exercised.  ^ Government has relied far more on 
voluntary press control in the interests of national security. 
Political misuse of powers has been resisted by the press, 
and in 1953, when the government suspended the Communist 
newspaper Kol Ha»am (lit: Voice of the People) for its 
attack on certain government policies, the Supreme Court 
quashed the order and publicly established the principle 
of press freedom as an attribute of democracy. (Goren,
1979; 97; Supreme Court of Justice No. 73/53-83/53:
Kol Ha»am v. the Minister of the Interior).
^^‘Nevertheless, they are far from being a dead letter. In 
April 198ii the military censor shut down Hadashot for four 
days for flouting a censorship ruling - the first such 
closure for thirty years in Israel proper. The censorship 
is more regularly applied or threatened in East Jerusalem, 
which, though formally annexed to Israel, has newspapers 
and press services sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation; these become involved in uncertainties of 
Israeli policy (Jerusalem Post« 4- May and 1 Oct 198^^. 
small Israeli settlers* publication on the West Bank was temporarily suspended in 1985 for publication of inflammatory
views.
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The influence of party as distinct from government on 
the press has not unduly cramped political debate in public. 
Wdfensohn (1979» 8-9) draws attention to the autonomy of
the press in intra-party debate. Notwithstanding its 
partisanship and value as a power-base for party leadership, 
the press has shown political flexibility and autonomy, 
sometimes leading the party into political change. Intra­
party debate is not information from government; but in the 
intimate connection between party and government in Israel 
it must enlarge public information on government thinking 
and trends. Davar, the organ of the Labour Party, has had 
some major and notorious differences with the party powerful 
(Frankel, 1980; 11^ 3). The Jerusalem Post records its own
transition from intimate co-operation with leading Labour 
government figures to positive criticism and opposition, as 
the Labour establishment developed cracks in policy and 
conflicts in personality (Erwin Frenkel, "A Newspaper’s 
Loyalties” in Jerusalem Post Jubilee Supplement. 1 Dec 1982, 
p.8). Galnoor notes (1982; 231) that the independent
newspapers were sufficiently independent to be widely 
regarded as the only viable opposition to the government 
(he writes about the period to the end of the 1960’s, when 
Mapai was politically dominant).
There were, and remain, deeper underlying constraints 
than those accepted voluntarily or imposed by law. 
Notwithstanding the clear declaration of the Supreme Court 
in the Kol Ha»am case, that "...the democratic process is 
by open debate and the free exchange of ideas on matters of 
public interest. ’Public Opinion’ plays a vital part in 
that discussion...”, the ideological, eastern European 
influence which saw the press as instruments of party and 
state was never far below the surface. Arguments more 
appropriate to the one-party state could be publicly aired 
from influential quarters. As late as December 1968 
Yisrael Yeshayahu, a Labour party ’apparatchik” who became 
Speaker of the Knesset, attacked the non-party press as a 
danger to democracy, because ’’The public needs full, 
reliable and objective information. That is why we should 
not rely on the private, commercial press, by its nature 
intent foremost... on making money” (Jewish Chronicle,
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London 20 Dec 1968). In July 1971 Yeshayahu asserted that 
the non-party press propagated hatred of the political 
parties, and "the absence of parties endangers democracy". 
Haaretz dismissed this in an editorial as "the Bolshevik 
mentality". But it illustrates an attitude that has never 
disappeared from Israeli political life (Jewish Chronicle, 
London, 2 July 1971, Elizur, 1973; 99).
Authoritarian attitudes to press and to public 
information were widespread, even if not always extreme.
The early leaders of the state, notably Ben Gurion, had a 
well-known contempt for the press and its needs and functions 
(Goren, 1979; 98-99), with no hesitation in manipulating
information given. Pinchas Sapir perhaps Israel's most able 
Finance Minister, was accused (Jewish Chronicle, London,
30 Dec 1971) of a "Pasha-like unconcern for informing the 
public".
The Yishuv inheritance, that the press is an instrument 
of the community, which it betrays by public criticism, is 
still deeply rooted. A survey report in March 1983 (Dahaf 
Research Institute Poll, Dr. Mena Zemach), during the 
divisive Lebanon war, in which sections of the press 
virtually filled the opposition role, showed some sixty-five 
per cent of the country's adult population to consider the 
Israeli news media "detrimental to the national interest", 
compared with fifty-one a year before. Israeli society 
across the political spectrum, though generally sympathetic 
to press freedom, has been less than outright in its support 
when it felt that damaging images were being presented to 
the outside world. A substantial section of the population 
wants to have press information only of the "right sort".
The Emergence of the "Opposition" Press
Both press and public long maintained the Yishuv 
confidence to which they had been heavily conditioned, that 
if there was manipulation and restriction of information 
from government it was for acceptable reasons. Galnoor 
(1982; 24-9) gives an astonishing figure of ninety-six per
cent in a 1970 opinion poll who "always or almost always" or 
"usually" believed government spokesmen. Attitudes began to 
change in the 1960's as the society consolidated and news­
papers acquired readerships with a rising standard of
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ieducation, weaker ideological commitments and more readiness 
to criticise. Eisenstadt (1967; 331) notes the upsurge of
independent public opinion during the controversy over the 
Lavon affair, a complex security cause-celebre which rocked 
the Israeli political establishment in the early 1960*s.
The censorship also came under accusations of serving 
political interests, and confidence in government demands 
for secrecy weakened. Goren (1979; 123-4-1) describes a
series of events which undermined press confidence in the 
tight hold which the Defence establishment held over 
military information. The Yom Kippur War of 1973» when 
information about early reverses was suppressed and 
otherwise grossly mishandled, undermined public as well as 
press willingness to accept official statements on defence 
and foreign affairs without question. Moreover, after the 
Six-Day War of 1967 a large foreign press corps had 
established itself in Israel, and this exerted pressures on 
the control of manipulation of information. In particular, 
it became more difficult to exclude foreign news reports.
The 1970's saw the breakup of consensus politics in 
Israel, finally expressed in the political "earthquake" of 
1977, ending the long dominance of Mapai in favour of a 
right-wing, Likud (lit: Unity) government. It was a mark 
of the habitual restriction of information from government 
that the press itself made a significant contribution to 
the loss of the support for Mapai which occasioned the 
change. Goren (1979; 158-61) points out that it left the
press unduly dependent on official handouts and on political 
leaks which "...usually consisted of conflicting data which 
did little to inform the public about what was happening in 
real fact...". The press, sought information elsewhere, 
exposing financial scandals and. rifts within the Labour 
establishment which helped to discredit the government. 
Self-imposed press limitations were weakening, and Galnoor 
(1982; 24.9) comments that "...the relationship between the
Israeli mass media and the political system was becoming more 
and more similar to that in other western democracies", 
especially in accusations that the mass media undermine 
the system*s legitimacy.
The press was in fact beginning, though unevenly, to 
develop along Social Responsibility lines, in the recognition 
of positive obligations to provide interpretive depth and 
conflicting views for public information. (Siebert, Peterson, 
Schramm, 1976; 87-90). The mainstream press was strongly
critical of the Likud government which had no significant 
press of its own, and contained some notably illiberal 
elements. The long dominance of Labour fostered Likud 
accusations that the press and broadcast media were ”a 
leftist mafia” intent on bringing down the government.
There were attempts to carry press censorship well into the 
political field, and to update the restrictive 1933 Press 
Ordinance (Goren, 1979; 162) which had virtually fallen
into disuse since the 1953 Kol Ha*am case. This was 
dropped in face of unanimous press reaction, but public 
attacks on the media continued, from major Likud figures, 
including the Prime Minister (Begin), who was convinced of 
a media bias against him personally (reminiscent of Harold 
Wilson's relations with the media in Britain's1960.'sLabour 
governments). The Editor of Haaretz put his finger on the 
underlying cultural clash; the Israeli media were modern 
and •«stern: Begin was a vintage east European politician 
who regarded media criticism as unpatriotic (Newsweek, 19 
April 1982, p.50).
The trend away from forms of co-operation with govern­
ment was accentuated by the hostility and actions of the 
Likud governments of 1977-84 towards the press, in which 
the Minister of Defence, who controlled the military 
censorship, was involved as much as the Prime Minister. In 
the last stages of the evacuation of the Sinai peninsula in 
April 1982, involving civil disobedience which had to be put 
down by the army, media access was severely restricted, and 
the media were banned, in March 1982, from Druze villages 
whose inhabitants went on extended strike against acceptance 
of Israeli identity cards following the extension of Israeli 
law to the occupied Golan Heights. The Journalists' Associa­
tion of Israel, meeting on 13 September 1982, strongly 
criticised the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence 
for attempting to curb free speech. The Israeli Invasion 
of Lebanon in June 1982 and the deep national controversy
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over its objectives sharpened the conflict, with the press 
emerging as the essential supplier to the public of 
information which the government would have suppressed, 
and as a powerful voice of criticism. The press played 
the major part in exposing the Beirut massacres by 
Christian Phalangists in September 1982, and led public 
opinion against government attempts to paper over the 
situation (Schiff and -^'ari, 198il; Chap. xiii).
The movement of the press into a generally oppositional 
position reflects also both the low public esteem of the 
Knesset and its ineffectiveness as an instrument for holding 
the government to account. The growing demand for more 
public information comes, however, more from press pressures 
in specific, controversial circumstances than from any 
general expression of desire for more public countervailing 
power. Nevertheless, government has become more open, and 
its exposure through appointed committees of inquiry more 
frequent and revealing. The Agranat Committee on the Yom 
Kippur War mismanagements of 1973 sat in camera and the 
government published only parts of its findings. By 
contrast, the Kahan Commiæion, on the Beirut massacres, 
sat mainly in public and almost all of its report was 
published and reproduced in the press. It was a new 
experience for Israelis to find not only the most senior 
ministers, including the Prime Minister, but also the Army - 
almost a sacrosant institution - publicly criticised before 
the world in an official report. It marks an enhanced 
political maturity, and a realisation that the public cannot 
be insulated from important news by official deprivation 
(especially when they can pick up foreign television 
broadcasts). Moreover Israel has come a focal news source
for the foreign press since 1967.
It has become increasingly difficult for government 
simply to attempt to withhold or suppress information once 
the leaks begin to break surface and its hand begins to be 
forced by press publicity and comment. The growing element 
of Social Responsibility gives this a component of public 
instrumentality as well as sensationalism or party interest. 
Even the State Controller's Report of 198A on the bank sharœ 
of 1983, which left the country saddled with
enormous public debt,and widely involved individuals, would 
probably not have resulted in the appointment of a judicial 
commission of inquiry (the Bejski Commission) but for the 
pressure of the press on both Knesset and government.
The Bejski Commission*s public sessions and extended 
examination of major establishment figures in the commercial 
banking world, the Bank of Israel, officials of the Ministry 
of Finance, ministers and former ministers were extensively 
reported and analysed in the press. Its unsparing con­
demnations of individuals as well as system and its demands 
for resignations^ introduced concepts of personal and public 
accountability not previously recognised in Israel. It 
exposed the extent to which information of vital importance 
to the whole community, which ultimately had to bear the 
price, had been controlled or set aside by those in power 
(whose considerations had sometimes been less than 
objectively or ideologically based).
Even the long-privileged status of state security is 
no longer an automatic rebuff to unwelcome questions. The 
highly-controversial actions of the intensely secret "Shin 
Bet” internal security service in suborning witnesses at an 
official enquiryiwo years previously broke public surface 
in June 1986. They involve further questions of the 
accountability of political figures, and they quickly 
overwhelmed the military censorship attempts to stifle them. 
The outcome is a police enquiry, despite the efforts of 
politicians involved to smother the affair.
These are, however, exceptional occasions of outstanding 
public significance and news value. The press shows little 
or no sign of progressing from the particular scandal to the 
general demand for more openness and accountability in 
Israeli public life. No demands for freedom of information 
and access emerge from the media, or from the public, as a 
general question of a public right to know.
Tension between politicians and press remains never 
far below the surface. Though generally responsible the 
press has its sensationalist elements, professional 
standards in checking sources of information are sometimes 
less than adequate, and many journalists are themselves 
politically committed. Invasions of privacy, the prevalence
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of attempts to slur political figures and other breaches of 
professional behaviour, over which the Press Council appears 
to be able to exert little control, expose the press to 
intermittent fire from the political world. This went so 
far in late 1985 as the secret drafting of a bill to 
license journalists through a statutory Press Council. 
Following exposure in the Jerusalem Post, 30 Dec 1985» 
prompted by a liberally-minded Attorney-General (Yitzhak 
Zamir) the proposal went no further. Ironically, it was 
drafted at the instance of a minister (Moshe Shahal) who had 
been responsible for attempts to introduce a Freedom of 
Information bill. But the episode illustrates the continuing 
latent hostility from authoritarian elements across the 
political spectrum towards the media, supported by the high 
level of latent public anti-media sentiment.
Broadcasting in Israel
From 194.8 to 1965 broadcasting was confined to radio 
and directed by the Government Information Service, part of 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Broadcasting is everywhere 
subject to some government control and it was certainly not 
in the nature of the highly politicised Israeli establishment 
to regard this powerful means of communication as something 
independent of political requirements. Policies were kept 
in line with those of the ruling Labour Party (Frankel, 1980; 
138); issues were avoided and certain politicians were kept 
off the air (Mishal, 1978; 35-45). It was not unknown for
the Prime Minister’s aides to telephone with instructions how 
to handle a particular item (Kollek, 1978; 131). Inevitably
the service came to be staffed by journalists and executives 
acceptable to the ruling elite.
It was not indefinitely defensible in a state which 
professed democratic institutions for broadcasting to remain 
under direct government control. The Broadcasting Law of 
1965 set up the Broadcasting Authority (IBA) as an independert 
corporation, ostensibly on the lines of the British Broad­
casting Corporation; no serious thought appears to have been 
given to any other model. Amendments were subsequently made 
to cover television services (Broadcasting Authority Law 
No.4.51/1965 as amended by Law No.4.83/1968 - IBA, 1970, 
available in English translation).
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The introduction of television was long resisted, by 
the opposition, which feared an extension of government 
influence, by religious parties, by the Finance Ministry, 
who feared it would stimulate consumption. The formal 
detachment of broadcasting services from government did not 
overcome the resistance, though privately financed 
educational braodcasting began in 1966 (Ííeev, 1973). Those 
Israelis who could afford heavily taxed television sets 
received broadcasts from neighbouring Arab states.
It took the 1967 war to rouse the Israeli authorities 
to the need for a domestic television service, and then with 
the object not so much of informing Israelis as of countering 
programmes from Arab countries. A million Arabs lived in the 
newly-occupied territories. In 1968, when the government 
began seriously to organise an Israeli service)» it was 
estimated that all West Bank Arabs had access to television 
receivers, that the then 300,000 Israeli Arabs had 10,000 
sets, and that the almost ten times as numerous Jewish 
Israelis had 25,000 sets, receiving Arab programmes (Neev, 
1973). Few things so plainly indicate as the tardiness and 
motivations of these developments the fixity of the Yishuv 
inheritance in the early period of the state, that public 
communications were an instrument of political power rather 
than of public information.
The Chairman and Dep%ry Chairman of the governing 
thirty-one-member plenum of the Broadcasting Authority and 
the Director-General are appointed by government. The plenum 
though nominally composed of representative and cultural 
elements, soon came to be constituted in accordance with the 
ubiquitous party key. The strings are in the hands of the 
government of the day; and in order to prevent any in­
congruence between the direction of the IBA and the complexioi 
of the government, if that should change, ten members of the 
plenum may object to the responsible Minister (of Education 
and Culture) against any resolution passed against their will. 
This is far removed from the studied distancing of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation from the government.
However, in the context of the Israeli system the devices 
for maintaining congruence may be seen as a conflict-avoiding 
measure.
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Clause U of the Broadcasting Law lays upon the IBA the 
task of giving "...appropriate expression of different 
outlooks and opinions prevailing among the public", as 
well as supplying reliable information. The balance 
between government and opposition is considered by Elizur 
and Katz (1980) to have been "studiously reflected in the 
media", even through the long Labour reign from 19^^8-77.
But like every other Israeli institution the IBA is 
politicised in its upper reaches, and like their newspaper 
counterparts television journalists are often close to 
political parties. Smith (1976» 201) comments that "The
entire atmosphere of Israeli television is bedevilled by 
politicking". A number of changes in which obvious talent 
was reckoned to be second to political sympathies were 
part of a redress of balance after 1977 in the IBA, which, 
in the Likud's eyes, resembled the press in being filled 
with leftist sympathisers. 1985 was marked by acute tensions 
within the organisation and its governing bodies between a 
Likud-appointed Chairman, the plenum and the staff. Public 
bickering and political manoeuvring to circumvent the normal 
appointment rules over the appointment of a new director of 
television services continued throughout the year.
The conflict between professional and political 
considerations leads to a professional caution about news 
and programmes which could be construed to have political 
undertones, and an avoidance which tends to deaden news 
presentation of "eyebrow editoralising" or personal comment. 
Political sensitivities are acute. This is a milieu in 
which the Chairman of the IBA could object to a broadcast 
comment (harmless in itself, but containing the dangerous 
word "morale") attributing the rise in price of meat to a 
rise in the world market (confirmed next day from official 
sources) as "potentially critical of government and poli­
ticisation of the news" (Roeh, Katz, Cohen, Zelizer, 1980; 
168). Inevitably caution extends to any kind of experiment.
Attempts to steer a course between professional needs 
and political perils produce a somewhat tortuous discussion 
in Israel about the role and content of television broad­
casting. A limited experiment to broaden the basis of the 
late-night news is discussed for almost two hundred pages.
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with a good measure of linguistics and abstraction (Roeh,
Katz, Cohen, Zelizer, 1980). A study by Peleg of objectivity 
in Israeli television news concludes that Israeli television 
journalists have created a "paraideology” of news based on 
an "enlightened liberal approach and a professional orienta­
tion" which is in fact an origin of bias, creating a 
distortion in the coverage of reality". For this para- 
ideology" they should substitute a "paraobjactive", a term 
which, for Pele^ "...well expresses the intermediate 
situation in which there is no objectivity in the news, and 
yet the news is not subjective in the usual sense of 
intentional political slanting". What this appears to 
imply is need for current affairs programmes, "...broadening 
and diversifying both the news bulletins and background 
programmes". A further conclusion is the need for'feducation 
for critical consumption of the media" (Peleg, 1981; English 
abstract 26-28). Peleg's conclusions that television news 
constructs a product presented as reality but not quite true 
to it are not new; but his line of thought illustrates the 
preoccupation of some Israeli thinking on the subject, with 
a degree of intellectual paternalism.
The broadcast media are often the first with the news, 
and must often use the information coming from leaks which 
makes it intelligible; without the freedom of the press 
to comment they do this with a minimum of interpretation. 
Israelis, therefore, tend to draw their understanding of 
events from the less inhibited press. Radio is the dominant 
channel for news broadcasts, which are frequent, universally 
heard on buses and in public places, and rapidly diffused by 
interpersonal contact. Television competes almost entirely 
on the evening news broadcast (Mabat; lit; Look); 94-«5^  
of Israeli households have television, and Mabat is estimated 
to be watched by 97/f of them, covering approximately two 
million people, some 90% of the adult Jewish population. 
(Source: officials of IBA). The Arab population has an 
Arabic news service within its own IBA programme. Mabat 
is supplemented weekly by an extended bulletin (Second Look) 
and by an interview programme (Moked: lit: Focus) with a 
figure of major public note. But radio, rather than 
television, runs regular programmes on the press, the news
17A
behind the headlines, economic and current affairs.
The one television channel is divided between separate 
educational, Arab and Hebrew programmes, and subject to 
competition from cross-border programmes. It lacks time 
facilities and finance to develop, though a second 
(commercially financed) channel is under consideration. 
Television ranks behind personal influence and the press as 
the medium helping most with decisions (Survey results by 
Modi’in Ezrahi (lit: Citizen Information) quoted in Elizur 
and Katz, 1980; 196) Election campaigning on broadcast
media is severely restricted by law, and the press takes 
the leading part in defining election issues. Elizur and 
Katz also draw attention (1980; 209) ^^e difference
between the Israeli radio and television, "••«more platforms 
for party rhetoric..." during an election, and the lead taken 
in England and elsewhere in Europe in ’’...identifying the 
issues, explicating them, and forcing the parties to take 
a stand on each. The politicians do not trust the broad­
caster to do this job fairly or well...".
The political influences are in fact never far away, 
through pressures on the Chairman and members of the 
Authority, by restriction of funds to maintain dependence, 
public criticism by M.K.s and occasional calls in the 
Knesset by more inflammatory members of coalition or 
government to take over management of the organisation under 
emergency powers• For example a Deputy Speaker of the 
Knesset (Cohen-Avidov) presented a motion for the agenda on 
7 July 1982 pressing ’’...the urgent need to put a stop to 
the lies and calumnies on Israel Television". The period 
was that of the Lebanon war when, though television 
reporting was of high standard, Israelis did not see on 
their screens the full coverage of the bombing of Beirut 
which was influencing the rest of the world, and prominent 
figures too critical of the war were edged off screen. 
Government pressures are aided by the relatively low public 
standing of the media. During the same period a television 
unit gathering views on the war in a pro-Likud area of 
Jerusalem on 26 September 1982 was physically attacked. 
Violent anti-media attacks have occurred elsewhere 
(Jerusalem Post. 2 August 1985, P-18) attributed to right-
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wing mili'ba.n'bs >
Pressures show no sign of abating. A display of 
independence by the IBA in refusing to allow an emergency 
provision of the Broadcasting Law to be exploited by the 
National Unity Government in order to put over its economic 
policy directly on television brought threats from both 
Mapai and Likud sources to reshape the rules to allow the 
government to issue instructions rather than recommendations 
to the IBA (Jerusalem Post, 8 July 1985» p.l). The 
Histadrut, the main party to economic negotiations with 
the government, subsquently stopped by strike action a 
Prime Ministerial broadcast (arranged instead within the 
scope of a routine programme); television journalists had 
complained that they were being made government puppets.
In October 1985 the Minister of Education (nominally 
responsible for the IBA) used his powers to ban an early- 
morning broadcast of a football match relayed from 
Australia, on the grounds that it would encourage 
schoolchildren to play truant, and that he thought it a 
poor use of limited funds. There was no IBA reaction to 
this ministerial intrusion into its management. (Direct 
pressure a few months previously by the Home Secretary in 
the United Kingdom which caused the BBC to ban a television 
showing of a film involving IRA terrorists in Northern 
Ireland had sparked off a protest from television journali^ 
which blacked out BBC services for a day).
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: SOME COMPARISONS
The differences between the United Kingdom and Israel 
are so great in terms of history, development, size, 
resources and populations that there is little point in 
making comparisons of government and public information for 
their own sake, even if there were any means of comparative 
evaluation against different social and political environ­
ments. But comparisons have some common ground in relation 
to two competitive political systems, of markedly different 
characteristics, but to be clearly distinguished from 
non-competitive systems. The object of such comparison 
is not to attempt to form value-judgements about government 
and public information, but to relate the characteristics 
in each case to their bearing on the concepts of the 
information cycle, response and steering within the 
political system.
Political Features and a Basic Israeli Constraint
some features of the two systems which have a 
constant bearing on the comparison must be noted. We have 
taken Israel to represent, at least until 1977, a multi­
party system with a dominant but never majority party and 
ideology, firmly established in its founding history, leading 
complex coalitions. The system is now moving towards 
broader but more competitive political polarisation, in 
which the dominant consensus has been significantly eroded. 
The central features of United Kingdom government have been 
exhaustively analysed over the years, from Bagehot onwards. 
Beloff and Peele (1980; 1-8) identify some changes which
have been taking place. Since 19U5 two major, centrally- 
oriented parties. Labour and Conservative, have alternated 
in governments which, though in an electoral minority, have
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commaided aparliamentary majority, save for a short-lived 
exception in 1974^  (Beloff and Peele, 1980; 14-1) • The
growth of a third, centrist force, an alliance of Social 
Democrats and Liberals is introducing fluidity. Both the 
United Kingdom and Israel have been passing through a period 
of social and political change likely to bring stresses to 
bear on the established political systems. The communication 
channels between government and public,.and the content which 
they convey, must be significant variables in adaptation and 
change.
The comparison must begin by noting a fundamental 
difference in public information about government in the 
widest sense. Con'Ironted so far with an effective choice 
between two parties, the British public knows very largely 
what the policies of the incumbent government will be on 
most issues, discounting the rhetoric of electioneering.
The coalition bargaining of Israel's complex governments 
places a primary constraint on this information. The 
declared party programmes will be compromised beyond the 
usual differences between promise and performance by 
elaborate, and sometimes secret coalition terms. There is 
a constraint of information about policies and programmes 
at the formative stages of the ruling coalition. A basic 
information link of electoral choice is compromised, and 
with it an element of accountability in the public mind.
As political systems the United Kingdom and Israel 
have an institutional similarity, in competing parties, 
free elective processes, representative assemblies, cabinet 
government ultimately dependent on parliamentary confidence, 
extensive bureaucracies and autonomous media. They have 
quite different representational patterns, deriving from 
their electoral systems. Full proportional representation 
in Israel produces an accurate diversity of party in the 
Knesset, but lacks direct constituency. The British
^^•An outstanding example occurred in 1977, when ,cratic movement for Change, whose election platform included 
electoral reform towards a constituency system, split in 
coalition negotiations. That half which Joined 
government effectively abandoned pursuitreforms which the partv had strongly advocated (Torgovnik, 
in Arian, 1980; 87-96).
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majority, territorial constituency leaves minority parties 
under-represented in Parliament, but maintains direct 
linkage between M.P.s and specific publics. M.P.s also 
require some minimum personal qualities, beyond party 
affiliation and sponsorship, even if many of them are no 
less party nominees or nominees of particular interests 
(e.g. trades unions). Though the modern United Kingdom 
Parliament is built around party, it was not until as 
recently as 1969 that a candidate's party allegiance was 
allowed to appear on the ballot paper.
British governments and parties have not been intensely 
ideological; an excess of ideology risks a diminution of 
electoral base which may eliminate rather-ithan merely reduce 
their representation. The Israeli system tends to encourage 
ideological factionalism, because it is not difficult for 
a small faction to pick up over the country-wide constituency 
the one per cent of votes cast which will gain a seat in the 
Knesset.
Government Information Potential
The bureaucracy is the main instrument in formation of 
government information potential. The characteristics of 
the Israeli bureaucracy have been discussed in Chapter Nine 
above. Beloff and Peele (1980; 220-37) emphasise the long
history and growfri of a central bureaucracy in the United 
Kingdom based on merit, closely cohesive and centrally 
controlled. Traditionally aloof from politics, even if 
class-oriented at higher levels by social and educational 
origins, and effectively free from patronage appointment, 
it has only since the late 1960's begun to accept party- 
nominated political advisers within departments. An 
administrative elite is able to develop a high quality 
of information intake and processing in the government's 
potential. A generally greater respect for government, 
effective enforcement, and less reason for evasion make 
this information base more reliable than the corresponding 
Israeli base, while the generally higher standards of 
administrative co-ordination must be presumed to produce 
greater added values. Insulation from close political 
interference in administrative tasks must also produce
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more complete and impartial conversion processes. It also 
facilitates sytemlc manipulation in order to further 
bureaucratic policies and frustrate ministerial intentions 
(Beloff and Peele, 1980; 231-32). As a basic tool of
government and a source of public information the United 
Kingdom information potential is superior to the Israeli 
in scope and reliability. Administrative policies at any 
one time are under uniform political direction.
Government Controls Over Information
Both systems have blanket restrictions and classifica­
tion systems relating to national security. Michael (1982; 
36-59) discusses the persistent criticism of Section 2 of 
the Official Secrets Act, 1911 in the United Kingdom and its 
use to try and protect government from embarrassment rather 
than espionage. Embarrassment results from media disclosures, 
but in peacetime the United Kingdom has no specific media 
controls. Israel has the specific press licensing and 
censorship legislation inherited and continued from the 
Yishuv. The former is now rarely used, but the censorship, 
under military control, is in regular operation, in close 
co-operation with the media. In the involvements of Israeli 
politics and foreign relations it is by no means confined to 
military matters, and Goren (1979; Chap, xii) cites cases 
in which it has been evaded, defied or outflanked through 
foreign media. In her view, however, the censorship has 
not played a vital part in political life and press- 
government relations. The Ministerial Committee on Security, 
backed by penal legislation (Revision of Penal Law (State 
Security) - 1957; decree of June 1966) has been more 
concerned'with political aspects of secrecy. Generally, 
security retentions of information in Israel are more 
extensive than in the United Kingdom.
Both countries have privacy legislation under develop­
ment particularly in relation to the use of computerised 
records. But this kind of retention is peripheral to the 
wider questions of government and public information.
The main reservations of information and its power- 
content by government are made under cover of political 
and bureaucratic discretion. In both the United Kingdom 
and Israel the range of discretion to authorise disclosures
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is undefined, and the fact and extent of retention are 
unknown; there is no access to sources. This is the 
principal area of manipulation and suppression for 
government seeking to minimise the transfer of power-coitent 
and negative potential to the public.
The United Kingdom*s reputation for bureaucratic 
secretiveness has been slowly modified since the 1950’s 
by pressures for more open government. Michael (1982;
Chap, xi) details progress since the landmark decision 
of 1952 by the bureaucracy, under pressures, to publish 
inspectors' reports on which ministerial decisions are made 
in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Aided by 
the growth of vocal pressure groups, in a favourable 
climate of public opinion, the introduction of freedom of 
information legislation is now reckoned a matter of time. 
Important government papers on the subject have been 
published,though progress was halted for the time being 
by the Conservative governments of 1979 onwards.
No organised impulse or interest exists in Israel for 
more open government. The secondary institutions which 
surround government and deal with it often have as much 
interest as government itself in manipulation and suppression 
of information. The press, though it may comment on 
particular retentions, shows no deeper interest of 
principle, and no kind of public opinion is in evidence. 
The security background is inimical to more open government; 
Israelis accept government secretiveness as part of the 
system to which they are habituated. Discretionary reten­
tions of information by government are rarely exposed to 
public pressures. Official declassification procedures and
^^•Notably Reform of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 
1911 (Cmnd. 7285J; Open Government (Cand.752077a 
"green paper"; Disclosure of Official Information; ^
Report on Overseas Practioe (1979j»
^^•See Jerusalem Post, pp.3 and 8, 9 Dec 1985 on restrictive 
and unorganised declassifications, and the same source, PP»1 
and 8, 1 June 1985 for contravention of/Archives Law by the 
Histadrut.
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the Archives Law (1955 and 1981) are sometimes openly defied
by departments and institutions on which the central
disciplines of the British bureaucracy have never been 
27effective.
In both the United Kingdom and Israel public access 
to government information not otherwise communicated is at 
official discretion, and Israelis would not expect co­
operation from a government department in giving it to them 
without some special influence. Some basis does exist in 
the United Kingdom, under the terms of the Croham Directive 
of 1977» opening the way to disclosure of background papers 
within the bureaucracy (fact was to be separated from advice). 
Internal bureaucratic regulations and the Public Records 
Act provi(fe other channels (Michael, 1982; 216-17). These
official channels of access are not always enthusiastically 
regarded by the bureaucracy; but they exist.
Leaks of Government Information
Authorised leaks of information are regularly used in 
United Kingdom government for its purposes, but the machinery 
of government is coherent enough to control information.
The seriousness with which unauthorised leaks are still 
regarded in the United Kingdom illustrates their peripheral 
place in the transfer of government information to the 
British public. But whistle-blowing leaks arising from 
conflicts of interest or conscience and duty, have increased, 
to the embarrassment of government. The revelations in the 
Ponting case in early 1985, and Ponting»s subsequent 
published account, throw light on the deliberate manipula­
tion of information in order to retain power-content within 
government, at the highest levels of a government department 
where political and bureaucratic echelons are in close 
contact•
In Israel, as noted,ChaptBr Nine, the political system 
could hardly function without profuse leaking, authorised 
and unauthorised. This reflects the constitution of govern­
ment, its tendency to avoid controversial decision and the
.Terusalem Post leader, 6 May 1986,. p,8: 
the Facts?", on retention by Ministry of Health Chernobyl of radiatioA contamination in Israel following the Chernooy
disaster in Russia»
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disarticulation and political distribution of parts of the 
machinery of government to coalition partners. Leaks are 
thus a normal part of the transfer of government information, 
deliberate and from the most senior sources. They are a 
constantly larger and more important discharge from 
information potential than in the United Kingdom, and less 
within government control. Leaks tend to be politically 
slanted rather than administrative information, and are 
thus an uneven basis for public information evaluation.
The release of government information potential 
through departmental spokesmen isin both countries organised 
on the basis of communication to media in official state­
ments and briefings in which the systemic influences within 
government are brought to bear.
Information and Parliamentary Insititutions
Israel has, of course, no second chamber; but the 
essential business of the United Kingdom Parliament is 
carried on in the House of Commons, with which some valid 
comparisons may be made. Beloff and Peele (1980) and Norton 
(1985) between them give up-to-date accounts of the 
constitution and work of Parliament, and discuss changes 
which have taken place in the past decade.
British M.P.s have limited facilities and allowances, 
comparable with those of M.K.s rather than with, say, the 
remuneration and facilities of U.S.A. Congressmen and 
senators. Norton (1985; Appendix 2) gives details. Like 
M.K.s, M.P.s are able to carry on other activities; but 
their timè, for five days per week, is far more intensively 
committed to parliamentary and constituency responsibilites. 
Their territorial constituencies provide a direct input 
from the public of all (or no) political opinions. Most 
M.P.s maintain close constituency contacts, a source of 
Questions and of contacts on casework with officials and 
Ministers. Norton (1985; 73» 86-89) stresses the
commitment of M.P.s to the constituency casework, and its 
importance as a source of information and feedback. Some 
eight to ten per cent of constituents are estimated to 
contact their M.P.s at some time, often with grievances 
about government. British M.P.s have closer contacts 
through their constituencies with the general public on a
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non-political basis than their Israeli counterparts.
To inform themselves from parliamentary facilities 
M.P.s have at their disposal the very active and extensive 
Library of the House. Apart from the many individual 
demands made, it prepares as a matter of course series of 
research and background papers on current legislation and 
topics of broad public interest which provide M.P.s with 
a constant basic briefing. The House Magazine . a weekly 
periodical for discussion, produced with Parliamentary
approval, gives further background and discussion of 
parliamentary events to M.P.s and the interested public 
alike. Like the agenda documents of the Knesset, those of 
the House of Commons are complex and barely intelligible to 
the public. The daily agenda (known as the Vote) containing 
constantly updated detail and texts, is used within 
Parliament and by the media and interest groups, though it 
is also on public sale. A much simplified document, the 
Weekly Information Bulletin (specimen contents cover at 
Table 9) containing over twenty pages of agenda information 
for the past and coming week, with a complete background to 
business, is available to the public as a statement of the 
content and state of parliamentary business for which there 
is no parallel in the Israeli Knesset.
Legislative procedures are comparable, but they bring 
the complete matter of bills, after committee, under debate 
on the floor of the House. For major bills the whole House 
may constitute itself a committee. No M.P. is precluded 
at any stage from taking part in debate of a bill. Though 
legislation is determined usually on party lines, the level 
of information from internal sources which individual M.P.s 
are able to obtain and deploy is far higher than in the 
Knesset. _________
^®*0n a basis of a very extensive library collection and a 
staff of about 100 - at least twice as large 
as the Israeli staff - the Library services ^requests for information annually, and gives written replies 
to over 6,000 information requests from M.P.s An on-line 
computer service provides reference backing 172). Making all allowances between the House of Commons and the Knesset, the advantage of the former.in information 
resources and backing is formidable.
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HOUSE OF COMMONS
Compiled in the Public Information Office o f the House o f Commons Library
London Her Majesty’s Stationery Office £1.75 net
THIS BULLETIN INCLUDES INFORMATION ON THE WORK OF THE HOUSE IN THE PERIOD 
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Business of the House of Commons 31 January -  7 February 1986 
Forthcomir^ Business of the House of Commons 10 -  14 February 1986 
Legislation -  General Notes
Complete List of Public Bills introduced in both Houses In the 1985-86 Session
Progress on Bills during the period 31 January -  6 February 1986
Private Bills: Commons proceedings as at 6 February 1986
Drder Confirmation and Provisional Order Bills:
Commons proceedings as at 6 February 1986
Standing Committees
Membership, Proceedings, Public Meetings 
Select Committees
Membership, Public Meetings, Publications 
Northern Ireland Legislation: proceedings as at 6 February 1986 
European Communities Documents received since the last Bulletin 
White Papers and Green Papers received since the last Bulletin 
Ministerial Appointments 
Further Information
State of the Parties in the House of Commons as at 6 February 1986 
By-elections and New MPs since the General Election of June 1983 
Selective Index to the Weekly Information Bulletin
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The main differences in public information between the 
systems are, however, in the published outputs from United 
Kingdom Parliamentary committees, and from the House of 
Commons itself. No House of Commons committee has any 
executive power or role, and committees are not, therefore, 
involved in the day-to-day distractions and often random 
incidence of executive business which affects the proceedings 
and programmes of, say, the Knesset Finance Committee.
Since 1979 House of Commons ad hoc standing committees 
examine legislation, and select committees scrutinise 
departmental policy and administration. Committees are 
constituted on the political composition of the House; but 
this "party key" is much less complicated than in the 
Knesset. Select committees have established recognition 
of their power to summon government witnesses, bureaucrats 
and ministers, though the provision of some kinds of 
departmental information is still a matter of contention. 
During the 1979-83 Parliament the average attendance of 
members of select committees ranged from sixty-four to 
eighty-nine per cent (Norton, 1985* 63) - extremely high
by Israeli standards estimated at twenty per cent (p.l52 
above). Meetings are fully recorded, with verbatim evidence, 
and there is public access. All records and reports are 
published, though relatively few are debated. But they 
provide the House with a mass of information in recommenda­
tions, evidence, argument and submitted papers.
In addition, two series of papers are constituted for 
the specific attemtion of M.P.s - thus brouglt to public 
attention. House of Commons papers contain a wide range of 
"accountability" information, in reports and accounts 
required by statute. This type of information is far less 
identifiable and less accessible in Israel., Command Papers 
(White Papers), presented by ministers^ contain reviews of 
particular topics and situations and statements of government 
policy, often as preliminaries to debate. They are govern­
ment documents, but provide essential information, rehearse 
arguments, and put them on the record. They may follow 
"Green Papers", documents displaying problems and arguments, 
and seeking public and parliamentary views on which a White 
Paper may later be constructed. They are, and are meant to
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The main differences in public information between the 
systems are, however, in the published outputs from United 
Kingdom Parliamentary committees, and from the House of 
Commons itself. No House of Commons committee has any 
executive power or role, and committees are not, therefore, 
involved in the day-to-day distractions and often random 
incidence of executive business which affects the proceedings 
and programmes of, say, the Knesset Finance Committee.
Since 1979 House of Commons ad hoc standing committees 
examine legislation, and select committees scrutinise 
departmental policy and administration. Committees are 
constituted on the political composition of the House; but 
this ’party key” is much less complicated than in the 
Knesset. Select committees have established recognition 
of their power to summon government witnesses, bureaucrats 
and ministers, though the provision of some kinds of 
departmental information is still a matter of contention. 
During the 1979-83 Parliament the average attendance of 
members of select committees ranged from sixty-four to 
eighty-nine per cent (Norton, 1985; 63) - extremely high
by Israeli standards estimated at twenty per cent (p.l52 
above). Meetings are fully recorded, with verbatim evidence, 
and there is public access. All records and reports are 
published, though relatively few are debated. But they 
provide the House with a mass of information in recommenda­
tions, evidence, argument and submitted papers.
In addition, two series of papers are constituted for 
the specific attemtion of M.P.s - thus brouglt to public 
attention. House of Commons papers contain a wide range of 
"accountability” information, in reports and accounts 
required by statute. This type of information is far less 
identifiable and less accessible in Israel., Command Papers 
(White Papers), presented by ministers^contain reviews of 
particular topics and situations and statements of government 
policy, often as preliminaries to debate. They are govern­
ment documents, but provide essential information, rehearse 
arguments, and put them on the record. They may follow 
"Green Papers”, documents displaying problems and arguments, 
and seeking public and parliamentary views on which a White 
Paper may later be constructed. They are, and are meant to
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be agenda-setting; but they do provide an agenda, and in 
depth.
All information arising from proceedings of the 
House of Commons is published. In 1983» for example, it 
included 884. issues of committee proceedings and reports 
and 628 Command Papers, many formal, but others (about 200) 
widely informative, covering subjects as diverse and 
important as:
Democracy and Trade Unions (Cmnd.. 8778)
The Government's Expenditure Plans (Cmnd. 8789)
Public Transport in London (Cmnd. 9004.)
Financial Management in Government 
Departments (Cmnd. 9058)
Policy for Roads (Cmnd. 9059)
Streamlining the Cities (Cmnd. 9063)
(Source: H.M.S.O. Catalogues).
Hansard, the verbatim record of House of Commons 
debates and proceedings is on public sale every morning 
while Parliament is in session, covering the debates up to 
a fixed "cut-off time" the previous evening (the House often 
sits very late into the evening, and Hansard is printed 
overnight). A weekly consolidation is also published. Any 
corrections are made in the bound volumes, which may appear 
much later and are archival. The Knesset Stenographic 
Protocol is actually a faster production than Hansard - it 
is not printed - but it is not a published document, though 
its text has virtually the same degree of aoithenticity.
The British public very clearly has an overwhelmingly 
greater degree of information from parliament than the 
Israeli public and accessibility to it, and the degree of 
difference is to be explained by more than the differences 
in historical.development of two competitive political 
systems. Beloff, and Peele (1980; 121-22) note an out­
standing educa.tive function of the British Parliament, in 
which many procedures and much information "...have their 
ultimate justification in the extent to which they make 
available to the public information about the workings and 
quality of the British governmental process". The Knesset 
simply does not conceive of itself in such a role. It is
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in operation» however symbolic as a political institution» 
inward-looking» with a low regard for public information 
interests. There is no kind of parallel with the concern 
which the British Parliament has often made explicit since 
the mid-nineteenth century» that ÜB papers and reports 
should be available to the public.  ^ Its proceedings engulf» 
in committee» information of public interest and potential 
feedback value» whose absence must diminish the effect of 
the information cycle.
Published Discharges from Government Information Potential 
Publication of the authentic texts of compliance 
information is standard in both government systems. United 
Kingdom availability is more diversified in publication of 
the texts of each enactment and instrument of delegated 
legislation» with periodic composite volumes. The Israeli 
system (Like most European systems) relies on publication 
through an official gazette (Reshumot), with similar composite 
volumes. (In the United. Kingdom the official gazettes have 
a varied history as conveyors of **state intelligence**» but 
now carry a miscellaneous collection of minor official 
notices).
Secondary compliance information in. the United Kingdom 
comes from a more highly organised bureaucracy» is profuse 
and detailed» readily available in print from government 
offices. The comparable body of information in Israel is 
relatively undeveloped» confined to a few. departments. Close 
contact between public and bureaucracy» the latter’s degree 
of social involvement» the possibilities of particularism 
and the advice obtainable from secondary institutions» all 
contribute to a lesser degree of felt need for this type of 
information,. In both, countries the media are more likely 
to be interested in contested:.^ interpretations» administra­
tive mishaps and personal hardships than in the adequacy of'the
information as a. class. _____________  ■ — - -----------
^^•For example» resolutions of both Houses as early as 1835 
following report by a Select Committee «¿î \ ®sentiment was periodically repeated (e.g. H.C. 350» leoj.;.It is emphasised in the official circular on Crown Copyright 
(GEN 75/76» 12 August 1975). See also H.C. 509* 1976-77, on 
House of Commons Services» expressing concern ,tion about proceedings of Parliament should be fully available
to the public.
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A substantial output of political information in 
government documents is directly available to the United 
Kingdom public on sale, simultaneously with its availability 
to the media (parliamentary documents are normally given to 
the press in advance, but embargoed until they are presented 
to parliament and publicly available). This material can 
be studied by general as well as the special-interest public. 
The full and authentic texts are a check on, media reports 
and the basis of alternative views and public, debate. The 
range is determined departmentally, and consideration of it 
no doubt embraces those dimensions of power which lie in 
the ability not to raise undesired issues or to transfer 
power-content which can be withheld. But generally the 
diverse origins within government provide an extensive 
discharge from government information potential, and the 
range of information transferred maintains continuity and 
perspective in public information.
There is no real comparability of range and availability 
in the Israeli system, where a concept of systematic public 
information barely exists. Even documents whose importance 
demands public availability are often in media and 
"privileged circle" circulation long before they are 
available to the public. Meanwhile, the media and 
interested parties have had their say, and public perceptions 
have been formed. A notable example is the Bejski Report 
of 20 April 1986 on the bank shares scandal of 1983 (p« 17^ 
above). It would be publicly unacceptable in the United 
Kingdom that the report of this judicial inquiry, made 
available to the Knesset Finance Committee, the media and 
governmental and closely associated circles, should not be 
available to the general public at the same time. In late 
August, 1986 the report is still not publicly available, 
though determined individuals can obtain it from official 
sources. The media and the public accept this as normal.
Attitudes and Expectations
The Bejski report is a current example (there have 
been others) of both government and public attitudes to the 
publication of government information. Israeli official 
publishing has been aligned to the special needs of nation-
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building rather than to systematic public information, and 
lacks the dimension of government-originated material 
readily available and formative of attitudes and opinion on 
current issues. Agenda-setting by such means is not 
developed. Controversial reports particularly are often 
limited in circulation, if not retained within government. 
Their power-content is not always retained with them but 
finds its way to the public with distortions of passage.
The United Kingdom is habituated to a particularly full 
parliamentary information output, readily available, and to 
a well-articulated transfer of information from government 
as an output of a cohesive and co-ordinated system of 
departmental and ministerial discussion and conflict 
resolution. Government information is regarded as reliable 
and authoritative, and the many interest groups are close 
enough to affairs to recognise the systemic influence in its 
public presentation. A high level and quality of public 
information from government, built up over many years, is a 
public expectation.
The Israeli public is habituated to much lower levels 
of information, and virtually none from the Knesset, with a 
content of often dubious reliability, administratively and 
politically. But the public is also accustomed to a stream 
of leaks from political institutions and bureaucracy which 
must make up much of the difference, and often gives them a 
closer idea of what is actually happening in government than 
their more officially and blandly informed British counter­
parts. But it is also more confused and dubious.
Public expectations are also related to feedback 
channels. Public information can be used in the United 
Kingdom as a basis for the exercise of countervailing power 
through ready access to the centre. The Israeli citizen 
has less interest in acquiring countervailing power, because 
the channels through which it can be exercised are much less 
effective. A consequent remoteness from government has been 
noted by observers. The citizen*s efficacy (belief that 
access to the political system can be translated into action 
and influence) is described as "astonishingly low" and 
contrary to studies elsewhere (Galnoor, 1982; 330).
Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira (1977; 78) relate this to lack
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of party and electoral sensitivity. Arian (1971; 67)
refers to a lack of individual conviction about personal 
influence on policy. Israelis exhibit a high degree of 
political interest, as evidenced by election turnout 
(Galnoor, 1982; 330). But this interest is not carried
into participation, which Galnoor (1982; 362-65) describes
as responsive rather than committed, interested in personal 
rather than political objectives, filtered and muted through 
the established secondary institutions. Galnoor sees this 
as a stabilising mechanism, carefully controlling and tuning 
public interest to the preference of the political centre.
The result must be to help insulate the political centre 
from the public as well as vice versa. Significantly in a 
justification of Israel as a democracy, because its citizens 
can have an impact on the steering,he has qiaLifications about 
the free flow of information within the system.
The Public Linkages
The last stages in the outgoing cycle of information 
from government, in whatever variety and volume, are its 
conveyance to the public and the publiées perception of it.
In both Israel and the United Kingdom the media are the 
essential carriers of political information, while most 
administrative information is communicated through the 
bureaucratic machinery of government, attracting media 
attention if it has some special news value.
The United Kingdom has autonomous media not subject to 
the extent of formal restriction and less formal pressures 
applicable to the Israeli media, and not closely associated 
with government in voluntary restriction. Its press is 
commercially rather than party-aligned and based. But 
Curran and Seaton (1985; 119-121) comment on its movement
to a generally right-wing orientation, often out of sympathy 
with public feeling on important issues and tending to 
reinforce attachment to the status quo. During the same 
period Israeli newspapers were moving into more radical and 
oppositional positions, also at some odds with public opinion 
on sensitive national subjects. Leigh (1980; Chap.^L ) 
discusses the moribund system of D-Notices, a form of 
collusion between media and government on security informa­
tion. But this has never attained the close co-operation 
of the Israeli press with government through the Editors'
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Qoraraittee. Leigh also discusses other means of manipulating 
the British press, including the use of privacy legislation, 
and of the Lobby system for unattributable briefing of 
accredited parliamentary correspondents. This is used by 
government as a channel of authorised leaking which does 
not exist on a systematic basis in Israel, where Knesset 
correspondents have no recognised Lobby. But they have 
close personal contacts in the Knesset and parties, and 
their reports, if more personalised, have more diversity.
The United Kingdom broadcast media play a part in 
explaining, as well as presenting political information, as 
independent commentators, far beyond anything which would 
be permitted to Israeli broadcasters. This most powerful 
of all media for reaching the public is kept under restraint 
in Israel by political considerations. The lack of 
diversity in broadcasting on the single television channel 
has so far muted debate on such issues. The official 
sanctioning of cable television services in August 1986 is 
likely to extend only entertainment facilities which will 
not raise questions of news and views.
The United Kingdom and Israel exhibit marked contrasts 
in outputs of public information within competitive political 
systems. Government in the United Kingdom is more publicly 
accountable and thus distributes more public countervailing 
power with information, in terms of informed public capacity 
to intervene in the political process, through more sensitive 
feedback channels. This countervailing power tends to be 
enhanced by moves towards some measure of freedom of informa­
tion. Political stability has been maintained in a fairly 
even balance of two major parties, neither of them dominant 
or strongly ideological (though the tendency is towards more 
parties with stronger ideological elements).
The prolonged dominance of one party in Israel inhibited 
the development of government accountability, and thus of 
public information. Ideology remains a powerful force, but 
its tendency to extremes has been historically constrained by 
a now weakening consensus. In the developing realignment of 
political forces around the future character and security of 
the state public countervailing power is constrained by
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deficiencies of public information and feedback channels.
Under pressures of development and survival Israel has 
tended to maintain historic elements of information 
constraint, distributing power in the circulation of 
information mainly within an inner circle of institutions, 
rather than to the general public.
An Illustrative Comparison; Northern Ireland and the West 
Bank and Gaza
The extent to which such differences may affect conceits 
of response and steering, and possible effects on stability, 
are considered in the following chapter. But divisive 
issues are a potential source of instability, and public 
information about them is an important variable in govern­
ment and public attitudes. Differences of approach may be 
illustrated by a comparison of public information available 
in the United Kingdom about the situation in Northern Ireland, 
and in Israeli, about the West Bank and Gaza.
There is, of course, no exact comparison of the two 
political situations. Northern Ireland is an integral part 
of the United Kingdom. But there are similarities: religious 
emotions and political,sentiment are inseparable; terrorism 
and violence are central - indeed, much more severe in 
Northern Ireland; armed forces and police are heavily 
committed; there are incompatible communities; a neigh­
bouring state is involved; no solution has been found; 
the problem engages feelings and actions in the wider world* 
The ambient public information situation about the West 
Bank and Gaza has been noted in Chapter Ten, with the story 
of the Karp Report. Table 10 gives a selection of documents 
related to the political issues in Northern Ireland which 
have been published by the United Kingdom government over a 
decade. Few examples, could suggest more clearly the 
difference of approach in these two states to public 
information, after making all allowance for differences of 
territorial status and the settled existence for many years 
of a Northern Ireland administration producing regular 
information of all kinds.
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TABLE 10
NORTHERN IRELAND : A SELECTION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON
POLITICAL ISSUES
Year
1972
1975
Publication
Violence and Civil Disturbance In Northern 
Ireland In 1969.Report of Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Scarman) (Cmnd. 556)'.
The Future of Northern Ireland. A Paper for 
discussion •
Report of the Commission to Consider Legal 
Procedures to deal with Terrorist Activities in 
Northern Ireland (Diplock).
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals 
(Cmnd. 5259).
Prosecutions in Northern Ireland. A Study of 
Facts.
Northern Ireland Constitution (Cmnd.5675).
Discussion Papers:
1. Finance in the Economy
2. Constitutional Convention - Procedures
Report of the Law Enforcement Commission 
(Cmnd. 5627).
Discussion Paper. Government of Northem Ireland.
A Society Divided.
Report of a Committee to consider, in the context 
of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland (Gardiner) 
(Cmnd. 58i47).
Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights.
Annual Report for 1974^-75 (H.C.. 632, Session 
1975-76).
Courts in Northern Ireland. The Future Pattern.
Northern Ireland Convention (Cmnd. 6387).
Working Party for Northern Ireland .
The Government of Northern Ireland. A Working 
Paper for a Conference (Cmnd. 7763)*
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TABLE 10 (cont.)
Year Publication
1980 The Government of Northern Ireland. Proposals 
for Further Discussion (Cmnd. 7950K
1982 A Framework for Devolution (Cmnd. 854-1) •
1984 Review of the Operation of the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Baker) (Cmnd.9222)
Source: H.M.S.O. Catalogues.
Note: The list above is a selection of documents
specifically related to political developments, 
issued by the United Kingdom Government directly 
and through its Northern Ireland Office. Many 
other routine but informative administrative 
documents are published through the Northern 
Ireland Office and through the separate Northern 
Ireland departments. The normal devolved 
Northern Ireland Government has been suspended 
for long periods.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
INFORMATION, RESPONSE AND STEERING: 
A LIMITED RELATIONSHIP
The Information Cycle in a Communications Framework
The essence of general systems theory on the Easton 
model is the capacity of the political system for response 
to stress and subsequent self-regulation by conversion of 
inputs of demand into outputs, which maintain support and 
meet or appear to meet demand. If the system cannot continue 
to produce authoritative outputs, accepted by its members, 
its persistence will be endangered, A continuous cycle of 
information is integral to these processes. Within it, 
feedback information is crucial to response. The many 
variables within this model information cycle (in which there 
is no need, for theoretical purposes, to attach or examine 
values) may have major consequences for the operation of the 
system,
Models derived from theory are abstractions whose 
practical application can be evaluated only by testing the 
degree to which the concept of the information cycle and 
response survives the evaluation and interaction of the 
variables ■’n real-world contexts. Such an assessment is 
possibl*^ only by reference to real-world systems in which 
values are allocated - that is, oower is exercised - related 
to the theoretical model by means of some framework which 
imports common structural elements and a communications 
pattern within which the variables operate.
Meadow’s political communication model (Fig, 3)» based 
on Easton’s dynamic response model (Figs, 1 and 2), indicates 
these factors in a sufficiently broad framework for the 
purpose. It sets out a pattern of communication linkages 
through which the passage of information between government
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and public (Easton's authorities and members of the 
political system) may be followed. In following it, 
influences on changes of form and content associated with 
particular stages and linkages can be identified.
Though Meadow's model serves to link theory with 
operation, it is inevitably over-simplified in order to 
represent main communications mechanisms, and cannot 
indicate the full complexity and interaction of the 
communications between government and public. Output and 
input channels are, of course, operatively facets of the 
same organisations. Government, groups and media are both 
effectors and receptors, but filtering and control are not 
exclusive to them; the functions occur also extensively 
within government, and to some extent within the public. 
Articulate participants and inarticulate spectators do not 
adequately represent the variability and topic-related 
fluidity of individual attitudes to information received or 
perceived. The lack of schematic representation of direct 
channels of communication between government and public is 
to be noted; it does not correspond with reality unless 
the absence of political significance is assumed. Parlia­
mentary outputs of major political significance (for which 
no origin is indicated) may be direct. Nevertheless, the 
exclusive interposition of media and groups between govern­
ment and public serves to emphasise the dominance of the 
channels and linkages through which many transfers of 
information from government to public are articulated.
The association of "information policy", with "press 
linkages" must be questioned as implying too positive a 
control of content and channel to apply to the diffused 
organisation through which government information is 
released for transfer to the public. These elements can be 
seen as contained within the systemic duality of government 
mediation in the framework of the hypotheses stated (p. 29 
above). Within this it is an expression of the degree to 
which government accepts or implements obligations to provide 
the public with information. As evident in examination of 
information transfer in Israel and the comparison with the 
United Kingdom, this is more a matter of attitudes to the 
transfer of power-content than of deliberate policy.
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Gatekeeping and agenda-setting cannot be attributed 
solely to media. They occur within government also, though 
much of the agenda of public affairs derives from events 
whose incidence is not under government control. Government 
has a power of initiation from its information potential, 
as well as of timing and content, and media have a comple­
mentary power (which often emphasises the government 
advantage) of revelation, disclosure, the recall of issues 
and the use of timing and emphasis to try to creatB effects. 
Government and the media may co-operate, in Israel through 
the Editors' Committee, in the United Kingdom through the 
D-Notice system, to keep information out of the public 
agenda.
Seymour-Ure points out also the ability of media to 
affect the climate of politics, as well as the public 
agenda at specific times; he quotes a revealing political 
comment about the concern of the British Cabinet "...with 
the agenda that the press and media are setting out as the 
crucial issues before the nation at any one time". 
Intensity, the relationship between a communication and 
other communications going on at the same time, and 
frequency of communications about a subject, are noted as 
other influences in defining what media audiences (the 
public) think about (Seymour-Ure, 197^; 36-37). This
does not, of course, necessarily define what they think.
It is now well-accepted that their opinions may already 
have been formed or obtained from others.
Primary Feedback; Constraint and Limitation
Ex hypothesi (p.29)» and as recognised by Downs and 
Apter (p. 12) there is inequality of information power- 
content in the political system in favour of government.
Its effect is to restrain countervailing power. There is 
thus a fundamental constraint on the congruence of 
government's information potential with the possible 
feedback from public information. Moreover, systemic 
mediation within government is aimed at determination of 
supportive feedback.
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Meadow's model does not distinguish feedback as such, 
and in actuality it seems doubtful whether feedback is 
clearly identifiable as a discrete phase of the information 
cycle. The antithesis inherent in the differing obectives 
of government and media within their working symbiosis 
(p. 68) must associate potential feedback so closely with 
initial outputs of information from government as to be 
almost inseparable from them. Journalists attempt to 
evaluate, criticise and penetrate government information at 
its point of presentation, in search of significance, 
implication and news values. The journalistic need for 
interpretive depth will have been foreseen before presenta­
tion and at government briefings (many government 
information staff are recruited for journalistic experience).
A degree of "anticipated feedback" from media may already 
have modified power-content released and retained, at the 
final stages of its transfer to the media, beyond the 
original intention.
Groups may also be in close enough relationship with 
governments to produce similar anticipation. This is 
particularly relevant to Israel where independent interest 
groups barely exist (pp. 105-06). But whatever their 
relations with government, groups are specially sensitive 
or receptive to particular kinds of government information, 
and media releases from government departments are often 
directed at specific groups.
Media, groups and government thus often collaborate 
consciously or unconsciously in primary feedback processes 
around the points at which government information is 
released for public distribution. Their selective biases 
may therefore be represented in what reaches the public as 
the "perceived policy outputs" of government.
The major feedback to government from information which 
it presents to the media for transfer to the public comes, 
of course, from the media themselves. It is systemic in their 
routines of publication or broadcast and in their organisa­
tional goals, which include comment and interpretation as 
simultaneous with and part of what now becomes public 
information through their instrumentality. The systemic 
urgencies of publication alone preclude testing public
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reaction except in the most random and immediate ways. 
Editorials and advocacy must reflect the goals, commercial 
as well as political, and possibly the ownership of the 
media themselves. These are involved, but relevant 
questions. Curran and Seaton have noted unrepresentative 
views of the British press (p*191 above). There are party/ 
press parallelisms in Israel, even if not rigorous.
Moreover, the content and form which media give to 
information from government is affected by news values.
Tables 1 and 3 suggest that routine releases from government 
are largely about routine matters. But items will be 
treated by media on the basis of their value as news rather 
than information. Information which government wishes to 
have a news impact on the public in political terms is 
communicated to the media through announcements and 
briefings at the centre of government rather than in 
departmental releases.
Chaffee (1975; 99-104.) discusses the constraints on
content which media exercise as parapolitical systems. 
Seymour-Ure (1974.» 36) notes the emphasis of the British
press on the "Westminster view" of British politics, and on 
parliamentary newa deriving from the overlapping of journalisn 
and politics, the accessibility of Parliament as a news 
source and its desire for publicity. There are differences 
in weighting of the factors in Israel, but they arrive at 
the same effects; the Israeli press tends to emphasise the 
"Knesset/Cabinet view" as news, surrounded by the leaking 
and speculation inherent in the political system and the 
lack of centrally co-ordinated information for the public.
At the media publication stage there are no other 
coherent feedbacks available to government. Ministers and 
senior bureaucrats immediately study media feedbacks for 
assessment of public reception of their information releases. 
They are absorbed into government's information potential, 
and thus possibly into the content and form of further 
releases. The systemic mediation of the information 
originally released, including any "anticipated feedback" 
content, may not always be discounted, introducing into the 
information potential an element of "self-fulfilling"
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distortion. Interaction of government information outputs 
and feedback thus takes place within a limited area of the 
information cycle, between politicians, bureaucrats and 
media staff all involved in or close to political life, who 
think mainly in political terms. The relationship between 
filtering, control and decision is much closer than Meadow's 
model (which is, of course, a statement of process rather 
than relationship) indicates.
Feedback from groups, which may also be parapolitical 
organisations in close contact with government, can be 
considered in similar terms.
Constraint in Public Feedback; A Discontinuity
So far feedback to government has been considered in 
terms of organisations rather than individuals. But public 
information, after all mediation, is finally received by the 
individual public. It is clear from the Israel/United 
Kingdom comparison that the public may receive much more 
information in some competitive political systems than in 
others. They also receive it in different forms, related 
to the characteristics of the system.
Chaffee (1975; 95) has suggested that the problems
of mediation in the minds of the public (of Meadow's 
"perceived policy outputs") are not those of the "support- 
oriented and authority-directed" Easton model, but relate 
to the diffusion and understanding of information among the 
members of the system (the public). Research has ideriified 
an array of constraints that operate within the individual 
members of the system to the absorption of political 
information from the media; cognisance of government 
decisional outputs is notoriously low and "Novel demands 
are expressed long before the audience becomes widely 
aware of them" (Chaffee, 1975; 100-01). Some conclusions
are consistent with Gandy's emphasis on government "subsidy" 
of news provision, which Chaffee notes as crowding out 
information which the public might find more enlightening 
but requires more effort than the press is willing to 
expend (Chaffee, 1975; 98). Further constraints are
identified in the media, considered as parapolitical 
systems, and in the political socialisation of the public.
201
whos6 view of information received from government depends 
on its relevance to their orientation towards the political 
system. In considering it they do not differentiate between 
opinions and information.
Political information is communicated to the public 
very largely through the media, and Chaffee cites 
researchers, including Klapper (i960) and Hyman and 
Sheatsley (194^ 7), for now widely accepted evidence that its 
diffusion is low. There is a paradoxical incompatability 
between media concentration on political news and the lack 
of public political involvement. The general picture is 
one of diffuse public support, and "Diffuse support and 
acquiescence simply don't lend themselves to the journalistic 
procedures our national media have developed...” (Chaffee,
1975; 99, 107).
Chaffee's arguments and the evidence he adduces 
suggest that feedback from public to government is secondary, 
behind events - i.e. decisions have been taken without it - 
and low in specific demand. Government cannot rest entirely, 
however, on the primary feedback of media and groups. The 
information potential must be supplemented by political 
calculations of the effects of ultimate secondary feedback 
from the public, especially on support. The uncertainties 
of diffusion on specific topics, as well as in general, make 
these difficult calculations. Seymour-Ure concludes that 
"The significance of media - induced effects...will depend 
on the virtually endless range of political questions in 
which an inquirer may be interested". In relation to 
elections media effects are wider and more complex than 
generally indicated by studies (Seymour-Ure, 1974; 63, 239),
and in competitive systems elections are the public judgement. 
Meadow's classification of the public who are not actually 
participant and articulate as inarticulate spectators does 
not negate the possibility that on topic-specific issues 
they may both become articulate and seek channels for 
expression.
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Response and Steering
The diffusion constraints in the minds of the public 
to which Chaffee draws attention identify a discontinuity 
between media and public at one extreme of the theoretical 
information cycle. A different type of discontinuity can 
be identified at the government extreme, in response and 
steering.
Neither response nor its translation into influence 
on steering are imperatives of systens theory, which simply 
accepts that failure to maintain support and meet demand 
may lead to breakdown and transformation. The system fails 
to adapt. Response can be seen as capacity for adaptation, 
and steering as the setting and maintenance of a course 
towards objectives which are the underlying information in 
the minds of those who control it. How far they allow it 
to be adapted by information which reaches them is a matter 
of political judgement. There is a selection process of 
subject and extent of change.
Steering is influenced at minimum by systemic 
deficiencies of government's information potential. It is 
also a function of continuity which governments inherit with 
commitments. Incoming United Kingdom governments of the 
1960‘s found themselves committed to rolling five-year 
financial programmes. Successive Israeli governments find 
themselves committed to external debt repayments and defence 
commitments which pre-empt some two-thirds of the annual 
budget. Government balances all sorts of other pragmatic 
pressures.
Judgements of steering adaptations are essentially 
intra-government decisions in which the outcome is a vector 
quantity, a resolution of influences of which input and 
feedback from media, groups and general public are only part, 
conditioned by the initial extent and mediation of output.
The characteristics of government and the body of retained 
power-content in information which has never been exposed to 
the modifying influence of public countervailing power are 
components of the decisional influences. Though in the 
widest terms thiss all comes within the scope of "information'* 
within government, it suggests a discontinuity in the 
concept of input, output and feedback as a continuous and
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complete cycle of self-regulation wUhin ihe political system. 
Information, response and steering have a limited relation­
ship. In the end, the predominant influence is that of 
government and its power to make decisions
An Alternative Framework
A framework of consideration which admits power in 
relation to information and change may be more closely 
applicable than the cyclical concept to real-world political 
systems. The mechanisms of adaptation and change can be 
expressed by reference to two limits which underlie transfers 
of information and power-content, rather than in terms of 
direct causation by information itself. The first is the 
level of ideological "will" in government (pp. A3~AA)» 
bureaucratic and political, determining the degree to which 
it is prepared to take decisions in which information is 
secondary to conviction. The second is the habituation 
level of the public, or the extent to which it will passively 
accept government decisional outputs as authoritative.
Beyond that limit stability and persistence of the political 
system are liable to be endangered. The communications 
between government and public are vital to the interactions 
of these two variables.
A lowering of the public habituation level would 
indicate a closer public concern about government decisions, 
calling for more accountability information, channels 
adequate to carry less acquiescent feedback to the points 
of decision and greater expectation that it would be taken 
into account. This implies a heightening of public 
participation. A higher level of ideological will in 
government would indicate a propensity to dogmatic decision, 
which government would tend to shelter from criticism by 
intensifying constraint of information, and thus of public 
countervailing power and of political competition. The 
higher the public habituation level, the greater^^Ee^owe?- 
content. A low public habituation level would suggest a 
substantial distribution of information power-content, 
reflected in public countervailing power. It is suggested 
that such a framework would take account of the realities 
and balances of power which infuse the distribution of
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information from government. It would also throw into 
relief the adequacy of communication channels.
It would be possible for example, to view the Israeli 
and the United Kingdom political systems within this 
framework. Up to 1977 competition in Israel was limited 
by the dominance of one party in a context of consensus.
The public habituation level was very high. Government 
ideology was strong. Though the pragmatic pressures and 
the necessity for coalition kept it from extremes, many 
decisions were influenced by ideology rather than informa­
tion. Circumstances and the paucity of accountability 
information, which competitive pressures were inadequate to 
improve, could be used to exploit public habituation and 
give government an unusually free hand. From 1973 onwards, 
as consensus declined, the level of public habituation was 
dropping, driven down by media revelations of incompetence 
and scandal in government. Public countervailing power 
grew on these in the absence of feedback channels adequate 
to elicit response and change from government against its
until support was eroded. This could have resulted 
in instability and transformation of the system, but its 
structure was strong enough to absorb the shock. The peace­
ful transfer of power in 1977 is considered to have been 
a watershed of the system’s capacity to persist.
From 1977 to 1984- the level of Likud government 
ideological will was high, but the falling level of public 
habituation did not succeed in extracting more accountability 
from government. The movement of the press into opposition 
was an indicator of lower habituation. Government’s 
steering decisions, particularly in the economy, on the West 
Bank and in the Lebanon war of 1982, were screened by 
constraints of information. Disarticulated public 
communications failed to convey a strength of public feedback 
which might have modified ideological fixation, until the 
essential messages from the public had to find means outside 
the normal channels to force themselves on government - 
overt discontent in the Army with the dubious objectives of 
the Lebanon campaign of 1982 and unprecedented public 
demonstration against its outcome. The tendency was again 
towards instability, fed by an inflationary crisis^ but
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temporarily resolved in 198ii by electoral deadlock and a 
national coalition within which ideological extremes are 
held in check.
By contrast, the public habituation level in the United 
Kingdom is lower, competition produces an adequate variety 
of accountability and other information, and ideology in 
government has not gone to extreme levels. Far more power- 
content than in Israel is distributed with information from 
government. In consequence government response and steering 
adjustment come under closer public scrutiny. Thus when an 
unusual degree of ideological dogmatism appeared in the 
Conservative governments of 1979 onwards over monetary 
policies, higher levels of public countervailing power 
expressed in loss of support, together with more effective 
group and direct communications between public and govern­
ment influenced a modification in the steering without 
potentially destabilising stress in the political system.
These are indicative examples which suggest applications 
to stability. High levels on both counts would suggest 
stability, perhaps extreme stability inhibiting change at 
an adequate pace to restrain the accumulation of un­
recognised pressures. A low level of public habituation 
and high level of ideological will may be seen as 
potentially destabilising. The relationship can be 
considerably explored. Analysis and comparison developed 
within a framework of this kind in relation to types of 
political systems or to real-world systems and particular 
events or situations within them could throw empirical light 
on aspects of systems theory. The implied continuity of the 
information cycle which underlies the Easton-type model, so 
far as it can be related to an operative framework, is open 
to doubt except in the most abstract sense.
Structural/functional and behavioural views of the 
political system discussed briefly in Chapter One provide 
an association of information with power and communication, 
Apter, in particular, postulates the inverse relationship 
between coercion and information around which comparative 
analysis on the basis of the content, form and communication
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of government and public information might usefully be 
developed. But the theoretical systens are concerned with 
the formulation of a complete theory in terms which it is 
difficult to apply to real-world political systems.
Within the operation of the information cycle 
constraints appear at every stage. Constraint of 
information is a recognised phenomenon in competitive 
political systems under pressures of security and survival.
Its function is to restrain public countervailing power in 
the interests of firm and quidc decisions which require 
unusual freedom of action for government. There is a clear 
connection with stability and external pressures.
The relationships of information to adaptation and 
stability in normal circumstances are not so clear. But 
both government will and public habituation tend to adjust 
themselves to each other. A failure by either to adjust to 
distinct changes in the other must be an influence either 
towards less responsive stability, or towards an instability 
in which government or public attempt to force their will on 
each other, possibly by means outside the normal framework 
of interaction. Otherwise, instability may result from 
sudden and quite exceptional influences to which the system 
has developed no normal capacity to adapt, such as military 
disaster or economic collapse from internal or external 
causes.
The constraints to which Chaffee has drawn attention 
are in media information and its absorption by the public. 
There is a suggestion that it is irrelevant to the needs of 
politically active individuals. On the other hand, newspapers 
survive by providing information relevant to the activities 
of their audience. Research into the relevance of media 
information, in relation to audiences expressed in politically 
socialised categories, is suggested (Chaffee, 1975» 99-113).
This is an approach to the study of constraint in 
communication and reception. But the possibility of reducing 
constraint in government should not be overlooked. One 
movement towards this has come from the public itself, 
through pressure-groups, in demand for freedom of information, 
access and open government. An aspect which has not come
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sufficiently to attention is awareness by government itself 
of its communications with the public and the moves it has 
made in response, to which the selfrdescriptive term of 
"outreach” can be applied. These have been mentioned 
briefly above 4p «69-71). These questions merit further note 
here, not least because they are indicative of movements 
in the balances of government and public information. They 
also call into question the so far virtually unchallenged 
instrumental role of the media and the rapid technological 
developments in communication. Finally th^ focus attention 
on the role of public information particularly in the 
political system.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
INFLUENCES FOR CHANGE
Access and Outreach
The mere provision of information by government in a 
politically competitive system has an implicit dynamism, 
expressed through interest groups and media particularly as 
a demand for access to information beyond the government 
screens, at its least mediated or unmediated point. That 
demand has been intensified over the last two decades by 
the growth of access legislation and practice, in the form 
i*reedom of information and more open government in 
North America, countries of Western Europe and Australia.
The movement has been essentially political, from poliUcally 
conscious and participant groups, who '^...see access as a 
primary means of holding government publicly accountable 
for its policies and actions” (C.S.D., 1979; 49).
The effects include reduction of constraint. Govern­
ments which know that information is ultimately accessible 
are less inclined to conceal or unreasonably distort it. 
Transfer of power-content to the public increases as 
discretionary control of it by government is eroded, and 
public countervailing power is augmented. Government retains 
tactical advantage, because access procedures have limitations, 
take time and retentions are not always obvious. Bureau­
cratic difficulties and evasions slow progress. But the 
strategic advantage of government's information superiority 
is curtailed, modifying the information inequality. More 
complete and accurate information from government must also 
tend to enhance the quality of feedback. So far as feedback 
influences steering, it must make it more accountable to 
information and less able to be arbitrarily determined by 
the influence of unaccountable ideological will.
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In the attention given to access by right or 
concession, with its concentrated political interest as a 
form of power-struggle with dramatic political quality, 
other developments from government itself to provide more 
information to the public by direct means have attracted 
little notice. The term "outreach” has been used here to 
identify this type of government activity, barely recognised 
as a coherent phenomenon of communication between government 
and public, because of its variety of mostly unremarkable 
forms. It does not have the uniformity of concept and 
practice of the idea of access.
The bases of action in outreach organisation are 
found in the presumed alienation of the public from the 
increasing complexities of government; in a government 
duty to provide the public with "neutral" information 
backgrounds relating to government concerns and decisions - 
i.e. greater understanding of government; in government- 
perceived need for public information which the media do not 
carry; and in the similarly perceived inadequacy or 
unsuitablility, or both, of the media as channels for the 
information which they deliver as public information. These 
justifications do not necessarily, or usually, occur in 
combination, and outreach organisation to which they give 
rise differs in form and objectives. As a phenomenon of 
direct government information relations with the public, 
outreach has a relevance to the diffusion problems (p. 201) 
in which Chaffee has suggested fields for research.
A note on some forms of outreach and the parallel 
development of access in some instances is appended.
Though the initiatives come from government, outreach 
provides a form of access - the phenomena can be seen as 
complementary - on a selective individual basis within the 
form of service offered, in contrast to traditional and 
indiscriminate discharges of mainly printed information in 
limited fields, often needing further mediation.
Nevertheless, any government penetration of public 
consciousness has significance as a form of political 
socialisation. And the most comprehensive and forceful forms 
of outreach to have appeared, in Canada and Australia, were 
overtly political in inspiration (Appendix, p.iv). Their
210
particularly distinctive feature was their positive hostility 
to the media, which they attacked as a barrier to communica­
tion, irrelevant or unsuitable to meet public needs for 
information from government. In both countries there were 
special problems of the identity of federal governments 
superimposed on largely self-governing sub-divisions. But 
the aim of the Canadian outreach experiment to reach the 
"unreached", who were claimed to be in process of alienation 
from remote and complex government raises some questions of 
functions of government and the role of the media as its 
principal channels of public communication.
Outreach and Media
The antithesis of government and media interests within 
the symbiosis which has developed may be seen as a modus 
Vivendi for differences ultimately irreconcilable within a 
competitive political society with autonomous media, possibly 
jeopardising the symbiosis itself. The Social Responsibility 
theory of the press developed by the U.S.A. Commission on 
Freedom of the Press (19/17), discussed in Siebert, Peterson, 
Schramm, 1976; 73-103» lays obligations on the press in
servicing the political system by, inter alia, providing 
information, discussion and debate on public affairs. To 
the extent that the press does not meet these obligations, 
it is proposed that some other agency - and in the end that 
must be government - should carry them out.
Hocking (194-7; 182-93)* puts forward the view that
"Government remains the residuary legatee of responsibility 
for an adequate press performance". In pursuit of this 
responsibility "It may enact legislation to forbid flagrant 
abuses of the press which "poison the wells of public 
opinion", for example, or it may enter the field of communi­
cation to supplement existing media". Though government 
"...should not aim at competing with, or eliminating 
privately-owned media". Terms of regulation which could 
cover such dangerously suggestive phrases as "poisoning the 
wells of public opinion" are impossible to define, let alone 
enforce, in a context of media goals, selection, headlining, 
positioning, eyebrow-editorialising, comment and tone of 
voice. Regulation on these terms must in the end be
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incompatible with the position of autonomous media in a 
competitive political system.
Nor can government itself be regulated. Even though 
the Commission recognised obligations on government not to 
manipulate the data on which public judgement is formed 
(Commission on Freedom of the Press, 19Uh 8), we have 
discussed above the degree of manipulation systemically 
rooted in it. For both press and government the Commission 
li^ksd rights and duties, but they could not be forced on 
the press without retrogression towards authoritarian ideas, 
in which government reserves the right in the end to say 
what public information should be.
The modus vivendi between media and government has been 
maintained by media self-regulation, often under some 
government pressure. But it does not always bridge the 
divergent interests^ and the antithetical tensions erupt from 
time to time in various forms. In Canada and Australia the 
tensions threatened the continuance of the symbiosis? 
circumstances made them particular^ acute. But accusations 
from government that the media misrepresent and distort 
information, or do not preserve a fair balance of opinion, 
are both widespread and commonplace. They can be seen in two 
typical forms: the well-known Agnew criticism of the U.S.A. 
press in the 1960*s as event-dominated, to which Chaffee 
(1975; 99-100) refers . in his discussion of the media as
parapolitical organisations; and, for example, the complaint 
of the Likud government on assuming.office in Israel in 1977, 
that the media were totally biased against it, and that it 
had no media channel to represent, its views.
These are complaints not without substance. Peterson's 
view of the Social Responsibility theory of the press as still 
emerging, but as containing an obligation to provide the 
public with accurate, objective and interpretive comment - 
"full access to the day's intelligence" (Siebert, Peterson, 
Schramm, 1976; 73-103) is in some conflict with the view of
media as parapolitical systems exercising constraints, or 
otherwise, in a specifically broadcast context, (Schlesinger, 
1978) presenting the public with their own images of presumed 
actuality. Media have an instrumental power which Galbraith 
(1985; 166-69) discounts as partly illusory, accepted as
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successfully persuasive when in fact only reinforcive of 
belief. Nevertheless, he notes that it combines ”..,in 
organisation and conditioning the great modern source and 
the great modern instrument of power".
The suggestion of alternative government action in 
communication is both compatible with competitive political 
systems and of more practical interest to explore as a 
possible contribution to public information. Siebert*s 
tentative conclusions (1948), in a passing consideration of 
the role of government in public communications were:
"Let the government keep its hands off 
information content, let it be efficient 
but cautious in regulating the market­
place, let it be unhampered in facilitating 
the work of existing media, and let use its 
own media when such use seems desirable......
The possibility that additional information 
and ideas may reach the public is great".
The use of government media (or government use of media) 
to convey information direct to the public in competition 
with autonomous media would be a radical development of 
outreach; but in principle it need be no more than extension 
of the direct channels which government already uses for 
types of information which do not interest the media.
Siebert^s thought is not unthinkable. It can be argued that 
an elective government in a competitive political system has 
the right to present its information to the public direct if 
it so wishes, particularly if the normal media channels of 
communication are clearly seen to be inadequate or flagrantly 
unrepresentative, and unable to regulate themselves.
Perversely oppositional media can be represented as infringing 
the right and the duty of government to govern, in which 
adequate provision of accurate information to the public is 
essential.
In competitive political systems (at least) government 
is regarded with suspicion as a source of information about 
its own actions and decisions, behind which are preoccupations 
of power. But this information is given to the media as the 
basis for their own transfers to the public, and they
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surround it with their own preoccupations. Government 
cannot claim a right to run newspapers - and newspapers 
limited to information from government alone would hardly 
command mass circulation. But if suitable channels are 
available it is difficult in principle to deny government 
a right to use them to convey to the public at least the 
information which it conveys to the press, including some 
of the background briefing.
Use of obvious, broadcast channels by government is 
widely restricted, by political jealousies and fear of 
propaganda, to "service” broadcasts and specifically 
political broadcasts under strictly defined conditions. But 
rapidly developing communications technology provides new 
sorts of opportunities. As a medium for news, print is now 
more confirmatory than original; but it can be created and 
displayed on the video-screen, and recorded and recalled at 
will. News services are already offered on teletext, and 
in the United Kingdom, for example, details of new government 
publications are publicised through the same means. It 
seems neither reasonable nor ultimately feasible for govern­
ment to be barred from methods of communication which can 
convey information direct to the public who may be interested 
to receive it. Outreach services use an established and 
simple communications technology, the telephone, but there 
is obvious potential in electronic channels, even for the 
secondary compliance information now distributed in the 
inflexible medium of print, with greater particularity for 
the individual and continuous updating.
Direct presentation of authentic texts would enable the 
pubUc to assess -the information presented in the media. But 
the Documentation Française has demonstrated now for many 
years that information backgrounds from government on 
political questions can be made available to the public, in 
parallel with the media, without either accusations of 
propaganda or usurpation of media functions. This form of 
outreach is capable of being developed beyond its present 
élitist audience, to supplement existing media in diffusion 
of government information intended for the public. It can 
draw on the superior information resources of the state.
2 U
The Documentation Française defined its position in relation 
to the public in 1973:
’The right of the citizen to information 
has as corollary the informative
responsibility of the State...... public
authorities resort to all available 
techniques of communication, and firstly
to publishing...... State publishing is
the documentation of the State put at the 
disposal of the citizen (Cr'emieux-Brilhac,
1973; 15, tr.).
The thought is not carried to its conclusion in terms of 
communication technology; publishing is not confined to 
print. The same source stresses the control of parliament, 
the normal financial and policy oversights, and also the 
control of the public, free to buy or not to buy, ”0n 
demand” services in any communication mode are not 
compulsory,
Siebert's idea may be one whose day has not yet 
arrived, but tensions between government and media may 
bring it nearer. So far, outreach experience suggests that 
whatever the public attitudes to media news, there is no 
demand for government to provide its own. The needs 
are more bureaucratic than political. The political maturity 
of the society would be fundamental to other extensions of 
outreach. They can be visualised in the United Kingdom or 
the U,S,A, They would not be feasible in a political 
environment such as Israel's where there is no central 
capacity for political agreement, nor adequate organisation 
of central information resource.
No other outreach developments have shown political 
involvement or potential. The most systematic forms of 
outreach, in the U,S,A,, reflect initiatives from government 
about alienation from the bureaucratic rather than political 
echelons of government, and earlier developments were well 
in advance of the sweeping access legislation of the mid- 
1960's and since. But the Federal Information Center 
Program, the most widespread outreach organisation, was
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roughly coriBmporaneous with access. The Consumer Information 
Program, instituted in 1970, has some linkage with what was, 
and remains a political concern in the U.S.A. about the 
position of consumers in relation to powerful manufacturers. 
But the material which the Program provides is not framed 
in any political terms. Smaller states, in Europe, have 
pursued minor forms of outreach, suited to their own 
administrative environments.
Any speculation about the possible effects of outreach 
on diffusion of political information from government 
encounters the constraints in the public’s minds. Mainly 
passive public orientations to government may simply imply 
that concern is misplaced, and that much government 
information in circulation, however it reaches the public, 
is in any case superfluous. The profusion of information 
from government in the United Kingdom, for example, may 
simply help to create a public myth about the distribution 
of power. If information is not absorbed its power-content 
is not distributed, and the public’s countervailing power 
is exercised for it by interest groups and media, whose 
power to influence government steering is not necessarily 
exercised on the public behalf.
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SOME CONCLUSIONS
A study of this kind cannot reach precise conclusions. 
But some broad conclusions which it suggests are summarised 
below:
1. Outputs of information from government are 
distributions of power to the extent to which their 
content provides a basis for public evaluation and 
criticism, augmenting public countervailing power 
which may limit government's freedom of action.
2. Government therefores tends systemically to 
constrain the content and form of information which 
it distributes from its information potential, 
within the terms of the hypotheses formulated, in 
order to restrain power transferred with it.
3. Information undergoes systemic mediation within 
government for internal use and decision in relation 
to bureaucratic goals and standards and the ideology 
of political echelons. Information for the public 
undergoes further government mediation, on the bases 
hypothesised.
U, Political information is transferred to the public 
mainly through media channels which apply further 
constraints related to their own systemic charac­
teristics and goals as parapolitical organisations. 
These may modify the power-content of the informa­
tion which government distributes. Mainly 
administrative Information transferred to the 
public through direct channels nevertheless often 
undergoes bureaucratic and other mediation, in issue 
or at the point of use.
5. Political competition requires information from 
government and is therefore a determinant of the 
extent of accountability and voluntary information
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outputs from government.
6. Competitive political systems can vary widely 
in volume and content of public information. The 
"dominant party" history of the Israeli political 
system accounts for much of the disparity evident 
in comparison with the United Kingdom. Historical 
influences and government and public attitudes are 
also relevant. But it is clear that competitive 
systems of different kinds can maintain adaptation 
and stability on very different information levels. 
Full political competition and relevant public 
information tend to limit excesses of government 
"will", through the countervailing public power to 
which they give rise, and thus contribute capacity for 
gradual adaptation related to information available. 
Limited competition and notable information constraint 
tend to produce disarticulations of adaptation, but 
not necessarily instability.
7. Examination of the operation of the theoretical 
information cycle in a political communications 
framework suggests that primary feedback to govern­
ment comes from media and groups. Its anticipation 
may modify government outputs at source. Public 
feedback is secondary, tends to follow decision and 
is inhibited by diffusion constraints associated 
with media and with public understanding of govern­
ment outputs. A discontinuity in the theoretical 
information cycle is apparent.
8. Further discontinuity may occur within government in 
relation to information which it retains and to the 
overriding of information by ideological will. There 
is a limited relationship of information, response 
and steering.
9. Mechanisms of adaptation and change may be more 
realistically expressed within a framework of 
public habituation and government will, rather than 
by reference to the continuous cycling of information 
through the system. No decisive relationship between
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information and stability is apparent, though there 
are clear connections.
10. The growth of forms of public access and of 
government outreach tends to limit government 
capacity for manipulation of information and thus 
to augment public countervailing power. Forms of 
outreach may also be seen as forms of access, but 
are concerned mainly with personal, administrative 
information.
11. The dominance of media as channels of mainly 
political communication is open to challenge within 
the terms of Social Responsibility theory, in a 
framework of competition rather than control.
Forms of outreach are capable of political 
development within that framework.
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APPEIMDIX
OUTREACH AND I T S  l / A RI E T I E S ;  A SUMMARY NOTE
D e l i b e r a t e  a c t i o n  by g o v e r n m e n t  on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  t o  
p r o v i d e  o r  i m p r o v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  by d i r e c t  means  
i s  i n c l u d e d  h e r e  a s  **outreach** * I n i t s  more p a s s i v e  f o r m s  
o u t r e a c h  s h a d e s  i n t o  mi no r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a c t i o n .  I n i t s  more 
a c t i v e  f o r m s  i t  o f f e r s  t h e  p u b l i c  new» i n f o r m a l  and p e r s o n a l  
f o r ms  o f  c o n t a c t  w i t h  g o v e r n me n t »  t h r o u g h  s p e c i a l  c o m mu n i c a ­
t i o n s  s y s t e m s .  Some r e l e v a n t  c omment s  on a c c e s s  t o  
g o v e r n me n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a r e  i n c l u d e d .
O u t r e a c h  and I t s  V a r i e t i e s
O u t r e a c h  i n  t h e  f o r m s  i n  w h i c h  i t  c an be i d e n t i f i e d  i s  
n o t  c o n g r u e n t  w i t h  a c c e s s  i n  a r e a s  o f  i n t e r e s t  o r  a s  any  
ans wer  t o  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  may s o m e t i m e s  be an 
a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  i n c o h e r e n t  demand i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  
whi c h m i g h t  u l t i m a t e l y  f i n d  p o l i t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n .  But  i t  i s  
l a r g e l y  an a p o l i t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and f u n c t i o n s  
o f  g o v e r n me n t  a s  g o v e r n m e n t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a p r o d u c t  o f  
p o l i t i c s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  v e r y  t e r m ’’ g o v e r n m e n t "  t e n d s  t o  h a v e  a 
p e j o r a t i v e  c o n n o t a t i o n .  O u t r e a c h  i s  n o t  n o r m a l l y  d e f i n a b l e  
i n t e r m s  o f  s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  o r  o b j e c t i v e s .  I t  
o p e n s  a c c e s s  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on a b a s i s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  s e l e c t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a " b l u n d e r b u s s "  d i s c h a r g e  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  m e d i a t i o n  o f  e x t r a - g o v e r n m e n t a l  t r a n s f e r  
c h a n n e l s .
Any g o v e r n m e n t  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c ,  h o w e v e r ,  ha s  
p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s .  Though n o t  a l w a y s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  f o r m s  o f  a c c e s s ,  o u t r e a c h  i s  s o me t i m e s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a 
v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e m,  i n s t i g a t e d  and c o n t r o l l e d  by g o v e r n m e n t ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  n o t  f r e e  f r om t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  power and
a u t h o r i t y  w h i c h  run t h r o u o h  a l l  )^ntlQT^ r, i.
 ^ g o v e r n me n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n
w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c .
An e a r l y  f o r m o f  o u t r e a c h  a p p e a r e d  in t h e  U . S . A .  i n  
1935 a s  a r e s u l t  o f  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  p r e s s u r e s  u h i o h  e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  t h e  f ^ e r a l  R e g i s t e r  a s  an o b l i g a t o r y  c h a n n e l  f o r  
a c c u r a t e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  o f  t h e  t h e n  r a p i d l y  
g r o u r n g  body o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l a u .  L a t e r  p r o v i s i o n s  ( 1 9 4 6 )  
e s t a b l i s h e d  ma n d a t o r y  p e r i o d s  f o r  p u b l i c  comment b e f o r e  
a d o p U o n  o f  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  p r o p o s a l s  -  a m e a s u r e  o f  p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The r a p i d  p o s t - 1 9 6 0  g r o u t h  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l .
ea and s a f e t y  and c o n s u me r  s a f e t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  m u l t i p l i e d  
t h e  r a n g e  and numbers  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  and i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  a b l e  
t o  i n t e r v e n e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  o r  l e g a l l y  in b u r e a u c r a t i c  p r o ­
c e s s e s  o p e n e d  t o  t hem i n t h e  F e d e r a i  R e o i s t e r . U s  O f f i c e  
a l s o  h a s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  c l a r i t y  o f  i a n g u a g e  u s e d ,  
a d e g u a t e  p r e a m b l e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  p u r p o s e  and  
c r i  i c a l  d a t e s  o f  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  I t  g o e s  f a r  b e y o n d  t h e  
c u r s o r y  m e n t i o n  o f  i t  i n  a B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l  s u r v e y  a s  e q u i ­
v a l e n t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ' s  G a z e t t e  ( C . S . D . .  1 9 7 9 ,  2 4 ) .
Wery e x t e n s i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t e n t  i s  t h e r e b y  d e l i v e r e d  
e h a n d s  o f  t h e  U . S . A .  p u b l i c ,  m a i n l y  t h r o u g h  I n t e r e s t  
9 o u p s .  b u t  n o t  u n u s e d  by I n d i v i d u a l s .  C h a f f e e  ( 1 9 7 5 ;  97)
comments on t h e  l i m i t e d  c o v e r a g e  g i v e n  by t h e  me di a  t o  t h e  
c o n v e r s i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n p u t s  i n t o  p r o p o s e d  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
e c a u s e  o f  t i m e  and s p a c e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w h i c h  me d i a  " g a t e -  
e e p e r s "  r e j e c t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  more i m m e d i a t e l y  n e w s w o r t h y  
ma e r i a l  -  a s o u r c e  -  i mp o s e d  c o n s t r a i n t  on p u b l i c  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  i n  t h e  medi a c h a n n e l s .  D i r e c t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  by g o v e r n ­
ment t h r o u g h  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e o i s t e r  c o u n t e r a c t s  t h i s  k i n d  o f  
c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h o u g h  w i t h o u t  t h e  medi a t r i m m i n g s  o f  c omme nt ,  
e O f f i c e  I S  a l s o  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an i n f o r m a t i o n  c o u n t e r -  
U i S . A .  G o v e r n me n t  Wanual  ■  an u n i m a g i n a t i v e  t i t l e  
or t h e  mos t  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  g u i d e  t p  g o v e r n me n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
i n f o r m a t i o n  s o u r c e s  t o  h a v e  e me r g e d f r o m a n y  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
e s i g n e d  a s  a p u b l i c  t p o l  f o r  p e n e t r a t i n g  t h e  U . S .  b u r e a u -  
c ^ c y  and t h e  i n f o r m a t i n n  a v a i l a b l e  f r o m i t . ^ ° T h e  e s s e n t i i
and r a i e v a n t " u g i s i u i o r ° ‘' " *  Federal Reoister system
Handbook, a g u i d ^ i f t h S  Document o T i f t i L  
Scleral  Register O f f i c e f  departments, avai lable  from the
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p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e g i s t e r  g r o u p  o f  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  t o  
keep t h e  p u b l i c  i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  and p r o p o s a l s  
o f  qov/ernment ,  i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  w i t h  g e n e r a l  U . S . A .  
c o n c e p t s  o f  c h e c k s  and b a l a n c e s  i n  gov/ernment .
The f a r - r e a c h i n g  U . S . A ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  on Fr ee dom o f  
I n f o r m a t i o n ,  a p e n e t r a t i v e  s e r i e s  o f  m e a s u r e s  f o r  p u b l i c  
a c c e s s ,  d a t e s  f r o m a s  l a t e  a s  1 9 6 6 ,  The i n v e s t i g a t i v e  t r a ­
d i t i o n s  o f  A m e r i c a n  j o u r n a l i s m  p l a y e d  a l a r g e  p a r t  i n t h e s e .  
They c o v e r  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u n d  and e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  shown them t o  
be a b u s e d  i n  some ways by l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  The mere  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f t e n  makes r e s o r t  t o  i t s  l e g a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  u n n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  m e d i a .  O u t r e a c h  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
f r o m g o v e r n m e n t  was f i r s t  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  and i t s  i m p o r t a n c e  
a s  a d i r e c t  c h a n n e l  f o r  p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  i m p l a n t e d  i n  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a c y  w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  p o w e r s  on t h e  p u b l i c  b e h a l f  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  o v e r s h a d o w e d  by t h e  more p o l i t i c a l l y  e x c i t i n g  
F r e e do m o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n .
The U . S . A .  was a l s o  t h e  f i r s t  i n t h e  f i e l d  w i t h  a f o r m  
o f  o u t r e a c h  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a l i g n e d  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  e x ­
p e r i e n c e d  by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p u b l i c  i n d e a l i n g  w i t h  g o v e r n ­
ment a g e n c i e s .  The F e d e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r s  were i n i ­
t i a t e d  by g o v e r n m e n t  i n 1966 t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c e s s ­
i b i l i t y  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  They work m a i n l y  by t o l l - f r e e  
t e l e p h o n e  ( a l m o s t  70^ o f  e n q u i r i e s  ) , g u i d e  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e  
c o r r e c t  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c e  o r  s o u r c e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e i r  
p r o b l e m , a n d  m o n i t o r  a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  e n q u i r i e s  f o r  e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s .  The b e n e f i t s  a r e  r e c i p r o c a l  -  t h e  p u b l i c  r e c e i v e s  
q u i c k ,  p e r s o n a l  and v e r b a l  g u i d a n c e ,  m a i n l y  a t  t h e  end o f  a 
t e l e p h o n e  l i n e ;  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  a b l e  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  e n q u i r i e s  
t o  p r o d u c e  u s e f u l  f e e d b a c k  t o  i m p r o v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s e s  
S i n c e  i t s  f o u n d a t i o n  t h e  F e d e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r  P r o g r a m has 
o p e r a t e d  f r o m  t h e  F e d e r a l  b u i l d i n g s  t o  be f o u n d  i n  most  
A me r i c a n  c i t i e s .
T h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  U . S . A .  p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a c t i v i t i e s  e . g .  t h e  Cons u me r  I n f o r m a t i o n  P r o g r a m p r o v i d i n g  
a s p e c i a l  s e r i e s  o f  p u b l i c a t i o n s .  But  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e g i s t e r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  and t h e  F e d e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t e r s ,  b o t h  s e t  
op i n r e l a t i o n  t o  no p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o v e r s y  b u t  a s  
a w i d e l y  p e r c e i v e d  p u b l i c  n e e d ,  e p i t o m i s e  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  
o u t r e a c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  U . S . A .  They b r i n g
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i mpor t a nt -  gowe r nme nt  I n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h s  n o t i c e  and u s e  o f  t h e  
c o l l e c t i v e  and i n d i v i d u a l  p u b l i c ,  u h l c h  u o u l d  n o t  r e c e i v e  i t  
a t  a l l  or  in e a s i l y  u s a b l e  f o r m f r o m t h e  r e m o t e r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T h e s e  a r e  c o g n i t i v e  r a t h e r  t h a n  m o t i v a t i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o u t p u t s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h o u g h  t h e  i t e m s  o f  t h e  
p u b l i c  a g e n d a  I m p l i c i t  i n  much o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e n i s t p r  
n o t i c e s  may hawe some m o t i v / a t i n g  e f f e c t s .
We may c o n t r a s t  u i t h  t h i s  t h e  a m b i t i o u s  o u t r e a c h  
s e r v i c e s  s e t  up i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 ' s  i n C anada and A u s t r a l i a ,  o f  
w h i c h  t h e  C a n a d i a n  e x p e r i m e n t  was t h e  p r o t o t y p e .  C h e r n s  
( 1 9 8 0 )  h a s  e m p h a s i s e d  i t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c a l  
o r i g i n s  and i n v o l v e m e n t s  w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
t h e o r i s t s  a r o u n d  t h e  t h e me s  o f  " p a r t i c i p a t o r y  d e m o c r a c y "  
and " r e a c h i n g  t h e  u n r e a c h e d "  i n C a n a d i a n  s o c i e t y ,  o v e r  t h e  
h e a d s  o f  t h e  m e d i a .  The s p e e d y  c o l l a p s e  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  
C a n a d a ,  an i n f l a t e d  o u t r e a c h  a c t i v i t y ,  s e e n  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t r u m e n t  w i t h o u t  a p r o p e r  r o l e  i n  g o v e r n me n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
f o l l o w e d  f r om t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
o f  i t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and t h e  h o s t i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r e s s .  Bu t  
an E n q u i r y  S e r v i c e ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  e m p h a s i s  was on t o l l - f r e e  
t e l e p h o n e  c o n t a c t ,  f o u n d  a p u b l i c  n e e d ,  and r e m a i n e d ,  w i t h  
t h e  u n q u a l i f i e d  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  a C a n a d i a n  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  
whi c h c o n s i d e r e d  i t  t o  be " . . . a m o n g  t h e  most  v a l u a b l e  and  
p o t e n t i a l l y  mos t  s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  C a n a d a ' s  o p e r a ­
t i o n s ,  f r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t a c t  b e t w e e n  
C a n a d i a n s  and t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t " .  The C o m m i t t e e  p i n -  
p o i n t e d  t h e  a d v a n t a g e :
"To many p e o p l e  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  w r i t i n g  a 
l e t t e r  t o  o f f i c i a l d o m  i s  u n i n v i t i n g ,  and  
p r e s e n t i n g  o n e s e l f  t o  a b u r e a u c r a t  i n  o r d e r  
t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  even more i n t i m i ­
d a t i n g .  S e e k i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  by t e l e p h o n e  i s  
an anonymous p r o c e s s ,  i t  i s  f a s t e r ,  and i t  i s
t h o s e  whose s t a n d a r d s  
make w r i t t e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t "
on N a t i o n a l  F i n a n c e ,
C a n a d a  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a f e d e r a l  s t a t e ,  and t h e  C a n a d i a n  
P r o v i n c e s  p r o f i t e d  by t h e  e x a mp l e  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  C a n a d a ,  
m a i n l y  by s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  f o r  t h e  
medi a , r a t h e r  t h a n  c o m p e t i n g  w i t h  t hem,  b u t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by 
s e t t i n g  up or  e x t e n d i n g  t o l l - f r e e  t e l e p h o n e  e n q u i r y  f a c i l i t i e s
i v
u n t i l  by 1980 s i x  ma j or  P r o w i n c e s  o f  t h e  t e n  had t h e s e  i n  
o p e r a t i o n  and a n o t h e r  two had c e n t r a l i s e d  d e p a r t m e n t a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t s .  T h e r e  were p a r a l l e l  d e w e l o p m e n t s  i n  a c c e s s  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  i n wh i c h  t h e  P r o v / i n c e s  were g e n e r a l l y  a h e a d  o f  
t h e  f e d e r a l  g o we r n me n t ,  w h i c h  l e g i s l a t e d  on a c c e s s  t o  p e r s o n d  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n a Human R i g h t s  A c t  i n 1 9 7 8 ,  b u t  d i d  n o t  a d o p t  
f u l l  a c c e s s  me a s u r e s  u n t i l  1 9 8 1 ,
The f e e d b a c k  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  I n f o r m a t i o n  C a n a d a  had hoped  
t h a t  C a n a d i a n s  woul d e x p r e s s  t h e i r  wi ews t o  t h e  f e d e r a l  
go\/ernment d i d  n o t  m a t e r i a l i s e  i n  any s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r m .  The 
p o l i t i c a l  c h a n n e l s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  a b s o r b  t h e s e .  But  a d m i n i s -  
t r a t i w e  r a t h e r  t h a n  p o l i t i c a l  f e e d b a c k  c o u l d  be w a l u a b l e .  
C a n a d i a n  P r o v i n c e s  were a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  c e r t a i n  d e p a r t m e n t s  
and a c t i v i t i e s  w h i c h  c a u s e d  undue v o l u m e s  o f  e n q u i r i e s ,  and  
t o r emedy t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  d i s c l o s e d .  C o s t s  
per t e l e p h o n e  e n q u i r y  p r o v e d  s u r p r i s i n g l y  l o w .  O t h e r  a d m i n ­
i s t r a t i v e  i m p r o v e m e n t s ,  s u c h  a s  c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  i n f o r m a t i v e  
h a n d b o o k s  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  were a c t u a t e d  ( C h e r n s ,  198Q;  5 4 - 5 5 ) .
O u t r e a c h  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n A u s t r a l i a  f o l l o w e d  t h e  C a n a d i a n  
p a t t e r n ,  i n t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
t h e  M e d i a  i n  l a t e  1972,  an ’’ i n s t a n t  g o v e r n m e n t ” c r e a t i o n  o f  
t h e  F e d e r a l  L a b o u r  g o v e r n me n t  w h i c h  had j u s t  a s s u me d  o f f i c e  
a f t e r  a l o n g  e x c l u s i o n .  C h e r n s  ( 1 9 7 9 ;  3 6 - 4 4 )  g i v e s  an
a c c o u n t  o f  i t s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and d e v e l o p m e n t ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e d  
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t e l e p h o n e  e n q u i r y  s e r v i c e s .  T h e s e  d i s ­
a p p e a r e d  w i t h  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  i n  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  1 9 7 5 .  The c l i m a t e  o f  A u s t r a l i a n  p o l i t i c s  d i d  
n o t  l e t  any v e s t i g e  o f  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  M e d i a  r e m a i n .
But  a s  w i t h  t h e  C a n a d i a n  P r o v i n c e s ,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  S t a t e s  
d e v e l o p e d  e n q u i r y  s e r v i c e s  w h i l e  a v o i d i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n ­
t r o v e r s y  o f  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  g o v e r n me n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e r v i c e s .
The h i g h l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  A u s t r a l i a n  ur ba n p o p u l a t i o n s  and t h e  
h e a v y  i n f l o w  o f  i m m i g r a n t s  f r o m S o u t h e r n  E u r o p e  i n t o  M e l b o u r n e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  were c r e a t i n g  new t y p e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  n e e d s  -  
i n d e e d  some S t a t e s  were a h e a d  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  
p r o v i d i n g  t h e m.  By t h e  end o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 ’ s ,  o f  t h e  f i v e  
ma j or  S t a t e s  ( e x c l u d i n g  t h e  N o r t h e r n  T e r r i t o r i e s  and  
T a s m a n i a )  o n l y  Q u e e n s l a n d ,  w i t h  a n o t a b l y  r e a c t i o n a r y  g o v e r n ­
ment ,  was w i t h o u t  a c t i v e  t e l e p h o n e  e n q u i r y  s e r v i c e s .
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c o mb i n e d  u i t h  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  a c t i v / i t i e s .  V i c t o r i a  had 
d e v e l o p e d  an i n f o r m a t i o n  h a n d b o o k  f o r  i t s  i m m i g r a n t s  -  
Pli q r a n t s *  M e l b o u r n e  -  w h i c h  was a model  o f  i t s  k i n d ,  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  a Communi t y S e r v i c e s  C e n t r e .  A u s t r a l i a n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
l e n d  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  h i g h l y  l o c a l i s e d  d e v e l o p m e n t s  by S t a t e  
g o v e r n m e n t s .
The s t a t e s  o f  S o u t h  and S o u t h - e a s t e r n  E u r o p e  h a v e  p o o r l y  
d e v e l o p e d  and m o s t l y  f o r m a l l y  b u r e a u c r a t i c  f orns  o f  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  t r a n s f e r  b e t w e e n  g o v e r n m e n t  and p u b l i c ,  o u t s i d e  t h e  
r o u t i n e s  o f  c o n t a c t  b e t w e e n  g o v e r n m e n t  and m e d i a .  So f a r  a s  
t h e r e  a r e  o r g a n i s e d  g o v e r n m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  t h e y  
p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  n e e d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  p u b l i c ,  t h o u g h  
I t a l y  h a s  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  o u t p u t  o f  o f f i c i a l  p u b l i s h i n g ,  b a s e d  
on d a t a  f r o m p u b l i c  s o u r c e s ,  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  medi a and a 
v a r i e t y  o f  " c u l t u i a l ” and e d u c a t e d  p u b l i c s .  G e n e r a l  s t a n d a r d s  
o f  e d u c a t i o n  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  a r e  n o t  h i g h ,  and i n  I t a l y  p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  s t a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s  c o n f u s e d  by a m u l t i p l i c i t y  
o f  v i r t u a l l y  a u t o n o mo u s  g o v e r n m e n t  a u t h o r i t i e s .  A l b e r a n i ,  
i n J o h a n s s o n  ( e d .  1 9 8 4 ;  1 0 7 - 4 9 )  g i v e s  a b i b l i o g r a p h i c
a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  c o n f u s i o n  o f  o f f i c i a l  p u b l i s h i n g .  T h e r e  i s  
n e i t h e r  a c c e s s  n or  o u t r e a c h  l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  a c t i v i t y .  The 
o n e - p a r t y ,  S o v i e t - d o m i n a t e d  s t a t e s  o f  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  h a r d l y  
e n t e r  t h i s  k i n d  o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
I n We s t e r n  E u r o p e  v a r i e d  p a t t e r n s  o f  a c c e s s ,  and some 
o u t r e a c h  a c t i v i t i e s  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d .  C . S . D .  ( 1 9 7 9 )  and  
C h e r n s  ( 19 7 9 )  g i v e  d e t a i l s .  The S c a n d i n a v i a n  s t a t e s ,  w i t h  
s m a l l  p o p u l a t i o n s ,  s t r o n g  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and s y s t e m s  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  p r o v i d e  f o r  p r o l o n g e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
l e g i s l a t i o n  by c o n s e n s u s  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o n f l i c t ,  h a v e  a l l  
a d o p t e d  f o r ms  o f  a c c e s s  l e g i s l a t i o n  -  i n d e e d  S w e d e n ,  where  
a c c e s s  r i g h t s  h a v e  been e n t r e n c h e d  i n t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  s i n c e  
1766 i s  t h e  w o r l d * s  e x a m p l e ,  t h o u g h  De n ma r k ’ s and N o r w a y ' s  
l e g i s l a t i o n  d a t e s  o n l y  f r o m 1 9 7 0 .  The s e  s t a t e s  h a v e  f e l t  no 
need o f  o u t r e a c h  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h o u g h  t h e y  a l l  t o o k  s t e p s  i n  
t h e  1 9 7 0 ' s  t o  i mp r o v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  and c o v e r a g e  o f  t h e i r  
g o v e r n me n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  Communal  d i v i s i o n s  i n  
B e l g i u m  ha v e  i mpe de d t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  more t h a n  f o r m a l  
o f f i c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and t h e r e  i s  no demand 
f o r  a c c e s s  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  Nor h a v e  any s u c h  n e e d s  been f e l t
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i n t h e  h i g h l y  dewol wed c a r f ona l  gov/ernment o f  S w i t z e r l a n d .  
D e w e l o p me n t s  o f  any s i g n i f i c a n c e  havye been c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  
F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  o f  Ge r many ,  t h e  M e t h e r l a n d s , F r a n c e  and 
t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m,  and t a k e  no common f o r m s .  The E u r o p e a n  
C o m m u n i t i e s  and E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  hawe had no i m p a c t  i n  
t h e s e  d i r e c t i o n s .  E l  s e w h e r e , F i n i  and and A u s t r i a  hav/e a d o p t e d  
a c c e s s  l e g i s l a t i o n .
The F e d e r a l  German R e p u b l i c  h a s  a d o p t e d  v/ery l i m i t e d  
a c c e s s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  I t s  o f f i c i a l  p u b l i s h i n g  i s  p o o r l y  o r g a n ­
i s e d  f o r  p u b l i c  a c c e s s ,  and c o m p l i c a t e d  by t h e  f e d e r a l  c o n ­
s t i t u t i o n .  But  t h e  F e d e r a l  Gov/ernment ha s  an i m p o r t a n t  P r e s s  
and I n f o r m a t i o n  O f f i c e ,  and a P a r l i a m e n t a r y  I n f o r m a t i o n  C e n t r e  
ha s  been a c t i v / e  s i n c e  1 9 7 2 .  A F e d e r a l  C e n t r e  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  
E d u c a t i o n  pr ov/ i de s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  o u t p u t  t o  b r o a d c a s t  medi a  
and i n  p u b l i s h e d  m a t e r i a l ,  b ut  i n t e r ms  o f  c i v / i c  e d u c a t i o n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s p e c i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  gov/ernment ,  A f e a t u r e  
o f  f e d e r a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  i s  e x -  
t e ns i v / e  and l a r g e l y  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  f r e e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n ­
f o r m a t i o n  m a t e r i a l  a b o u t  gov/ernment a c t i v / i t y  and l e g i s l a t i o n .  
T h i s  a p p r o a c h e s  a h a p h a z a r d  and u n s p e c i f i c a l l y  t a r g e t e d  f o r m  
o f  o u t r e a c h  on gov/ernmenb c r i t e r i a  r a t h e r  t h a n  e x p r e s s e d  
p u b l i c  n e e d  o r  s e l e c t i v / i t y . The s y s t e m  ha s  been u n d e r  r e -  
v/iew.
I n t h e  M e t h e r l a n d s  a c c e s s  p r e s s u r e s  w h i c h  b e g a n  i n  t h e  
1 9 6 0 * s  " . . . a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p u b l i c ’ s 
w i s h  t o  g e t  a b e t t e r  g r i p  on t h e  o p a q u e  m a c h i n e r y  o f  gov/ern­
ment "  ( C . S . D . ,  1979 ;  39)  r e s u l t e d  i n  a c c e s s  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n
1 9 7 8 ,  e n c o u r a g i n g  r e l e a s e  o f  more i n f o r m a t i o n  by gov/ernment ,  
b ut  s t o p p i n g  s h o r t  o f  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  c o u r t s .  T h e r e  i s ,  
howev/er, a w e l l - d e v / e l o p e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m  i n gov/ernment ,  
m e e t i n g  i n d i v / i d u a l  r e q u e s t s ,  w h i c h  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  more 
p o s i t i v / e  f o r m s  o f  o u t r e a c h .
The U n i t e d  Ki ngdom h a s  made g e s t u r e s  t o w a r d s  a c c e s s  
l e g i s l a t i o n  and t h e  r e f o r m  o f  s e c t i o n s  o f  i t s  O f f i c i a l  
S e c r e t s  A c t  w h i c h  a s e r i e s  o f  c o n t e n t i o u s  p r o s e c u t i o n s  hav/e 
b r o u g h t  i n t o  t h e  l i m e l i g h t ,  and p u b l i c  ( and j u d i c i a l )  d i s -  
f a v/our .  F u r t h e r  p r o g r e s s  a w a i t s  a more s y m p a t h e t i c  gov/ern­
me n t ,  The h i s t o r y  and t h e  o f f i c i a l l y  a r g u e d  p r o s  and c o n s
V/ll
a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  s e t  o u t  i n a Gr e e n P a p e r  (Cmnd 7520)  wh i c h  i s  
an i n t e r e s t i n g  e x a mp l e  o t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of" our  b a s i c  h y p o ­
t h e s e s  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  v i e w .
L e i g h  ( i 9 6 0 )  and M i c h a e l  ( 1 9 8 2 )  g i v e  p o p u l a r i s e d  b u t  com­
p r e h e n s i v e  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  a m b i e n c e  o f  o f f i c i a l  s e c r e c y  and  
moves t o w a r d s  more open g o v e r n m e n t .
O u t r e a c h  s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Ki ng dom ar e n o n ­
g o v e r n m e n t a l  and m a i n l y  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  p u r e l y  
i n f o r m a t i v e ,  i n C i t i z e n s ’ A d v i c e  B u r e a u x  and s i m i l a r  o r g a n i ­
s a t i o n s ,  w i t h  some f u n d i n g  f r o m c e n t r a l  or  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  
A p a r t  f r o m t h e  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  d e p a r t m e n t a l  o f f i c e  n e t w o r k s  
a t  wh i c h  o f f i c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  c an be o b t a i n e d ,  o f t e n  in  
p r i n t e d  f o r m ,  t h e  U n i t e d  Ki ngdom g o v e r n m e n t  p r e f e r s  t o  work 
t h r o u g h  s u c h  s e r v i c e s .  O v e r t  and d i r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  c ommuni ­
c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  r a r e  e no ug h t o  be r e m a r k e d :  e . g ,  
i n r e c e n t  y e a r s  i n c u mb e n t  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  o r g a n i s e d  h o u s e -  
t o - h o u s e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p a m p h l e t s  s p e c i a l l y  c o m m i s s i o n e d  t o  
p r e s e n t  t h e  v a r i o u s  c a s e s  i n c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  r e f e r e n d a  on 
e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  Common M a r k e t  ( 1 9 7 5 )  and d e v o l u t i o n  o f  g o v e r n ­
ment p o we r s  t o  S c o t l a n d  and Wa l e s  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  Thes e q u e s t i o n s  
c u t  a c r o s s  nor ma l  p a r t y  l i n e s  and c o n f l i c t e d  w i t h  t h e  t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  d o c t r i n e s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  c a b i n e t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  t h e  
L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  c a b i n e t  was d e e p l y  d i v i d e d  on t h e  f i r s t ,  
bey ond t h e  no r ma l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  d i s s e n t i n g  
members ( B e l o f f  and P e e l e ,  1 9 8 0 ;  2 5 ) .  S u c h  o c c a s i o n s  a r e
r a r e  e no ug h t o  p r o v o k e  no o p p o s i t i o n  f r o m t h e  B r i t i s h  medi a  
t o  what  m i g h t  have been s e e n  a s  g o v e r n me n t  p r o p a g a n d a ,  and 
g o v e r n m e n t  t o o k  c a r e  t o  a v o i d  t h a t  a c c u s a t i o n .  B u t  a p a r t  
f r o m t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d  t h e  i n c i d e n t s  have  
an i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  S i e b e r t ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  
g o v e r n me n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  m e d i a .
In t h e  D o c u m e n t a t i o n  F r a n ç a i s e  F r a n c e  h a s  d e v e l o p e d  a 
u n i q u e  g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e  w i t h  o u t r e a c h  a s p e c t s ,  whos e  
o r i g i n s  r e a c h  back t o  1 9 4 2 .  What must  be t h e  most  i n t e l l e c ­
t u a l  s t a t e m e n t  a b o u t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  ever  t o  have come  
f r o m a g o v e r n m e n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  La D o c u m e n t a t i o n  e t  l ’ E d i t i o n  
d ’ é t a t  (1973) e x p r e s s e s  a p o s i t i v e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  g o v e r n me n t  
and p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n .  D e t a c h e d  f r o m t h e  p o l i t i c a l
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i n v / o l ue me nt s  and o r i g i n s  w h i c h  c o n f u s e d  I n f o r m a t i o n  Canada  
a g e n e r a t i o n  l a t e r ,  i t  l i n k s  t h e  power o f  c o m p u t e r i s e d  i n ­
f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g  i n  modern gov/ernment t o  what  we hav/e 
d e s c r i b e d  a s  gov/ernment ' s i n f o r m a t i o n  p o t e n t i a l  and t o  t h e  
p u b l i c  r i g h t  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  
t o  i n f o r m ,  t h e  n e e d  t o  i n h i b i t  i n f o r m a t i o n  monopl y  by t h e  
s t a t e  and t o  prev/ent  a b u s e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  power by t h o s e  i n  
a p o s i t i o n  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  s o u r c e s  and t o  " p r e f a b r i c a t e ” 
d e c i s i o n  ( i . e .  t o  m a n u f a c t u r e  c o n s e n t ) .  T h i s  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  
giv/en e x p r e s s i o n  i n  an o r g a n i s a t i o n  -  La D o c u m e n t a t i o n  
F r a n t ^ a i s e  -  s u p e r i m p o s e d  on t h e  n o r ma l  gov/ernment a p p a r a t u s  
o f  d e p a r t m e n t a l  p u b l i s h i n g  and i n f o r m a t i o n ,  w i t h  an o u t p u t  
o f  d o c u m e n t s  and s p e c i a l i s e d  l i b r a r y  f a c i l i t i e s  w h i c h  p r o ­
v i d e  t h e  i n f o r m e d  c i t i z e n  and " o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s ” w i t h  a 
c o m p l e t e  b a c k g r o u n d  on c u r r e n t  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  and e c o n o ­
mic p r o b l e m s .  I n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i t s  o u t p u t s  t h i s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
c a t e r s  f o r  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  and p o l i t i c a l  ' e l i t e ,  a t a c i t  
r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
e x p r e s s e d  i s  l a r g e l y  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  f a i r l y  n a r r o w r a n g e  
o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  a w a r e .  Bu t  t h e  e x p r e s s e d  a i ms  o f  o b ­
j e c t i v i t y  and i m p a r t i a l i t y ,  a s  a s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  r e ­
f l e c t i n g  n e i t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l  n o r  c o r p o r a t e  i n t e r e s t s ,  and 
n o t  an i n s t r u m e n t  o f  p r o p a g a n d a ,  ha v e  met w i t h  r e m a r k a b l e  
s u c c e s s .  The i m p a r t i a l i t y  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and i t s  o u t ­
p u t s  h a 3 i  n e v e r  been q u e s t i o n e d ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  i t s  f o r m a l  
p o s i t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  P r i me  M i n i s t è r e s  O f f i c e .  The p r i c e  i s  
an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  c u r i e r t  c o n t r o ­
v e r s i a l  t o p i c s .
A more p o p u l a r l y  b a s e d  f o r m o f  o u t r e a c h ,  c o m p a r a b l e  
w i t h  o t h e r  o u t r e a c h  p r o d u c t i o n s ,  comes f r o m a n o t h e r  o r g a n i ­
s a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  P r i me  M i n i s t e r ’ s O f f i c e  and d i r e c t e d  a t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  o u t s i d e  -  
t h e  S e r v i c e  d ' i n f o r m a t i o n  e t  de D i f f u s i o n .  I n 1978 i t  
p u b l i s h e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  D o c u m e n t a t i o n  F r a n ç a i s e  t h e  most  com­
p r e h e n s i v e  g u i d e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  on t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and 
p e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  t h e  s t a t e  t o  be f o u n d  i n E u r o p e  or  
e l s e w h e r e .  The s u c c e s s  o f  t h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  ( Lb G u i d e  de 
VOS D r o i t s  e t  D e m a r c h e s ) a s  a b e s t  s e l l e r  marks n o t  o n l y  
i t s  q u a l i t i e s  b u t  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  f e l t  p u b l i c  ne e d f o r  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n .
i x
Â
A p e c u l i a r i t y  i n  a d o p t i o n  o f  a c c e s s  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  
F r a n c e ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  a l l  e x p e r i e n c e  e l s e w h e r e ,  was i t s  
o r i g i n  i n  i n t e r n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  p r e s s u r e s ,  i n  a b u r e a u c r a c y  
n o t o r i o u s  f o r  i t s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and s e c r e c y .  The D o c u m e n t a ­
t i o n  F r a n ç a i s e  was i n t i m a t e l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h o u g h  a c c e s s  i s  m o n i t o r e d  by t h e  C o n s e i l  d ' E t a t  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o u r t s  ( L o i  l\l° 7 8 - 7 5 3 ,  17 J u l y  1 9 7 8 ,  c h a p . l ;  
D é c r e t  f\l° 7 8 - 1 1 3 6 ,  6 De c e mbe r  1 9 7 8 ) ,  A U n i t e d  Ki ng dom  
r e p o r t  r e m a r k s  w i t h  f a i n t  s u r p r i s e :
” • . . t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  been a 
s u s t a i n e d  c a m p a i g n  . . .  a g a i n s t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
s e c r e c y , , , , ............................. T h e r e  were p r e s s u r e s
f r o m  s e v e r a l  i n t e r e s t e d  g r o u p s  f o r  more 
o p e n n e s s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  b u t  t h e  a d o p t i o n  by  
t h e  M a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  o f  t h e  new l a w i n  
J u l y  1 9 7 8 ,  w i t h  a c h a p t e r  added on 
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  a c c e s s  came somewhat  
u n e x p e c t e d l y "  ( C . S . D . ,  1 9 7 9 ;  3 6 - 3 7 ) .
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